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ARTICLES
VICTIM WRONGS: THE CASE FOR A GENERAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE BASED ON WRONGFUL VICTIM
BEHAVIOR IN AN ERA OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS
Aya Gruber*
I. INTRODUCTION
The suggestion of a criminal defense based on victim liability, or the victim's
contribution to the crime, elicits shocked, horrified, even vitriolic responses.
Blaming the victim is nearly universally considered wrong and inconsistent with
criminal law theory and goals. The concept of victim blaming brings to mind
horror stories of defense attorneys brutally cross-examining rape victims about
their dress or past sexual habits, police officers ignoring battered women, or
society blaming the Central Park jogger for her imprudent dusk exercising.
Victim blaming conjures up images of political advertisement slogans criticizing
the official who allows criminals to sue victims for injuries the criminals sustain
during the commission of the crime. 1
In addition to general objections to victim blaming,2 many are particularly
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1. In the 2002 campaign for attorney general of Florida between Charlie Crist and Buddy Dyer,
the Crist campaign ran an outraged television advertisement claiming that Dyer wanted to allow
criminals to sue innocent victims. Joe Follick, Muddy Ads Run in Legal Job Race: Crist, Dyer Haven't
Played Nice in Battle for Office, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 1, 2002, at 4.
2. An explanation of the subject of this paper to one of my colleagues elicited the remark, "Why
do I have such a violent reaction to any rule that focuses on the behavior of victims?" Others have
made statements to the effect of, "That just seems wrong." George Fletcher argues that victim
blaming is a central problem of the modern criminal trial and supports an approach to criminal
punishment that embodies "solidarity with victims." GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME:
PROTECTING VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL 7 (1996). Fletcher advocates:
[A]n alternative way ... in the centuries-old debate between those who advocate deterrence
of future offenders and those who yearn for retribution by making the punishment fit past
crimes. Each of these traditional views has something to offer, but none adequately
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disturbed by the negative gender implications. Feminists spearheaded reform of
domestic violence and rape laws to recognize the illegitimacy of focusing on
victim precipitation. Reformists observed:
One of the most repugnant characteristics of contemporary rape cases
where the rapist is a person known to the victim.., is an unspoken
standard, enforced by legal arguments and believed by juries, of
something like "contributory negligence" as negating the rapist's
culpability. 3
I, myself, have argued elsewhere that the foremost error in the rape trial is
the jury's illegal importation of tort defenses like contributory negligence,
comparative negligence and assumption of risk, defenses based on victim
behavior. I objected principally to a criminal system that allowed juries to base
their acquittals not on whether consent existed, but rather on whether the
complainant "asked for it." 4
The examination of victim liability, however, is an undeniable part of
criminal law. It exists both in the doctrinal body of law, 5 though perhaps not
accounts for punishment in a time when deterrence seems not to work and the promise of
abstract retribution rings hollow. The imperative of punishing the guilty springs not from
our personal duties to high ideals but from our relationships with the humbled victims in our
midst.
Id. This view, that criminal law should focus on duties to victims, is a benchmark of the modern
victims' rights trend in criminal penology. To illustrate his point, Fletcher discusses several blaming-
the-victim "horror stories," with a populist twist. The victims are themselves members of
disempowered minority groups-homosexuals, African-Americans, Jewish people, and women.
However compelling their stories of victimization, the insertion of the populist twist is indeed ironic,
since a victims' rights penology will lead to more convictions and incarcerations, disadvantaging the
most marginalized segment of society: poor minorities. In addition, the narrative of victimhood itself
often embodies the very racist, paternalistic, mono-religious sentiments that Fletcher implicitly rejects.
See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the narrative of victimhood.
3. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward
Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American "Retreat Rule", 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303,330
n.161 (1992). See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44
ARIz. L. REV. 131, 194 (2002) ("[T]he notion of blaming the victim because of her conduct in
precipitating a sexual crime is particularly problematic in light of the history of similar abuses in rape
law."); Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family
Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 131
(1999-2000) ("A second dimension of the multiple victimization of women is societal blame - blaming
the domestic violence victim often occurs. Similar to a woman being blamed for being a rape victim
('she asked for it') and a woman being blamed for sexual harassment ('she invited it,' or, 'she went
along with it,'), the battered woman is frequently blamed for domestic violence because she stayed in
the battering relationship.").
4. Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in the
Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203,211 (1997):
This paper.., identifies the foremost legal error in the rape trial as the "widespread
bootlegging of the tort concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk into
the working law of rape." The importation of tort-type defenses into the criminal rape trial
is a legal flaw within the trial process that calls for a legal solution.
(quoting Terri Villa-McDowell, Privacy and the Rape Victim: The Inconsistent Treatment of Privacy
Interests in Two Recent Supreme Court Cases, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 293, 327 (1992)).
5. See infra Part II for a discussion of some existing victim liability doctrines.
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named as such, and in actual practice. 6 Justification defenses are the most
obvious examples of formal victim blaming doctrines in criminal law. The
doctrines of self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property base
justification of an intentional killing exclusively on the victim's behavior.7 Other
less obvious examples of victim liability in criminal law are the doctrines of
provocation and entrapment and the use of battered woman syndrome evidence
in self-defense cases. 8 The introduction of battered woman syndrome evidence,
for example, invites the jury to acquit the battered woman who kills precisely
because the decedent was a bad actor. Despite the deep-rooted nature of victim
blaming in criminal law, courts and theorists tend to avoid characterizing even
the above defenses as examining victim liability. Rather, they frame the
defenses as defendant mens rea issues, 9 adhering to the general principle that
criminal law does not apportion blame among parties to a criminal transaction.
6. This happens informally as decisions not to prosecute, offers of plea agreements, and jury
nullification, or more formally at sentencing. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K2.21 (2002) ("The court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the actual
seriousness of the offense based on conduct (1) underlying a charge dismissed as a part of a plea
agreement in the case, or underlying a potential charge not pursued in the case as part of a plea
agreement for any other reason; and (2) that did not enter into the determination of the applicable
guideline range."). See also infra Part IV.D discussing prosecutorial, juror, and judicial discretion.
7. Alternatively, the defenses are based on the defendant's perception of the victim's behavior.
Part IV.E will discuss the issue of reasonable mistake of fact as it relates to victim liability defenses.
8. Provocation is often framed as a defendant's mens rea issue. Reduction of deliberate killing to
manslaughter depends not so much on the victim's bad acts as on the defendant's mental state ("heat
of passion") that negates specific intent to kill. See, e.g., People v. Maher, 10 Mich. 212, 217 (1862)
(stating that killing is a manslaughter if "the act of killing, though intentional, be committed under the
influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by adequate or reasonable provocation"). Self-
defense cases have used battered women's syndrome to explain why a battered spouse feared
imminent bodily injury even though injury did not readily appear to be imminent. Alafair S. Burke,
Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman,
81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 242-43 (2002). This evidence may also explain why a battered woman might
reasonably fear imminent bodily injury from her husband even when he is not currently attacking her,
for example, when he is asleep. Id. Entrapment becomes a victim liability defense in cases where, for
example, agents pretend to be victims (fraud or sex crimes). Although the agents are not actually
victims, as far as the defendant knows-they are. Yet, unlike actual victims, government agents'
precipitate behavior is grounds for a possible entrapment defense.
I deliberately refrain from characterizing consent defenses (like in rape law) as victim liability
defenses because such defenses are less about the victim creating liability than about the role of free
will (contract) in criminal sanctions. The defense of consent, as in rape law, is not about the
complainant's saying "yes" justifying a rape; rather, it is the idea that the existence of consent
(contract) makes the ensuing sex not criminal.
9. For example, the commentary to the Model Penal Code states:
At most ... provocation affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of
moral blameworthiness. Provocation is thus properly regarded as a recognition by the law
that inquiry into the reasons for the actor's formulation of an intent to kill will sometimes
reveal factors that should have significance in grading ... a recognition of the fact that one
who kills in response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a
significantly different character deficiency than one who kills in their absence.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (commentaries) (1995).
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Very little existing recent literature proposes victim liability rules1 ° or
examines the role of victim liability in criminal law, 11 perhaps due to the negative
connotations of victim liability. 12 In addition, the few articles that propose victim
contributory liability in criminal law justify the proposal not on philosophical
grounds, but rather on the basis of Coasian economic theory. 13
A critical examination of criminal law reforms over the past several years,
however, reveals a general trend toward an increasing role of the victim 14 in
10. This article contrasts the idea of a "general" victim liability defense with the existing specific
victim liability defenses, which provide defenses to certain crimes when the victim has engaged in
specific wrongful behavior. For example, self-defense provides a defense when the victim has engaged
in imminently threatening behavior. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989). For a discussion
of the imminence requirement in self-defense, see infra Part M.E.
11. There is an older article that examines extensively victim precipitation in criminal law and
advocates, to some extent, a non-specific victim liability defense. See James J. Gobert, Victim
Precipitation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 511 passim (1977).
12. This Article widely uses the term "victim liability" and, to a lesser extent, the terms "victim
behavior," "victim contribution," and "victim precipitation." These terms are meant to denote
broadly the concept of examining the victim's role in a crime, under certain conditions, as a basis to
lessen the defendant's liability. When I talk about "victim liability" in criminal law, I mean that the
victim may be assessed fault in a criminal transaction, and that this assessment can ultimately affect the
culpability calculus (by reducing or eliminating the defendant's liability). The term "liability" is meant
to indicate that the examination of the victim's role in the criminal offense occurs at the liability phase
of the trial, as opposed to the sentencing phase.
13. The economic argument is that placing liability on the victim creates optimal incentives for
the victim to exercise reasonable care in crime prevention. Consequently, society benefits because
victims internalize the costs of protecting themselves from crime. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon
Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 434, 452 (1995) (noting economic benefits of imposing contributory fault on victims); Alon
Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative
Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1193-97 (1994) (explaining that "efficiency requires the distribution of the
costs of precautions between the state and potential victims . . . to minimize the total cost of the
crime"). This author's search has uncovered no other law review articles primarily concerned with
proposing a defense of victim liability in criminal law.
14. Complainant or alleged victim is a more accurate word, as the legal issues this paper
addresses are for the most part at the pre-trial or trial phase prior to establishment of the guilt of the
defendant (or sometimes the existence of a crime). Accordingly, there is, as of yet, no legal "victim."
However, this article uses the word "victim" to denote the person involved in the criminal prosecution
who is claiming to have suffered harm (or had a family member suffer harm from) the defendant.
Victims' rights legislation generally does not distinguish between alleged victims and victims as proven
after a criminal disposition. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (Victims' Bill of Rights):
(A) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, a victim of crime has
a right:
1. To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation,
harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process.
2. To be informed, upon request, when the accused or convicted person is released from
custody or has escaped.
3. To be present at and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal proceedings where
the defendant has the right to be present.
4. To be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a negotiated
plea, and sentencing.
5. To refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant, the
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criminal prosecutions. With the rise of the victims' rights movement, 15 the crime
victim has gained near party status much like a tort victim, propelling the
traditionally public criminal law toward privatization. The victim has emerged in
modern criminal law as a major presence in all stages of a criminal prosecution, 16
as well as having risen to prominence in legal theory and debate.' 7 The trend
toward focusing on the victim's status, behavior, and desires, however, does not
include a scrutiny of the victim's contribution to the crime. In fact, as mentioned
before, the ideology of victim-centered prosecution is particularly unfriendly to
the concept of victim liability.
The problem with the privatization18 trend is that it assumes the victim, who
defendant's attorney, or other person acting on behalf of the defendant.
6. To confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged,
before trial or before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the
disposition ....
Although the "rights" listed above are all conferred at the pre-trial or trial stage, the Arizona
Constitution's treatment of the victim assumes occurrence of a criminal offense and proper
identification of the victim. Even though the provisions empowering the victim plainly have effect
prior to a finding of guilt, the Constitution nonetheless defines "victim" as "a person against whom the
criminal offense has been committed or, if the person is killed or incapacitated, the person's spouse,
parent, child or other lawful representative ...." Id. § 2.1(C). Most U.S. states have passed similar
Victims' Bills of Rights. E.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 34; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 35; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1)(a).
15. Throughout the article, there are broad generalizations about the victims' rights movement.
It is true, however, that the movement has a diversity of voices. See Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment
as "Closure": The Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215,
249 (2001-02) (noting "diversity in the movement"). This paper refers broadly to apparent trends in
the movement in law and popular culture.
16. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic Overview, 3
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 3 (1999) ("The victim plays a role in every aspect of American penal law, from
the general and special part of substantive criminal law to the imposition of penal norms in the
criminal process and, eventually, to the actual enforcement of norms upon suspects and convicts.").
17. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem With Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. L.J. 17, 17 (2000) ("The victims' rights movement has gained the status of a mini-
discipline, complete with its own idiom of 'victimology."') (citing Martha Minow, Surviving Victim
Talk, UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1416 (1993)); Cornelius Prittwitz The Resurrection of the Victim in Penal
Theory, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 111 (1999) ("It is obvious that crime victims have assumed a
prominent place in the study of criminal law. We talk about victims in criminology and criminal justice
policy; we talk about them in criminal procedure and in substantive criminal law.").
18. The term "privatization" in this article is meant specifically to describe the investment of
prosecutorial powers, traditionally placed entirely in the hands of the government, in the private
victim. It does not use privatization in a more expansive sense to mean "delegating norm-changing
power to non-state forces." Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal
Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 517 (2003). Dan Kahan argues that the
changing times dictate a broad move towards privatization of criminal law enforcement:
We are accustomed to seeing criminal law enforcement as an exclusive state prerogative.
When we feel like offering romantic apologies for it, we describe criminal law as an
expression of community morality, something the state alone has the authority to voice.
When we feel like broadcasting our liberal anxieties, we describe it as a species of
"legitimate force," a good the state monopolizes and must therefore exercise with caution.
But it's time to get over this way of thinking about the criminal law. We live in the age of
deregulation. Just as air travel and telecommunications have been freed from inefficient
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now has what amounts to prosecutorial powers under the law, is an
incontrovertibly truthful, moral, and irreproachable entity.19  Victimhood
narratives, internalized in the victims' rights movement, create the image of a
fictional "blameless" victim. Moreover, victims' rights reforms not only rely on
the pre-supposed perfection of the victim, but assume a priori that the victim's
wishes will be adverse to the defendant's. 20 The result is that most victims' rights
reforms increase the likelihood and severity of criminal punishment. The law,
then, fails to account for the inevitable existence of victims who are themselves
wrongful actors. Put another way, the current trend in the law cannot grasp
situations in which inserting the victim into the criminal case should result in less
rather than more severe punishment.
Consequently, the problem with the privatization trend in the criminal law
is that it is based on a fiction. Its premises are faulty. The solution to this
problem could be a general reversal of the victims' rights trend. Certainly, many
scholars have criticized the victims' rights movement on a plethora of legal
grounds.21 The broad topic of the propriety of the victims' rights movement in
general, however, is beyond the immediate scope of this Article. In addition,
given the incredible political force of the movement, a trend toward decreased
victims' rights is unlikely to occur in the immediate future.22 Thus, rather than
forms of centralized control, so punishment is due for a liberating dose of privatization.
Indeed, privatization, I will argue, is essential to the future effectiveness of criminal law in
our most crime-ridden communities, where it's clear that the state has neither an
authoritative moral voice nor a monopoly on force, legitimate or otherwise.
Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1859-60 (1999).
19. Lynne Henderson discusses the fiction of the blameless victim in popular ideology:
"True" victims must remain always innocent and righteously angry at the same time. The
rhetoric and images of victims' rights proponents ignore the effects of violence on the victims
themselves, and those effects include victims becoming perpetrators as a result of their
experiences.
Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victims' Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 579, 587 (1998). Martha Minow further argues that the popular construct of the victim reduces
all that is complex and individual about the human being to a single trait-victimhood:
Preoccupation with victimization works the same way, even when victim status is claimed by
an individual in an effort to obtain sympathy or recompense. Here too, a limited slice of the
individual becomes the focal point. Any richer sense of the person undermines the claim of
victimhood, because victimhood depends on a reductive view of identity. Moreover, the
language of victimization invites people to treat victimhood as the primary source of
identity.
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411,1433 (1993).
20. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 587 (commenting that victimbood narratives portray victims
as "righteously angry"). See also infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of
portrayals of victims as "innocent" and defendants as incapable of being victims.
21. See, e.g., James M. Dolliver, Victim's Rights Constitutional Amendment: A Bad Idea Whose
Time Should Not Come, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 87, 90 (1987) ("By constitutionally emphasizing the
conflict between the victim and the accused and placing the victim in the role of a quasi-prosecutor or
co-counsel, the victims' rights amendment represents a dangerous return to the private blood feud
mentality.").
22. See Joh, supra note 17, at 28 ("The victims' rights movement, with its common idiom and
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formulating a general argument against the victims' rights movement, this
Article proposes an alternate solution to the privatization problem. It posits that
the criminal law should incorporate a more complete and realistic view of the
victim.2 3 The criminal law should account for the victim, not only as a wronged
actor, but also as a wrongful actor where appropriate. The Article will show how
the victims' rights trend logically dictates an increased focus on victim liability.
There is no general or non-specific victim liability defense in criminal law.
In other words, there is no defense that generally exculpates a defendant, in a
variety of factual situations, for crimes precipitated by wrongful conduct on the
part of the victim. Rather, the existing victim liability defenses are offense-
specific and victim conduct-specific. They serve to exculpate defendants only in
extremely particular circumstances. The consequence is that the current victim
liability law regime treats similarly situated defendants very differently. 24 Thus,
the criminal law's failure to include a general or non-specific defense of victim
liability has resulted in doctrinally disjointed and schizophrenic body of law:
[W]hile victim and third-party precipitation have a long history in
criminal law, the non-recognition of them as valid formal
considerations has resulted in their uneven application. Criminal law is
riddled with analogous victim and third-party precipitation situations in
which similar offenders are treated very differently. 25
Criminal law should not carve out very small classes of victims (i.e.,
imminent killers, harmers, or threateners of property) whose actions can
formally justify otherwise criminal acts on the part of defendants. Many of the
same considerations that underlie the current specific victim liability doctrines in
criminal law could justify victim liability for other classes of victims engaged in
wrongdoing. Other wrongful behavior on the part of victims (outside of those
specifically recognized as bases for mitigation, justification, and excuse) could be
useful meters with which to judge the moral responsibility of the defendant. 26
Despite the pervasiveness of specific victim liability defenses, there is a
values, constitutes a vital and powerful political community.") (footnote omitted).
23. Martha Minow critiques the one-sided identity of victims:
[E]veryone I know actually negotiates [different] identities-navigating between assigned
images and inner feelings, new and old contexts, experiences, and ideals. Yet this complexity
is denied by the cramped view of identity. This complexity is denied by the notion of
victimization that confines those who invoke it and seals the confinement with the promise
of absolution and support.
Minow, supra note 19, at 1434 (footnotes omitted).
24. See generally infra Part IV.A; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (commentaries).
25. Gobert, supra note 11, at 540.
26. George Fletcher contrasts "victim blaming" with "legitimate" defenses focusing on the
culpability of the defendant. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 2. However, he does not account for
the possibility that the law may legitimately define a defendant's moral culpability with reference to
the wrongful behavior of the victim, just as with the consenting behavior of the victim (which Fletcher
would sanction as justifying what might be otherwise criminal behavior). In other words, the
defendant who commits an act in response to a reprehensible action on the part of the victim may
simply be less "immoral" than a defendant who commits the same act against a wholly innocent
person.
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general philosophical aversion in criminal law to apportionment of blame, unlike
in tort law. Criminal law, for the most part, takes an injurious event and
presumptively dictates that one party is blameworthy and the other is not, rather
than looking at both parties' contribution to the injury. Thus, tort law seems to
account for the complexity of human transactions in a way unlike criminal law.27
Moreover, because the laws governing victim liability have developed in
such a disjointed and ad hoc manner, they are problematic in their current
manifestations. The current victim liability doctrines are often unfair as applied.
As constructed, they also are overinclusive in that they provide a defense to
actors unworthy of exculpation. 28 They are underinclusive in that they fail to
provide a defense to actors worthy of exculpation. 29
As an alternative to the collection of specific victim liability defenses, this
Article proposes a "non-specific" victim liability defense. "Non-specific"
denotes a defense that will exculpate any criminal defendant, as opposed to just
a murder or assault defendant, 30 who responds to wrongful victim behavior
under certain conditions. Non-specific also captures the idea that "wrongful"
victim behavior can include more types of behavior than the current specific law
takes into account.3 1 Briefly, the elements of the non-specific victim liability
defense are as follows:
1. The victim of the crime engaged in sufficiently wrongful conduct;
2. The victim's conduct caused the defendant to commit the charged
offense;
3. The defendant was not predisposed to commit the charged offense;
and
4. The defendant's response balanced against the victim's wrongful
conduct dictates that the defendant should be exculpated or his
punishment mitigated.
This Article is part of an ongoing project to develop the non-specific victim
27. See Gobert supra note 11, at 513 ("A crime does not occur in a vacuum; numerous antecedent
forces contribute to bring it about.").
28. Feminists have lodged such a critique against the provocation defense. They argue that the
provocation defense has been successfully utilized by abusive husbands who kill their wives for
attempting to leave the relationship. Consequently, provocation is overinclusive because it offers
mitigation to those defendants who do not deserve mitigation under the law. See generally Victoria
Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L. J. 1331
(1997) (arguing that reform of murder law to include a "heat of passion" defense "leads to a murder
law that is both illiberal and often perverse"). See also infra Part IV.E for a discussion of provocation.
29. For example, the imminence requirement of self-defense, has prevented battered women who
kill their sleeping abusers from prevailing on the defense. To the extent that justice requires that such
defendants be exculpated, self-defense is underinclusive. See infra Part IV.E for a discussion of the
imminence requirement in provocation.
30. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the specific crimes to which self-defense, provocation,
defense of others, and defense of property apply.
31. For example, self-defense is predicated on the wrongful victim behavior of imminently
threatening the life of another. Certainly, victims may undertake other wrongful actions-for
example, threatening future injury, economic destruction, or other non-violent harms. See infra Part
IV.A for a discussion of wrongful victim behavior not covered by existing victim liability law.
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liability defense. It examines the relationship between the victim liability
defense and the privatization trend in criminal law and analyzes ways in which
the development of a singular defense will refine the current victim liability
doctrines in desirable ways. Specifically, Part II of the Article examines the
trend toward increased focus on the victim and the movement in criminal law
toward privatization. Part III analyzes the problem with the victims' rights
movement and discusses the need for a more complete picture of the victim.
Part IV discusses how implementation of the non-specific victim liability defense
remedies several problems with the current collection of specific victim liability
defenses. Part V expounds upon the meanings of the elements of the defense
and its practical application. I will more fully elucidate the parameters of the
defense, as well as discuss its philosophical bases, in future papers.
II. THE VICrIM IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW
The victim, in modern criminal law, has emerged as an undeniable presence
in all stages of a criminal case, shifting the criminal paradigm away from simple
government enforcement to increased privatization. 32 While in past times the
victim served little more function than an essential government witness, 33 with
the advent of the victims' rights movement, today's victim is a major focal point
throughout the criminal process.34 Victims' Bills of Rights,35 victim impact
statements, 36 legislation named for victims37 and other new policies reflect the
idea that a criminal prosecution is not just between the state and the defendant.
Rather, there is an incredibly powerful and important third party involved 38 who
32. See supra note 18 for a discussion of the term "privatization" in the context of this Article.
33. See Gessner H. Harrison, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Arizona's Courts and the Crime
Victims' Bill of Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 531, 533 (2002) ("Before the VBR [Victims' Bill of Rights]
became law... [o]nce a crime had been committed, a victim's role in the typical criminal prosecution -
if the victim would play any role at all - was to serve solely as a witness for the prosecution."); John W.
Stickels, Victim Impact Evidence: The Victims' Right that Influences Criminal Trials, 32 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 231, 236-37 (2001) (noting that purpose of President Reagan's 1982 Task Force on Victims'
Rights was to "change the status of the victim of a criminal act from a person who merely identifies the
perpetrator and testifies in court to the role of an active participant in the criminal justice system").
34. See Alice Koskela, Victim's Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force Transforms the
Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHo L. REV. 157, 158 (1997) ("During the past two decades, the victims'
rights movement has dramatically expanded the rights of crime victims and restricted the rights of
criminal defendants, causing a fundamental change in the justice system.").
35. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.
36. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the increasing reliance on the
effects crimes have on victims in sentencing.
37. Jonathan Simon observes, "Megan's Law is a story about the power of a social movement,
the victims' rights movement, to command remarkable attention from state legislatures and
Congress." Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1136 (2000).
38. Alice Koskela remarks on the role of the crime victim:
Victims no longer are relegated to minor roles in the process: they are taking center stage in
the courtroom, dramatically altering how justice is achieved. The aim of the victim's rights
movement has been to give victims a "voice" in the process. But this understandably
impassioned voice may drown out less popular calls for fairness and an objective search for
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should not, and now cannot, be ignored.39 The heightening of crime victims to
party participant status through state Victims' Bills of Rights and the call for a
federal constitutional amendment creating federal victims' rights has concerned
many legal theorists:
[T]he apparently unstoppable political force of the [victims' rights]
movement has become unsettling to many legal scholars and
practitioners. They fear that the public-prosecutor paradigm of
American criminal justice, with its constellation of public safety,
deterrence, rehabilitative, and retributive aims, will devolve into a
private-prosecutor system, pitting victim against accused. In the
process, our criminal law will become merely a mechanism for exacting
a victim's personal vengeance. 40
Despite such concerns, the trend toward increasing the presence of victims in
criminal prosecutions continues.41
The role of the victim in the legal process starts at the beginning of a
criminal case. Prosecutors generally take into consideration whether or not the
truth.
Koskela, supra note 34, at 163.
39. Lynne Henderson criticizes the logic behind victim's rights:
"Victims' rights" were-and are-used to counter "defendants' rights" and to trump those
rights if possible. In an argument that traces back to at least the early 20 th Century, people
accused of crimes are probably "guilty as sin" and undeserving of so much legal protection.
The argument continues that the constitution of a state, or of the United States, contains
specific rights protecting those (accused) of crimes (and, in the case of (habeas corpus) and
cruel and unusual punishments, those convicted of crimes). Victims of crimes, on the other
hand, are blameless innocents far more "deserving" of rights, and they have absolutely no
constitutional rights . . . . One fallacy in that argument immediately appears: Victims, as
citizens, have many constitutional rights, regardless of the specific protections for
defendants.
Henderson, supra note 19, at 582-83 (footnotes omitted). Victims' rights advocates, on the other hand,
argue that the victim should naturally play a significant role in the criminal trial:
Logic certainly dictates that a crime victim has an "interest" in the criminal justice process to
which he or she must respond when called. Logic tells us that something is not right when
the victim is not consulted about what happens to the person who raped them, or killed their
child while driving drunk, or left them wheelchair-bound after being shot during a robbery.
After all, it is the victim who is raped, not the state; it is the drunk driving victim's family
whose insurance rates go up, not the state's; and it is the paraplegic, not the state, who can
no longer work as a mailman.
Judith Rowland, Illusions of Justice: Who represents the Victim?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 177,
178 (1992).
40. Koskela, supra note 34, at 158.
41. Jonathan Simon comments on the social importance of the victims' rights movement:
Victims' rights has emerged over the past 25 years as one of the most important social
movements of our time, comparable in its influence on our political culture to the civil rights
movement or feminism. In part because of the enormous appeal of victimization to
television media, the victims' rights movement has been able to make visible a whole host of
criminal justice decisions that until recently were made with little attention to public
justification.
Simon, supra note 37, at 1136.
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victim desires to "press charges, ' 42 although they do not do so in every case and
in fact cannot in some arenas like domestic violence. 43 Prosecutors, as a matter
of course, take the victim's wishes into consideration during the plea negotiation
process. For example, as a public defender, I often encountered rejections of
plea suggestions on the ground that "the victim would never accept such a plea
agreement." 44  Indeed, some jurisdictions require prosecutors to consult the
victim during plea bargaining.
45
Turning to the trial phase of the prosecution, the victim participates in the
42. As one commentator noted, "[S]till another factor [in charging decisions] is the attitude
of the victim. Victim attitude influences the availability of evidence, obviously so where a
conviction can be obtained only if the victim will testify. But beyond this, the fact that the victim
wants prosecution is morally and politically influential...." KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (4th ed. 2000) (citing Geoffrey Hazard, Criminal Justice System:
Overview, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 450). See also Dubber, supra note 16, at 17
("[T]he victim can influence the process in various ways, such as by deciding whether or not to
press charges."). However, the prosecutor enjoys discretion to prosecute even when the victim
does not want to go forward. In my experience as a public defender, cases involving
uncooperative, indeed recanting, victims sometimes ended in dismissals, but it also often ended in
trials or pleas.
43. Interestingly, the victims' rights movement was intimately tied to the outcry against unfair
treatment of battered women by the legal process. See Koskela, supra note 34, at 163 ("The origin of
the modern victim's rights movement is difficult to pinpoint, but can probably be traced to several
factors. The re-emergence of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in greater awareness of the
problem of domestic violence and the creation of grassroots programs specifically for victims of
domestic violence.") (footnote omitted); Stickels, supra note 33, at 236 ("[The] lack of court protection
for victims motivated several movements that increased awareness of the lack of protections for
victims in the criminal justice system. One of these movements resulted in a greater awareness of the
problems encountered by the victims of domestic violence and the lack of adequate response by the
system.") (footnote omitted). The resulting reforms included mechanisms like mandatory arrests and
"no-drop" policies, whereby police and prosecutors would proceed with cases even against the victim's
wishes. See generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (advocating mandatory prosecution of
domestic violence defendants including forced participation of domestic violence victims at trial).
Ironically, such reforms have effectively undermined the goal of giving the individual victim a "voice."
This author has experience practicing as a public defender in the Washington, D.C. Superior Court
specialized "domestic violence" court. This court includes, at least informally, a prosecutorial "no-
drop" policy. The result is that many "victims" beg the defense attorneys in the case to convince the
prosecutor drop the case against their spouse, lover, mother, brother, child or other domestic relation.
These cases are generally not dropped, and proceed to trial against the victims' wishes. The arguments
from the prosecution side, that either the women are too scared to go forward with the prosecutions or
they simply do not know what is good for them, may be accurate, but are also undeniably paternalistic.
While "no-drop" policies arguably serve legitimate social interests, giving voice to the victim cannot be
said to be one of them.
44. Perhaps, however, this was often simply a negotiation tactic, to which a defense attorney
could freely reply, "my client would never accept your counter-offer." To be fully honest, more often
than rejections based on the victim's desires, defenders hear, "My supervisor will never approve this
plea agreement." Maybe it is simply the nature of negotiation to "pass the buck."
45. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-832(f) (2003) ("Prior to the disposition of the case, the
district attorney's office shall offer the victim the opportunity to consult with the prosecuting attorney
to obtain the views of the victim about the disposition of the case, including the victim's views about
dismissal, plea or negotiations. sentencing, and any pretrial diversion programs.").
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trial most importantly as an essential witness. 46 Victims' rights advocates have
successfully persuaded legislatures to exempt victims from rules that prohibit
testifying witnesses from observing the trial.47  Indeed, some victims' rights
advocates argue that the victim (or victim's family) should have an absolute right
to testify during the guilt as well as sentencing phase of a trial, even if the
testimony has little probative value and tends to prejudice the defendant. 48  In
addition, restorative justice and mediation programs offer opportunities for
46. See supra note 33 for a discussion of the victim's role as witness at trial.
47. The purpose for "the Rule of Witnesses," which prevents testifying witnesses from observing
trials, is that their observation may prejudice their testimony. See Gore v. State, 599 So.2d 978, 986
(Fla. 1992) ("The rule of witness sequestration is designed to help ensure a fair trial by avoiding the
coloring of a witness's testimony by that which he has heard from other witnesses who have preceded
him on the stand.") (internal quotations omitted). Some jurisdictions provide an absolute exemption
from the Rule to crime victims. E.g., ALA. R. EVID. 615(4); ARIZ. R. EVD. 615(4); ARK. R. EVID.
616; N.H. R. EVID. 615(1); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.385(4). Other jurisdictions provide for conditional
exemption from the Rule. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.616(d) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that
victims are exempted unless presence is prejudicial); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2615(5) (West Supp.
1998-99) (stating that victims are exempted unless exclusion is in interests of justice). See generally
Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 443 (1999)
(discussing victims' rights and Rule of Witnesses).
48. John Stickels argues, "In Stahl, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that crime victims
did not have the right to testify if it infringed on the defendant's right to a fair trial .... Without a
sound legal base, the defendant's rights automatically trump the victim's rights." Stickels, supra note
33, at 246 (discussing Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). In Stahl, the victim's
mother was called for the sole purpose of identifying a picture of the deceased. 749 S.W.2d at 828.
The following exchanges occurred at trial:
THE COURT: Can you assure me that if you come in here to identify your son's picture,
that you can do it without any emotion?
MRS. NEWTON: I can assure you I will try. I don't-
THE COURT: I know. I understand.
MRS. NEWTON: I can't say what's going to happen.
Id. The following is a transcript of Mrs. Newton's testimony:
[QUESTIONS BY THE PROSECUTOR]
Q: Mrs. Newton, I am going to show you State's Exhibit No. 25 [a full-faced morgue
photograph of Arthur Newton], and I want you to take a look at State's Exhibit No. 25 and
ask you if you can identify the person depicted in State's Exhibit No. 25?
A: Oh, my God.
Q: Can you identify that picture, Mrs. Newton?
A: Oh, my God. My baby. My God.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can we have the members of the Jury go to the Jury room?
THE WITNESS: May he rest in hell. May he burn in hell. Oh, my baby.
(Whereupon the jury leaves the courtroom).
Id. The Court of Appeals reversed the murder conviction on the grounds that the outburst prejudiced
the jury, noting that the prosecutor made references to the outburst in closing argument. Id.
Victims' rights advocates counter that testifying gives the victim or family necessary psychological
closure. This claim, however, is not undisputed. Lynne Henderson observes that "[tihe persistence of
the notion that testimony is cathartic is utterly unsupported by empirical evidence. In fact, some
disagree that telling a trauma narrative aids victims of extreme trauma to heal at all." Lynne
Henderson, Revisiting Victims' Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 383, 408 (1999) (footnote omitted). See
Prittwitz, supra note 17, at 128 ("There is little evidence that being victimized always means being
traumatized, and there is no reason to believe that all traumas are equal.").
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victims to participate fully as parties in the disposition of criminal cases.4 9
Other new reform laws represent the victim's heightened pre-sentence role.
For example, in many cases, victims receive legal or social worker advocates and
even police representatives who can be present at all stages of a criminal
prosecution.50 These advocates may attend trial, position themselves near the
prosecution, show support for the victim, and comfort distraught victims after
testifying, even in the presence of the fact finder. A victim may also apply for
and receive money prior to the disposition of a case from victim-witness
assistance funds51 and after a conviction from victim compensation funds. 52
49. Scholars argue, however, that these alternative dispute resolution programs have not been
embraced universally by the victims' rights movement. Markus Dubber observes:
Victim-offender mediation similarly will result in dismissal, or the decision not to initiate the
criminal prosecution in the first place. The alternative disposition of facially criminal cases
occurs rarely and unsystematically, even in minor cases. In the extremely punitive climate of
the past decades, restorative justice programs have operated quietly on a small scale, even if
the results have often been encouraging. They have not attracted much attention among
policy makers beyond the local level or among criminal procedure scholars, with the
exception of the occasional article sounding a cautionary note. Most important, they have
not been embraced by the American victims' rights movement. That movement instead has
concentrated on converting defendants' rights into victims' rights in the formal criminal
justice process and, in what is generally considered to be a related objective, increasing
criminal punishment, including the more frequent use of the death penalty.
Dubber, supra note 16, at 22 (footnotes omitted).
50. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1(9) (stating victim has "[t]he right to have present at all court
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or other support person of the victim's
choice"). In Washington, D.C., the Superior Court domestic violence program provides victims
"domestic violence advocates" who may be present at all stages of a prosecution. See supra note 43
for a discussion of the author's experience as a public defender in Washington, D.C.
51. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 244.2-105 (2002) (enacting victim-witness assistance program).
This author was involved in a domestic violence trial in District of Colombia Superior Court where the
complainant alleged that her husband, the defendant, had engaged in acts of verbal and physical abuse
against her. There were no recorded injuries and no physical evidence of abuse. The only other
government witness was the nine-year-old daughter who testified at trial that she did not see any
physical abuse. Essentially, the trial came down to the word of the complainant against the word of
the defendant. During the time of the alleged abuse, the couple was in the process of divorcing. The
defendant was arrested on the complainant's allegations the day before he was going to leave her and
move to Ohio. The government revealed through discovery that shortly after the defendant's arrest,
the complainant received over $1000 in victim assistance so that she could move to a new apartment.
She spent this money entirely prior to the case going to trial.
An obstruction and murder case this author defended involved a victim-witness who was
allegedly a victim of the defendant's acts of obstruction and a witness to him confessing to the murder.
The witness, who had a pending criminal case, a drug problem, and had been living with the defendant
prior to his arrest, received thousands of dollars from the government for lodging, food, and other
incidental expenses over the course of several months, all of which was spent prior to trial. The jury
ultimately discredited the victim and acquitted the defendant of the murder. By that time, the witness
had already spent the money. I do not relate these stories to say that victims and witnesses do not
deserve assistance at any time. Rather, I related them to highlight some of the strange results of
labeling an individual a "victim" with the panoply of rights and benefits that brings, prior to any
adjudication of guilt.
52. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (2000) (authorizing federal grant of funds to states' victim
compensation programs); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-108 (2002) (awarding compensation to victims of
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, victims' personal attorneys appear to be playing increasingly
important roles in criminal prosecutions. 53
In addition, in the past several years, the trend in criminal law has been to
define criminal liability in part by reference to the status or characteristics of the
victim.54 Assault laws almost universally confer harsher penalties on those who
assault members of law enforcement 55 or particularly vulnerable victims. 56 Hate
crime legislation has put the race and ethnicity of victims in the spotlight.57 The
status or characteristics of the victim may increase criminal liability or
punishment even when the defendant is not aware of such characteristics. 58
In the post-conviction phase, the victim has become a major force during
sentencing. In the landmark case of Payne v. Tennessee,59 the Supreme Court,
overruling past decisions to the contrary, 60 held that victim impact evidence, as
compensable crimes perpetrated on or after July 1, 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-501, et seq. (2001)
(creating compensation plan for victims of violent crimes).
53. See Henderson, supra note 48, at 429-32 (discussing case in which victim's personal attorney
filed brief in support of motion in limine to preclude defendant from asserting defense of provocation).
54. See Dubber, supra note 16, at 15 (using hate crime legislation as example of how victim
characteristics can define liability for criminal offense).
55. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-405 (2001) (providing 5-year penalty for assault on police officer,
while D.C. Code § 22-404 (2001) provides for a 180-day penalty for assault on a civilian); FLA. STAT. §
921.141 (1999) (enumerating, as aggravating circumstances, that victim of homicide was governmental
official engaged in official duties or especially vulnerable person).
56. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04, Injury to a Child, Elderly Individual, or Disabled
Individual (1989) (providing higher penalties for assault on vulnerable person).
57. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. CH. 720 § 12-7.1 (2004) (defining "hate crime" as being motivated by
reason of person's "actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual
orientation, physical or mental disability or national origin"); N.Y. CLS PENAL § 485.05 (2000) (noting
that person commits a hate crime when she "intentionally selects crime victim based on race, color,
gender....").
58. Markus Dubber posits:
Whenever criminal liability - or at least the particular nature of the criminal liability - turns
on the victim's characteristics, several difficult questions arise: (1) whether the victim in fact
possessed these characteristics [intent or mere awareness] and (2) whether the perpetrator
had the requisite mental state with respect to the victim's characteristics (intent or mere
awareness) .... [Aln Illinois court recently unearthed a third question, namely (3) whether
criminal liability requires affirmative answers to (1) or (2).
Dubber supra note 16, at 16 (citing In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355 (I11. 1997)) (footnote omitted). The
issue of the admissibility of victim impact statements, which will be discussed later in this section,
brought to light the problem with assigning a defendant blame for victim characteristics of which he
had no knowledge. In Booth v. Maryland, a case which has since been overruled, Justice Powell,
opined:
The focus of a VIS [victim impact statement], however, is not on the defendant, but on the
character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family. These factors may be
wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. As our cases have shown,
the defendant often will not know the victim, and therefore will have no knowledge about
the existence or characteristics of the victim's family.
482 U.S. 496,504 (1987), overruled by, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
59. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
60. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989) (barring use of such evidence at
sentencing); Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (barring use of victim impact statements), overruled by, Payne v.
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well as the prosecutor's sentencing allocution referring to the plight of the victim
were not barred by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Writing for the High Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
opined:
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the
jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and
blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase
evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. "[T]he State
has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which
the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just
as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the
victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society
and in particular to his family." Booth, 482 U.S., at 517 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). By turning the victim into a "faceless
stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial," Gathers, 490 U.S., at
821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), Booth deprives the State of the full
moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having
before it all the information necessary to determine the proper
punishment for a first-degree murder. 6
1
Justice O'Connor emphasized the restorative function of victim impact
evidence, observing:
"Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization." Brief for Justice For
All Political Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 3. It transforms a living
person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking
away all that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution
does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back.
62
Today, victim impact evidence is a significant part of sentencing, from
minor offenses to capital murder cases.63 The victim's role does not end after
sentencing. Victims also participate in probation and parole decisions. 64
Consequently, the victim's presence is significant throughout the criminal
prosecution, from its inception to the very decision to release the offender from
prison.
Tracing the political and historical forces that led to the emergence of the
victim as a major player in criminal prosecutions is a difficult and complicated
task, which I do not undertake in this Article. 65 This Article includes a
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
61. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
62. Id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. The debate in legal academia over victim impact evidence and, particularly whether the
possible gains to the victim outweigh the possible prejudice to the defendant, rages on. For a very
insightful discussion of these issues, see generally Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights,
37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985).
64. See State ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 875 P.2d 824, 830 (Ariz. 1994)
(ruling "victim had a constitutional right to be informed that she was entitled to request notice of, and
to participate in, any post- conviction relief proceeding") (emphasis in original).
65. For a fuller discussion of the social, political, and historical forces behind the victims' rights
movement, see generally Dubber, supra note 16 and Henderson, supra note 63.
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discussion of the victims' rights movement to emphasize that the victim is a
significant force, rising nearly to the status of a party, in a criminal case. From
the above, it is clear that the victim's feelings, actions, characteristics, wishes, and
even employment are now acceptable, even desirable, focal points in a criminal
case. The focus on the victim, however, for the most part, serves the function of
generally increasing liability and punishment for defendants. The trend toward
inserting the victim into the culpability calculus clearly does not include scrutiny
of victim behavior as a means to lessen liability or punishment for defendants. 66
The problem with the trend toward privatization is that it fails to view the
victim, who is the undeniable center of the reforms, in a full and fair manner.
The next section will discuss victimhood narratives and explain how the victims'
rights movement's one-sided view of the victim evidences the need for legal
reform.
III. VICTIM TALK AND THE FICTIONAL VICTIM
While the victims' rights movement has boosted the victim to near-party
status, this status elevation has clearly not coincided with a trend toward
comparing the culpability of the parties in a criminal transaction. 67 Instinct,
however, may dictate that the trend should in fact include victim scrutiny.
Instinctually, many would resist the idea of granting prosecutorial powers or
victim's rights to victims who are themselves wrongful actors, such as robbers,
drug dealers, or wife-beaters. 68 President Clinton exemplified such ideology by
stating, "we sure don't want to give criminals like gang members, who may be
victims of their associates [any rights]." 69
In addition, by allowing, for example, judges to take into account the
character and feelings of the victim during sentencing, the criminal law has
inserted an element of comparative blameworthiness into the criminal trial. As a
matter of logic, such a comparative survey should include scrutinizing the
victim's wrongfulness:
[I]mporting the victim into the blameworthiness calculus logically
66. By "victim scrutiny" I do not mean an unlimited examination of the character of the victim;
rather, only the victim's wrongful behavior that relates to the crime could be grounds for lessening or
absolving the defendant of liability.
67. In fact, many victims' rights advocates actively block perceived "victim blaming," relying on
narratives of victim blaming horror stories. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a critique of
"victim blaming" as a criminal defense.
68. See Henderson, supra note 48, at 404 n.81 (discussing feminist criticism of victims' rights as
empowering batterer in cases where battered woman fights back and is charged as a defendant).
69. Henderson, supra note 19, at 585 (quoting Clinton's Announcement in Support of a Victims'
Rights Amendment (Online News Hour, June 25, 1996)) (footnote omitted). Here, however, Clinton is
talking about victim character generally rather than wrongful behavior specifically as precipitating the
crime. Id. In this paper, I do not advocate general scrutiny of victim character any more than I would
advocate general scrutiny of defendant character. The debate over the propriety of character evidence
in the criminal trial is interesting, but I do not undertake it here. See, e.g., Chris William Sanchirico,
Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1230-31 (2001) (using primary
incentives framework to examine rules regarding admission of character evidence at trial).
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requires courts to call into question the victim's relative
blameworthiness - to measure the offender's actual moral culpability
requires examining whether the victim "deserved" what he got and
whether [the] harm the criminal does to society.., could be
insignificant in comparison to the benefaction.., that would otherwise
be left undone. 70
And yet, the victim rights' movement retains this idea that focusing on
victim behavior as a means to absolving the defendant of liability is improper
under most circumstances. An explanation for the aversion to assessing victim
wrongfulness is that embedded in the narrative of victimhood is the idea that
victims are a priori innocent and even beyond reproach and defendants are
guilty.
Privatization efforts and the victims' rights movement rely on the fiction of
the blameless victim. The powerful narratives of victims' rights portray the
victim as an ultimately innocent party:
Popular culture and ideology construct an image of victims and
violence that, tragic and terrifying as it is, is quite limited. "Victims"
are "blameless," innocent, usually attractive, middle class, and white.
They are articulate and sympathetic. The image of victims appears to
be confined to victims of particularly brutal homicides, often
committed by repeat offenders, and the grieving families of those
victims. 71
Not only does this ideology consider the victim the quintessential "innocent
party," it also considers the victim beyond questioning or criticism:
There is a strong tendency for people to couple a claim of victimhood
with a claim of incorrigibility - that the victim knows better than
anyone else about the victimization, and indeed, the victim cannot be
wrong about it.... This may reflect an almost religious view of
suffering, empowering those who suffer with at least respect and
perhaps reverence from others. 72
The victim then ascends to the status of someone who is not only beyond
reproach, but also beyond doubt. Reforms that assume, prima facie, that the
victim is always credible reflect the acceptance of the absolute veracity of victims
by the victims' rights movement. Victims' Bills of Rights and other reforms
confer pre-trial rights to "victims" even in cases where the defense contests that
any crime has occurred 73 (i.e., non-injurious assault cases or rapes).74 By giving
70. Henderson, supra note 63, at 991-92 (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
71. Henderson, supra note 19, at 584.
72. Minow, supra note 19, at 1434 (footnote omitted). Minow goes on to say, "Especially where
feelings of hurt are involved, victims assert authority on the basis of their experience and treat
statements of that experience as conclusive and the end of the discussion." Id.
73. See supra note 14 (examining victims' rights legislation).
74. They also grant pretrial "victim's" rights to families of decedents in cases where the defense
asserts accident or self-defense. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(C) (defining "victim" as "a person
against whom the criminal offense has been committed or, if the person is killed or incapacitated, the
person's spouse, parent, child or other lawful representative, except if the person is in custody for an
offense or is the accused").
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these complainants rights as "victims," the law presupposes that the
complainants' version of events is true (and by implication the defendants' is not
true). From the beginning, then, the designated victim - most likely designated
by the prosecution75 - is innocent beyond doubt, absolutely truthful, and even
deserving of reverence. Juxtaposed with this the image of criminal defendants:
"[diefendants are subhuman; they are monsters. The criminal is Ted Bundy,
Lawrence Singleton, Richard Allen Davis, Willie Horton-criminals who seem to
be the very embodiment of evil. Alternatively, the image of the criminal is the
ominous, if undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male." 76
These images of defendants, as well as narratives of victimhood, are extremely
complicated,, bringing with them an array of social prejudices and
presuppositions, impacting both race and gender. As a consequence, victim
impact statements "may also draw impermissibly on images entwined with
racism." 77
75. In many cases, especially assault cases, the identity of the true victim is often in question.
Consider the case of two people who get into a fight. Generally, the prosecution will designate either
the person who reported the incident or the more injured party as the "victim" and confer upon him
the panoply of rights that designation entails. One of this author's cases involved a third party who
had called the police to report a fight. Both of the fighters were detained by police on the scene. Both
claimed that they acted in self-defense. Police ran a background check on the two and designated the
one with the criminal history as the defendant, and the one without a criminal history as the victim. In
my experience with many domestic violence cases, when third parties call the police to the scene and
both persons involved in the domestic dispute claim self-defense, the man is normally arrested and
designated defendant and the woman is designated victim. In one case, the man was designated the
defendant, even though the uninjured female "victim" had stabbed him.
76. Henderson, supra note 19, at 586-87 (footnote omitted). Elayne Rapping argues that many of
these images of victims and criminals, and the victims' rights movement itself, is in no small part fueled
by television images. Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims' Rights
Movement, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 665, 675 (2000). She discusses the television series, "America's
Most Wanted":
The series, which featured reenactments of actual crimes followed by pleas to viewers to
help catch the still-at-large perpetrators, was a success with audiences as well as the FBI,
which worked with [John] Walsh on the series and welcomed his help in catching alleged
criminals. But as Anna Williams explains in an article about the series, the format was not
only sensational and melodramatic in form and style, it was explicitly oriented toward a view
of crime as a family matter, for it invariably pitted victims of traditional nuclear families
against the harrowing images of criminals as antisocial loners and lunatics preying on women
and especially children. Michael Linder, one of the series producers, explained the criteria
for choosing cases for the series in an issue of TV Guide: "A drug dealer who shoots another
drug dealer is not as compelling as a child molester or murderer.... If a man brutalizes
innocent children, that definitely adds points." Such a hierarchy of victimization is a
mainstay of the Victims' Rights Movement, which plays upon notions of decent families
besieged by violent amoral criminals.
Id. at 675-76 (citing Van Gordon Sauter, Rating the Reality Shows and Keeping Tabs on the Tabloids,
TV GUIDE, May 2, 1992, at 18 and Anna Williams, Domesticity and the Aetiology of Crime in
America's Most Wanted, CAMERA OBSCURA, Jan.-May 1993, at 97-98) (footnotes omitted).
77. Minow, supra note 19, at 1432 (footnote omitted). See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims
Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 421 (1988) (footnote omitted), who states:
The meaning of victimhood in our society is constructed by a dominant culture that often
displays difficulty conceiving that important harms can come in varieties unlikely to afflict its
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Nonetheless, the idea of viewing the victim as prima facie beyond reproach
and the defendant as prima facie not only guilty but evil is seductive. It enables
society to "purge [ ] itself of deviant elements and thereby heal itself as it salves
the victim's pain" by "declaring the offender an outsider so alien to the
community that identification is simply impossible."78 The acceptance of victim
impact evidence during sentencing, for example, signaled a marked shift in the
systemic focus from offender identification, through mitigation evidence
portraying the defendant as a human being, to victim identification, through
powerful statements of rage and pain. Victim identification, Markus Dubber
argues, carries with it a very persuasive force:
The identification with the victim at the expense of identifying with the
offender provides an additional benefit to the onlooker, which may
well have contributed to the success of the victims' rights movement.
By denying any similarities with the offender upon which identification
could be based, the onlooker transforms the essentially ethical question
of punishment into one of nuisance control. An ethical judgment is no
longer necessary.... Once the offender is excluded from the realm of
identification, the question 'how could someone like us (or, stronger,
like me) have done something like this' no longer arises.79
Consequently, a straightforward social explanation of why many consider
victim liability an altogether immoral concept is that society embraces the image
and rhetoric of the absolutely innocent victim and absolutely guilty defendant.
Although these victimhood narratives generally inure to the detriment of
criminal defendant, under certain circumstances, defendants are able to co-opt
the image of victimhood. 80 Battered wives who kill their abusers are the most
obvious example of this. Arguably, we do not feel the same degree of moral
revulsion at this class of killers as we do about other killers; nor does a moral
reverence attach to the class of victims.81 Some posit that the tendency to view
women, especially abused women, as victims (even if they are in fact defendants)
is itself a reflection of our stereotypical images of victims-"[t]he victim is
helpless, decimated, pathetic, weak. '8 2 Other defendants who tend to benefit
members. This construction of victimhood, in American law, American politics, and
American popular culture, makes virtually inevitable - perhaps even necessary - the vision
of Bernhard Goetz as heroic victim, and, consequently, the image of the black youths on the
train as victimizers.
78. Dubber, supra note 16, at 8.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Martha Minow observes:
Talk of victims seems to divide the world into only two categories: victims and victimizers.
No one wants to be a victimizer, so potential victimizers try to recast themselves as victims.
It becomes a world of only two identities, which essentially reduce to one characteristic, that
of the helpless victim.
Minow, supra note 19, at 1433 (footnotes omitted).
81. Markus Dubber posits, "In American practice, cases of domestic abuse in which a woman
kills her male partner often come down to a question of who is considered to be the 'true' victim, the
deceased man or the accused woman." Dubber, supra note 16, at 11 (footnote omitted).
82. Minow, supra note 19, at 1432. Henderson, however observes that "[uinder current models
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from such recharacterization as victims include vigilantes, like Bernard Goetz,
who kill would-be "criminals. '83 People v. Goetz84 illustrates how victimhood
narratives can call into play society's racist undercurrents. 85 Stephen Carter
argues that Goetz's trial strategy drew on racially charged images of the heroic
vigilante killing the threatening, black criminals:
Blackness is noticed, and it can threaten simply by appearing
unexpectedly, in a wealthy white suburb in the middle of the day, on a
darkened sidewalk in the middle of the night, on the other side of the
peephole in the door when no one is expected. Thus when Mr.
Slotnick, the defense attorney, kept inviting the jury (and, by
extension, the public) to imagine the atmosphere in the subway car, he
conjured, whether he planned to or not, an image of innocent
whiteness surrounded by threatening blackness. Those who endorse a
vision of victimhood resting on the fact of racial oppression would here
win a vital point: Emotive power would be lost were one to conjure
instead an image of "innocent blackness" surrounded by "threatening
whiteness" 86
Cases like Goetz's illustrate the complicated nature of issues of race and
gender as they relate to victims' rights and victim liability. On the one hand, the
victims' rights movement empowers abused women, as victims, to see their
abusers punished and African-Americans, as victims, to counter racist defenses
or seek justice for hate crimes. On the other hand, the movement's
unfriendliness toward defendants and victim liability defenses, not only
disadvantages all minority defendants, but could prevent battered women from
seeking justification for killing their batterers and encourage victims who play
upon racist stereotypes, whether consciously or not, in their victim impact
statements.
Nonetheless, identifying defendants as victims is a favorite tactic of defense
attorneys both at the liability level (recasting the homicide defendant as the
victim of domestic violence) and sentencing level (recasting the defendant as a
victim of a pernicious familial or social background). The viability and social
popularity of this tactic, however, are questionable in this "tough on crime" era.
Many feel that criminals use the "abuse excuse" as "a manipulative ploy ... to
avoid individual moral responsibility and free choice."87 The defendant's past or
of victims' rights and arguments in support of such rights.., these women are not victims at all, they
are criminals. If the abused killed the batterer, then the abuser, or the family of the abuser,
automatically becomes the official victim and has the right to punish the abused." Henderson, supra
note 19, at 586 (footnote omitted).
83. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43-41 (N.Y. 1986) (reinstating indictment against
Bernard Goetz, a white man who shot and wounded four black youths on New York City subway train
after one or two of them asked for five dollars, because he claimed they were going to rob him).
84. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
85. See Carter, supra note 77, at 428 (discussing racial implications of Goetz case).
86. Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Henderson, supra note 19, at 588 (footnote omitted). See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ,
THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER CoP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
(1994) (discussing chronic "abuse excuses" used by criminal defendants such as Michael Jackson and
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even current victimization is often neither a defense nor an excuse at
sentencing.88 Even when defendants can capture victimhood narratives, the
success and pervasiveness of favorable defendant narratives is minor compared
to that of favorable victim narratives. In the end, the characterizations of the
victim as innocent and even saintly and the defendant as guilty and immoral are
the ones that resonate most strongly. Consequently, embedded in the
justification for giving victims' near prosecutorial power, at least implicitly, is an
incomplete and one-sided characterization of the victim.
Not only is the privatization trend rooted in the presupposition that the
victim is ultimately innocent, victims' rights reformers also assume that victims'
interests are, or should be, adverse to defendants' interests. This is evidenced,
for example, by the apparent failure of the movement to embrace those victims
who wish to ask the court for leniency for the defendant or let the judge know
that they do not believe in the death penalty.89 In addition, the rhetoric of
victims' rights revolves more often around vengeance and punishment than
forgiveness and mercy. 90 The movement has succeeded in the institution of
Erik and Lyle Menendez).
88. Henderson notes that "there is no 'bad childhood' defense" and that "prosecutors routinely
argue that evidence of the horrific abuse suffered by those who commit terrible murders is not true
'mitigating evidence."' Henderson, supra note 19, at 589 (footnote omitted).
89. Popular forces were, in part, responsible for courts giving voice to outraged victims during
sentencing. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 859 (stating "[t]oday's majority has obviously been moved by an
argument that has strong political appeal") (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissenting in Booth
v. Maryland, noted that "[rlecent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what has come
to be known as 'victims' rights."' 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These same popular and
political forces, however, failed to move the Tenth Circuit to afford the same participation rights to
victim's families who did not wish for the defendant to receive the death penalty. See Robinson v.
Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Nothing said by the Court [in Payne] suggests the
Court intended to broaden the scope of relevant mitigating evidence to include the opinion of a
victim's family member that the death penalty should not be invoked."). This issue has not yet been
addressed by the Supreme Court; however, the Supreme Court denied Robinson's request for a stay of
execution. Elizabeth Joh observes: "neither the victims' rights (community) nor the Supreme Court
generates or tolerates narratives in which victims' families can exercise mercy, kindness, or forgiveness
towards defendants .... From the perspective of victimhood, the concept of mercy does not square
with conceptions of helplessness and rage." Joh, supra note 17, at 28 (footnote omitted). But see
Kanwar, supra note 15, at 249 ("Over the past several years, the 'voices' of murder victims have both
promoted and opposed the death penalty with equal force.").
90. Victims right's advocates often prioritize punishment over forgiveness. Brown notes:
The role of forgiveness in VOM [Victim-Offender Mediation] is complicated, and it is
dangerous to assume that a victim necessarily wants to or can forgive an offender ....
Although VOM promises such victims the opportunity to meet with their offenders in an
atmosphere that might lead to apology and forgiveness, a necessary precondition for
forgiveness and reconciliation is an expression of accountability on the part of the offender.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43
EMORY L.J. 1247, 1277 (1994) (footnote omitted). Lynne Henderson counters that victims may
benefit more from forgiveness than vengeance because, "Forgiveness alone retains the uncontested
authorship essential to responsibility and resolution. Forgiveness, rather than vengeance may,
therefore, be the act that eventually frees the victim from the event, the means by which the victim
may put the experience behind her." Henderson, supra note 63, at 998.
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prosecutorial "no-drop" policies, 91 and has even sought the elimination of plea-
bargaining. However, the movement does not seek to empower victims who do
not wish to prosecute their cases and do not wish to testify in court or before
grand juries. 92
Critics contend that the victims' rights movement in fact focuses more on
increasing punishment than on empowering victims. Some scholars theorize that
the victims' rights movement was borne out of a prevailing penology of
vengeance:
Th[e] deontological interlude [of the retributivist movement of the
1970s]... proved short-lived. Certainly in practice, if not in theory,
retributivism quickly gave way to its consequentialist analogue,
vengeance, and the crudest form of consequentialist penology,
incapacitation. The rise of the so-called victims' rights movement in
the United States formed an important part of this consequentialist
(re)turn.... This movement, after all, began as and always remained a
political movement, fueled by grassroots campaigns of concerned
citizens backed by politicians eager to outdo their opponents in the
tough-on-crime competition.93
Under this view, the victims' rights movement is more of an anti-crime, even
anti-defendant movement, than a movement intended solely to give victims of
crime more participation in the criminal process. As a result, the calls for the
granting of party or near-party status94 are a means to empowering the victim
only when the victim's interests are adverse to the defendant's.95 Given this
91. See supra note 43 and accompanying text, which discusses how prosecutors' offices institute
policies that certain types of offenses, often domestic violence offenses, may not be dismissed prior to
trial, even if the complainant does not wish to "press charges."
92. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for an examination of the issue of victim
cooperation.
93. Dubber, supra note 16, at 6. Lynne Henderson similarly comments:
Recent victims' rights proposals appear to be driven more by the retaliatory view of
retribution than by the moral aspect of retribution. The victim who participates in
sentencing might further the ends of the retribution-as-vengeance theory by providing
specific and graphic information about the crime-information that will provoke outrage.
Henderson, supra note 63, at 994.
94. Some victims' rights advocates explicitly endorse private prosecution. Rowland, supra note
39, at 179 (1992). Judith Rowland, an attorney who represents victims, observes:
Why, then, do we now find ourselves locked into a system in which a public prosecutor
representing the state is the collective voice which speaks for crime victims in the criminal
justice system? The answer is puzzling. Our legal heritage is derived for the most part from
English common law, which has for centuries been firmly rooted in a process of private
prosecution. This concept is based on the seemingly obvious premise that the victim is the
person actually injured. This practice was prevalent as recently as the opening of the
Western frontier. Somewhere between old England and modern America, something went
awry.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
95. Turning crime into a quasi-private system like tort, as understood in the victims' rights
movement, clearly does not include the tort concept of apportionment of blame like comparative fault
and assumption of risk. The politics of the movement dictate that criminals should never "get a
break." See supra note 4 for a discussion of these tort concepts.
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philosophy, the victims' rights movement certainly would not advocate an
increased role for the victim in the criminal trial if doing so provided further
defenses to the defendant. 96 Ultimately then, it appears that the true end of
privatization is increased punishment. In order to achieve this end, the
movement empowers a fictional blameless victim who seeks vengeance rather
than forgiveness. The movement has failed, however, to account for the
blameworthy victim, the racist victim, and the wife-beating victim that receives
"victims' rights." 97
There are many responses to the problem discussed above. One could
simply advocate a general rejection of the victims' rights movement. One might
argue that the victim should go back to being a tangential player in the criminal
process. 98 While the general debate over victims' rights is interesting and well
taken, this project assumes the reality of the privatization trend 99 and advocates
an alternative response. The substantive criminal law should have a built-in
mechanism that accounts for blameworthy victims. By doing so, the law will take
a more realistic and fair view of the parties to a criminal transaction. In addition
to providing a solution to the problem of the one-sided victim, the non-specific
victim liability defense would refine the current legal regime in numerous
desirable ways. The next section will analyze several doctrinal, practical, and
social problems with the current collection of specific victim liability defenses
and demonstrate how the problems can be addressed by adopting, as an
alternative, the non-specific victim liability defense laid out in the introduction.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT VICTIM LIABILITY DEFENSES
At this point, one might simply respond to my call for reform by stating that
the law is already full of defenses and practices that scrutinize victim
wrongdoing. Indeed, during initial discussions of this Article, many queried,
"How would 'your rule' affect the law?" 1° The question of why there is a need
96. Victims' Bills of Rights are careful to make sure that they create no new defenses. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 10606(c) (2003) ("This section does not create a... defense in favor of any person arising
out of the failure to accord to a victim the rights enumerated").
97. See supra note 43 for an examination of how the victims' rights movement was ironically tied
to the unfair treatment of battered women.
98. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for criticism by scholars of the "tough on crime"
nature of the victims' rights movement.
99. This is due in part to the massive political force of the victims' rights movement. See
Henderson, supra note 63, at 952 (stating that "the symbolic strength of the term 'victims' rights'
overrides careful scrutiny: Who could be anti-victim?"); Joh, supra note 17, at 17 (stating that victims'
rights movement has gained multidisciplinary status "complete with its own idiom of 'victimology"');
Kanwar, supra note 15, at 253 (discussing victims' rights movement's political force).
100. This section will explicate why, as a practical reality as well as a matter of juridical
consistency, the non-specific victim liability defense is desirable. However, a novel legal rule need not
be justified solely by reference to its expediency in the area of the law. It may simply be the case that
the rule refines the law in a logical way. For example, one may ask whether there was a "need" for the
Model Penal Code at the time of its inception, given the existence of state laws that covered nearly
exhaustively all areas of criminal law. Experts observe, however, that even apart from particular
doctrinal gaps filled by the Model Penal Code, the Model Penal Code was important specifically
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to reform existing victim liability doctrine is perhaps the most significant one this
project addresses. In answering this question, this section will analyze several
problems with the current collection of specific victim liability defenses'0 1 and
discuss remedying these problems by substituting the non-specific victim liability
defense.
A. The Existing Law is Arbitrarily Incomplete
The current collection of victim liability laws applies only to designated
crimes precipitated by designated victim behaviorsY° 2 The body of law does not
cover many crimes and many victim behaviors and provides no clear reason for
distinguishing between the situations covered by victim liability law and those
not covered. 10 3 The criminal charges to which existing victim liability doctrines
generally apply are assaults and killings. For example, the doctrines of self-
defense, provocation, defense of others, and defense of property, provide
exculpation exclusively to physically assaultive conduct. 1° 4  One might
presuppose that when provoked by wrongful conduct, the natural human
response will be an immediate attack against the wrongful actor. If it is the case
that violence is the general response to the wrongful conduct of another, then
one would consider the current law an accurate and complete account of human
reaction. The presupposition that people generally react with violence, however,
is not correct. People react in a variety of ways to wrongful conduct. One could
respond to wrongful victim behavior by, for example, destroying property or
stealing.10 5 The doctrines of self-defense, provocation, defense of others, and the
like do not contemplate non-violent yet criminal reactions to wrongful conduct.
because it provided a coherent body of criminal law compared to the doctrinally disjointed status quo
of state criminal laws:
The Model Penal Code was influential in a variety of different ways. First, the very notion of
a systematic codification of criminal law received a dramatic boost from the Model Penal
Code. Apart from the degree to which any particular state recodification resembled the
Model Penal Code, the Code provided the impetus for undertaking new codifications in the
first place, where many jurisdictions had previously been content with relatively loosely
organized compilations of the accumulated criminal statutes passed over the years, many of
which simply embodied or assumed traditional common law rules. Second, the specific form
of codification developed in the Model Penal Code was powerfully influential.
Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part,
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297,297 (1998).
101. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of how criminal law has
become disjointed and schizophrenic in its application of existing victim liability defenses.
102. For example, self-defense applies specifically to the crimes of homicide and assault and
specifically to the victim behavior of engaging in conduct imminently threatening to another. See infra
Part V.E, for a discussion of the practical application of the non-specific victim liability defense as an
alternative to self-defense.
103. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underinclusiveness of victim
liability defenses.
104. See supra note 24 for examples from the Model Penal Code Commentaries.
105. For example, Person A, through blackmail or embezzlement, economically destroys Person
B, who later attempts to steal some money from Person A. Under current law, Person B does not
have a defense to attempted theft.
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Interestingly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do account for a greater
range of reactions to wrongful victim conduct. United States Sentencing
Guideline § 5K2.10, which provides for a downward departuret ° 6 based on victim
conduct, states:
[The victim conduct] provision usually would not be relevant in the
context of non-violent offenses. There may, however, be unusual
circumstances in which substantial victim misconduct would warrant a
reduced penalty in the case of a non-violent offense. For example, an
extended course of provocation and harassment might lead a
defendant to steal or destroy property in retaliation. 0 7
Although the federal sentencing guidelines see fit to take into account
victim precipitation in non-assault situations during the sentencing phase, there
is no common law or legislative analog in the liability phase. The confounding
result is that the current law treats those who react violently to victim
precipitation as less blameworthy than those who react nonviolently to victim
precipitation.
In addition to limiting victim liability inquiries to specific categories of
crimes, the current law limits victim liability to specific victim wrongdoing. Self-
defense, defense of property, and defense of others limit victim wrongdoing to
imminently life-threatening10 8  and property-threatening behavior.10 9
Provocation is arguably more expansive in that it takes into account a wider
range of provoking behavior. 10 However, even provocation is limited in several
important respects. For example, in many jurisdictions, a defendant may only
assert provocation when the victim conduct falls into a pre-set category of
"adequate" provocation. "I In addition, several jurisdictions place temporal
limits on the length of time the defendant is entitled to be "provoked."' 1 2 The
106. A downward departure allows the judge to sentence a defendant below the applicable
guideline range because of an extraordinary circumstance which takes the defendant outside the
"heartland" of sentencing cases. See United States v. Middleton, 325 F.3d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 2003)
(discussing how circumstances warranting downward departure must take defendant out of heartland
of cases contemplated by Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines).
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003).
108. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the parameters of self-
defense.
109. See, e.g., FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.6 (g) (2002) (stating requirements for justifiable use
of force in defense of property).
110. Not all provocation law predetermines categories of adequate provocation. In this sense
provocation law may encompass any provocative act. See, e.g., Forehand v. State, 171 So. 241, 243
(Fla. 1936) (stating provocation is that which moves defendant to heat of passion).
111. Illinois, for example, recognizes only a few categories of provocation, including "substantial
physical injury or substantial physical assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery
with the offender's spouse." People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 110 (Ill. 1995). See Rogers v. State, 819
So.2d 643, 662 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) ("Alabama courts have, in fact, recognized three legal
provocations sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter: (1) when the accused witnesses his or her
spouse in the act of adultery, (2) when the accused is assaulted or faced with an imminent assault on
himself; and (3) when the accused witnesses an assault on a family member or close relative.").
112. See, e.g., State v. Mauricio, 568 A.2d 879, 884 (N.J. 1990) (holding that jury charge of
provocation manslaughter is not available if accused cooled off before killing).
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non-specific victim liability defense can remedy situations in which it seems fair
to lessen or eliminate defendant liability but the provocation does not fit into a
technical category113 or the cooling off time is insufficient.
114
The non-specific victim liability doctrine is not limited to specific crimes or
specific subcategories of wrongful behavior. The defense provides more
flexibility in the law to lessen defendant liability in a wider range of victim
precipitation situations. For example, the non-specific victim liability defense
could address the following situations, which fall outside existing victim liability
doctrines:
1. The victim, an abusive boyfriend, hits the defendant and leaves.
The defendant, in response, throws his belongings out the window.
The defendant is charged with destruction of property.
u5
2. The victim has extorted money from the defendant until he is
destitute. The defendant later attempts to steal some money from
the victim. The defendant is arrested for attempted theft.
t16
3. The defendant, a serially abused wife, kills her sleeping husband.
113. For example, the non-specific victim liability defense would provide a defense where the
defendant responds, not to a sudden attack, but to a prolonged series of past mistreatments.
Provocation law is well-settled that the paradigmatic category of physical provocations consists of
sudden attacks that rouse angry passions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peters, 361 N.E.2d 1277, 1280
(Mass. 1977) (stating voluntary manslaughter is killing in heat of passion based on sudden combat).
Feminists have suggested an alternative formulation of provocation that excuses force used in
response to prolonged past attacks that instill fear, rather than a sudden attack that instills rage:
To the extent that manslaughter law can accommodate emotions other than anger, it at least
can partially recognize that women who kill are more often targets than instigators of
violence. To use this mitigating defense, however, a woman will have to introduce evidence
that it was reasonable for her to react in terror to physical provocation. Those who have
been systematically abused will be required to demonstrate that their experience of past
abuse influenced their perception of future danger. They will be forced to strain the
temporal limits of provocation doctrine in order to admit the details of their lives. The
further back a woman goes in her experience, and the more apparently trivial the event that
triggered her response, the more she must persuade the court to recognize that terror and
fear can be cumulative.
Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1715-16 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
114. One could imagine a situation in which an ordinary, reasonable, law-abiding citizen is
provoked into killing his son's murderer long after the cooling off time has expired. This situation has
led some courts to develop the uncomfortable doctrine of re-triggered provocation. "A few States,
notably California and Pennsylvania, have apparently found sufficient provocation from what appears
to be 'the last straw' theory-a smoldering resentment or pent-up rage resulting from earlier insults or
humiliating events culminating in a triggering event that, by itself, might be insufficient." Dennis v.
State, 661 A.2d 175, 181 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
115. Provocation does not generally mitigate punishment for destruction of property. Rather,
the existence of provocation is used nearly exclusively to reduce first degree murder to voluntary
manslaughter. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of provocation, its
elements, and when it mitigates.
116, No victim liability defenses apply to theft. If, however, the defendant is literally starving and
steals bread, he could possibly assert the defense of necessity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW § 5.4 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing necessity defense). Necessity, however, is not a victim liability
defense.
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The defendant is charged with murder."17
4. The defendant lives in a bad neighborhood. He has been assaulted
and threatened several times by the victim, a gang member. In an
effort to prevent further attacks by victim, the defendant hires a
person in the neighborhood to assault the victim. The defendant is
arrested for assault and conspiracy.1 18
Of course, one might respond that the above defendants should not be
exempt from liability because they have committed harms. Fairness concerns,
however, dictate that some individuals who commit harms should be exculpated
because of attendant circumstances.1 19 Moreover, the existing law provides
defenses to defendants who commit harms in response to victim precipitation in
a variety of other situations, It is difficult to see a good reason why the above
defendants should be more culpable than the following defendants who have
colorable victim liability defenses under current law:
1. The victim, an abusive boyfriend, hits the defendant. The
defendant, in response, stabs him. The defendant is arrested for
aggravated assault and asserts self-defense and provocation.
120
2. The victim trespasses on defendant's lawn. The defendant comes
out and hits him with a bat. The defendant is arrested for
aggravated assault and asserts defense of property.121
117. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (holding that battered woman who
killed sleeping abuser could not prevail on self-defense because of imminence requirement). This
scenario will be discussed in depth infra Part W.E.
118. Again, the defendant will not generally have a valid self-defense claim because the harm is
not imminent. See infra Part IV.E for how the non-specific victim liability defense will practically
apply in this situation.
119. These concerns are at the heart of justifications and excuses. Burke, supra note 8, at 242-43
(describing justification versus excuse defenses). Justifications exculpate an individual when the
harming of another produces a beneficial state of affairs. Id. Excuses exculpate an individual when
the harming of another does not produce a beneficial state of affairs but is otherwise pardonable under
the circumstances:
Justification defenses operate when the defendant's act is the morally preferred option.
Because justified acts are viewed as objectively preferable, the psychological, subjective
peculiarities of the defendant are generally irrelevant to the application of the justification
defense. In contrast, excuse defenses apply when the act itself is harmful, but when
something about the actor relieves her of moral culpability for the wrongful act.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. Provocation mitigation may be predicated on a sudden attack. See Peters, 361 N.E.2d at
1280 (stating sudden combat is one of events that lead to provocation mitigation).
121. FLA. STD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.6(g) states:
Defendant would be justified in using force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm
against victim if the following three facts are proved:
1. (Victim must) have been trespassing or otherwise wrongfully interfering with land or
personal property.
2. The land or personal property must have lawfully been in (defendant's) possession, or
in the possession of a member of [his] [her] immediate family or household, or in the
possession of some person whose property [he] [she] was under a legal duty to protect.
3. (Defendant) must have reasonably believed that [his] [her] use of force was necessary
to prevent or terminate (victim's) wrongful behavior.
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3. The defendant's husband has hit her a couple of times in the past.
The husband goes to hit the defendant, and she grabs a gun and
shoots him. The defendant is arrested for murder and asserts self-
defense. 122
4. The defendant is a gang member who beats up and threatens all
the children in the neighborhood. One of the children snaps and
comes at the defendant with a knife. The defendant shoots the
child. The defendant is arrested for murder and asserts self-
defense.123
The non-specific victim liability defense crystallizes the unsystematic
collection of victim liability laws that arbitrarily cover certain situations but fail
to cover others into a coherent rule dictating the circumstances under which
people are less culpable for their criminal acts because they have responded to
wrongful victim behavior.
B. The Existing Law is Incoherent and Unfair
The purported legal justification for many of the specific victim liability
defenses, most notably provocation, is that the existence of the victim
wrongfulness reduces the defendant's mens rea for the offense. To the extent
that a defense like provocation focuses formulaically on the mental state of the
defendant while at the same time manifesting in ad hoc categories of "adequate
provocations," 124 which have little to do with subjective mens rea,125 a non-
specific victim liability defense that explicitly recognizes victim conduct as part of
the formula is a more intellectually honest legal doctrine. 126 In other words, if
122. Self-defense may be asserted here because the defendant is in a confrontational situation
where bodily harm to the defendant is imminent. See infra Part IVE for a discussion of self-defense
and its technical limitations.
123. The defendant in this case may assert self-defense because he is facing imminent bodily
injury or death.
124. See supra note 111 for a discussion of categories of "adequate provocation."
125. Reduction of provocation to categories of "adequate provocations" has little to do with
subjective mens rea precisely because it categorically predetermines reasonable causes of heat of
passion rather than looking at the defendant's particular state of mind and whether he was reasonably
moved to heat of passion. So, although courts give lip service to the idea that provocation is all about
the defendant's mental state, the categorical approach implicitly, although silently, considers whether
the victim behavior was wrongful enough to justify at least in part the victim's death. An ideological
embracing of exclusionary categories of adequate provocation is evidenced in the movement to
exclude a priori homosexual advances as adequate provocation. See Robert B. Minson, Comment,
Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV.
133, 136 (1992) (arguing that adequate provocation should not include homosexual advance even if
advance subjectively moved defendant to heat of passion and even if societal consensus determined
advances to be sufficiently outrageous). One of Minson's arguments is that provocation has become
so problematic in this area because it is overly concerned with blaming the victim. Id. at 158. I would
counter that it is problematic precisely because the current status of provocation law does not allow
the law to dictate which victim behavior society ought to condemn. Thus, the current the law does not
prevent the defense from being invoked where the victim has engaged in less than wrongful behavior.
126. See infra Part V, which examines the elements of the non-specific victim liability defense
and how it focuses both on the culpability of the defendant and the culpability of the victim, rather
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provocation is all about what goes on in the defendant's head, then logically the
quality of the victim's conduct should be irrelevant, so long as it subjectively
negates mens rea. The implication, then, is that courts should concentrate not on
whether the provocation is categorically "adequate," but rather on whether it in
fact negated the defendant's intent. As a mens rea issue alone, the focus on
reasonableness or any other prescriptive element, is misplaced.
When viewed in this light, provocation unhappily straddles the line between
operating as a way to negate an element of the crime (mens rea) and operating as
a separate defense that lessens liability of the defendant because the existence of
reasonable provocation shows the defendant to be less morally culpable. To
illustrate, certain jurisdictions characterize provocation as reducing first degree
murder to second degree murder precisely because the presence of passion
negates the requisite intent for first degree murder, premeditation:
A sudden transport of passion, caused by adequate provocation, if it
suspends the exercise of judgment, and dominates volition, so as to
exclude premeditation and a previously formed design, may not excuse
or justify a homicide, but it may be sufficient to reduce a homicide
below murder in the first degree, although the passion does not entirely
dethrone the actor's reason. 127
As a result, the presence of passion reduces the crime only to second degree
murder. 128 This approach makes sense because the defendant may prove lack of
intent through any competent evidence. For example, he may argue that the
amount of time he deliberated over the murder was insufficient to show
premeditation. 129 Likewise, he can argue that the existence of passion interfered
with his ability to premeditate a crime.130 A purposeful killing based on passion
rather than deliberation is by definition, in many jurisdictions, a second degree
murder.
Clearly, however, provocation is not always treated simply as a matter of
negating premeditation. First, in many jurisdictions, provocation reduces first
degree murder not merely to second degree murder but to manslaughter. 131 This
reduction is often based on more than the fact that passion interferes with
premeditation. In order to voluntary manslaughter, provocation must do more
than just the mental state of the defendant.
127. Forehand, 171 So. at 243 (quoting Whidden v. State, 59 So. 561, 561 (Fla. 1912)).
128. See ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-2 (2003) (stating provocation mitigates first degree murder to
second degree murder).
129. See Bostic v. United States, 94 F.2d 636, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ("Lapse of time is important
because of the opportunity which it affords for deliberation.").
130. As one court noted:
Deliberation is proved by demonstrating that the accused acted with consideration and
reflection upon the preconceived design to kill; turning it over in the mind, giving it second
thought. Although no specific amount of time is necessary to demonstrate premeditation
and deliberation, the evidence must demonstrate that the accused did not kill impulsively, in
the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity.
Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1979) (internal quotations omitted).
131. See Cox v. State, 518 A.2d 132, 136-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (holding that provocation
mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter).
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than merely negate mens rea. The provocation must show that the provoked
defendant was less criminally culpable than a second degree murderer who acted
out of passion. How then does homicide law distinguish between provocation as
a mens rea issue, which should reduce first degree murder only to second degree
murder, and provocation as a fuller defense, which can reduce first degree
murder all the way to manslaughter? The answer is that provocation law, which
reduces murder to manslaughter, inserts an element of prescription into the law.
It not only requires that the defendant acted in the heat of passion, and thus
without premeditation, but also requires that his heat of passion is reasonable:
"[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when.., a homicide which would
otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.
32
Indeed, some courts go farther than reasonableness, requiring that the
provocation fit into pre-determined categories of adequate provocation. It then
becomes difficult to understand why provocation, incorporating a prescriptive or
evaluative element, merely mitigates to manslaughter rather than excusing the
conduct altogether. As a pure mens rea inquiry, it makes sense for provocation
to reduce first degree murder only to second degree murder. When formulated
as a defense incorporating legal prescription (the requirement that the actor be
reasonable and that the provocation be in a legally pre-determined category), it
is difficult to see why a person who complies with that prescription is nonetheless
guilty of manslaughter. It seems that the defendant's compliance with the legal
prescription, which is based on sentiments regarding culpability, should fully
exculpate him:
Why the [provocation] doctrine mitigates and does not fully exculpate
might seem more difficult to explain under the evaluative view. If the
defendant's anger or rage embodies a morally appropriate evaluation
of the victim's provoking conduct, why does the law not fully immunize
the defendant from condemnation? 13
3
Indeed, in the not too distant past of homicide law, the existence of
provoking adultery in some jurisdictions served as a justification for murder,
rather than just a mitigating factor.134 The Article will take another look at the
imprecise distinction between mitigation and exculpation in of Part V.
In addition to the lack of doctrinal coherence in the provocation doctrine,
the law's vacillation between a mens rea issue and a more prescriptive issue leads
to unfair applications. For example, the provocation doctrine applies in every
jurisdiction in some formulation to murder prosecutions. It does not, however,
apply universally to assaultive conduct that falls short of killing.1 35 There is a
132. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962).
133. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Concepts of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 313 (1996). On the surface, the distinction does not appear too complex.
134. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 59 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. 1933) (noting that penal code justified
homicide committed by husband when he witnessed victim committing adultery with husband's wife).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 460 F.2d 1322, 1323 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Provocation is
ordinarily no justification for an assault."); People v. Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970); see generally CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, ASSAULT § 86 Provocation (citing cases). To some
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fairly straightforward doctrinal reason for this divergence. As a mens rea issue,
provocation negates the necessary intent for first degree murder. The general
intent1 36 required for assault, 137 and even arguably the specific intent1 38 required
for assault with intent to kill, is different from the intent required for first degree
murder (premeditation). 39 Consequently, the fact that adequate provocation
negates premeditation does not mean it negates the requisite intent for assault.
Formulating provocation as a strict mens rea issue 140 is therefore
problematic because it leads to this unfair situation: a person provoked by seeing
an assailant murder his daughter attacks and kills the assailant. That person
avails himself of the provocation defense, is convicted of manslaughter, and
receives a sentence of five years in jail.141 A person similarly provoked attacks
extent, this problem has been remedied by state legislatures who have crafted statutes that provide
defenses similar to provocation to assault crimes.
136. General intent, as used in this context, is an intent to do the criminally prohibited act
without regard to a specific result. See People v. Maynor, 662 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)
("In order to commit a specific intent crime, an offender would have to subjectively desire or know
that the prohibited result will occur, whereas in a general intent crime, the prohibited result need only
be reasonably expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective
desire to have accomplished such a result.").
137. See Smith v. United States, 593 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C. 1991) ("We hold that the offense of
assault, whether the 'attempted-battery' type or the 'intent-to-frighten' type, remains a general intent
crime which may be proved by a showing that a defendant intended to do the acts which constitute the
assault.").
138. Specific intent, as used in this context, is an intent to commit an act with a certain result in
mind. Maynor, 662 N.W.2d at 476. In the case of assault with intent to kill, it is a specific intent to kill.
See Leftwitch v. United States, 460 A.2d 993, 994 n.1 (D.C. 1983) ("Assault with intent to kill
require[s] the specific intent to kill.").
139. First degree murder requires premeditation. State v. Thompson, 65 P.3d 420, 424 (Ariz.
2003) ("[A] person commits first degree murder if... [i]ntending or knowing that the person's conduct
will cause death, the person causes the death of another with premeditation") (internal quotations
omitted). First and second degree murder require malice. See People v. Jones, 30 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283
(Cal. Ct. App. 1963) ("[T]he element of malice aforethought is present in both degrees of murder.").
Assault requires neither premeditation, malice, nor specific intent. See also People v. Williams, 29
P.3d 197, 200 (Cal. 2001) ("[A]ssault does not require the specific intent to cause any particular injury,
to severely injure another, or to injure in the sense of inflicting bodily harm .... Rather, assault
required the general intent to willfully commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences of
which if successfully completed would be the injury to another.") (internal quotations omitted). There
is also a historical explanation for the unavailability of provocation defense in assault cases:
[P]rovocation was given legal relevance because murder was traditionally punished by death,
and society felt that the death penalty was too severe for a person who killed upon
provocation. Since there was no death penalty for offenses less than murder, there was no
need for the rule of provocation.
Gobert, supra note 11, at 535 (1977) (citing Peter English, Provocation and Attempted Murder, 1973
CRIM. L. REV. (ENG.) 727, 735 (Dec. 1973)). Gobert rejects the notion that the historical arguments
continue to carry any weight by asserting, "[S]ociety's obligation to draw meaningful distinctions
between offenders for punishment purposes, while of greatest consequence where death is a possible
penalty, remains in all cases." Id. at 535.
140. This is accomplished by framing provocation as strictly about whether the defendant had the
requisite mental state for the crime. See State v. Oliver, 321 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Wis. 1982) ("Heat of
passion negates the distinct intent required for first-degree murder ... ").
141. For example, in the District of Columbia, a judge can sentence a person convicted of
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but does not kill the assailant (and, in fact, only injures him superficially). That
person may not avail himself of the provocation defense, is convicted of assault
with intent to kill or attempted murder, and receives ten years in jail. t42 Most
would find it offensive to their sense of justice that the law treats the person who
does not kill more harshly.143
Similar to the above criticism, the Colorado Court of Appeals found
unconstitutional a statutory scheme that allowed a provocation defense to
second degree assault on an elderly person but disallowed the defense to third
degree assault on an elderly person.'" The court described the operation of the
classifications as follows:
As a result of the operation of § 18-3-209, however, a person who
commits second degree assault on the elderly with provocation would
be convicted of a class one misdemeanor, while a person who, also with
provocation, commits third degree assault on the elderly-and thus
who has acted less culpably and has caused less harm-would be
convicted of a class 5 felony. This legislative scheme allows an
irrational classification to occur.' 45
The court found illogical the concept that, under the same circumstances,
the law convicts a defendant who caused less harm of a greater offense. The
court observed:
[T]he statutory scheme for assault as it is applied here allows a more
severe degree of conviction and punishment to be based on a lesser
degree of mental culpability and determined by the fortuity of having
caused less serious harm to the victim. This is untenable and contrary
manslaughter to probation, to thirty years in jail, or to something in between. See D.C. ANN. CODE §
22-2105 (2001) (discussing penalty for manslaughter). Under the statute, "[w]hoever is guilty of
manslaughter shall be sentenced to a period of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years." Id. Thus, a
person convicted of manslaughter, depending on the judge presiding, could receive a five-year
sentence.
142. For example, in the District of Columbia, the sentence for assault with intent to kill is
between two and fifteen years. See D.C. ANN. CODE § 22-401 (2001). A judge can sentence a person
convicted of this crime to two years in jail, fifteen years in jail, or something in between. Id. The judge
may not, however, sentence the person to one year in jail or probation. Id. Thus, a person convicted
of assault with intent to kill, depending on the judge, could receive ten.years in jail.
143. Other rules attempt to address this problem, but are ineffective or unfair for other reasons.
Gobert observes:
Some courts, perhaps swayed by this reasoning, will not convict a defendant of attempted
murder or assault with intent to murder if the completed homicide would have been
manslaughter. This response is really nothing more than a defense of impossibility, and, if
based on a technical definition of murder, will be of limited utility, confined basically to the
two aforementioned crimes. On the other hand, if intended as a more general defense, it
transforms the role of provocation. Unlike in homicide, where provocation serves only to
reduce the seriousness of the defendant's crime, when applied to lesser crimes against
persons this approach would make provocation a complete defense.
Gobert, supra note 11, at 535.
144. See People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161, 165-68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting statutory scheme
because it violated defendant's right to equal protection).
145. Id. at 165.
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to common sense.
146
The prosecution had argued that the provocation doctrine was applicable to
second degree assault because the requisite mental state was intentional injury
but inapplicable to third degree assault which required only a "knowing and
reckless" mental state. 147 The prosecution contended that provocation could
reduce only the "intentional" mental state. 148 In rejecting this argument, the
court explicitly distinguished provocation law in assault from provocation law in
murder, holding that the former was not strictly a mens rea inquiry:
Thus, provocation, as it relates to the crime of assault, presupposes the
required mental state, but provides that the circumstances involved
may nonetheless reduce the severity of the penalty attached to the
offense. In this respect, the treatment of provocation in the context of
assault differs from provocation in homicide .... 149
By so holding, the court created within the context of assault, in effect, a
victim liability defense. The court conceptualized provocation in the context of
assault not merely as an issue of the defendant's mental state, but rather as an
issue of the defendant's culpability in the context of the victim's behavior. 150
One might then say that there is no need for the non-specific victim liability
defense because judges can create similar law in their decisions. Judges can
remedy the incoherent and unfair situations through their judicial
interpretations. The problem is that the court's framing provocation as a victim
liability defense undermines the purported logic behind the provocation
doctrine, namely, that provocation mitigates punishment because it negates
intent. 151 Consequently, the judge's reasoning amounted to a hidden revolution
in the law of and reasoning behind the provocation doctrine. The law should,
however, create new legal rules explicitly rather than hide them contradictorily
in exceptional case law. The more concrete the legal rule, the more legitimate
the attendant judicial interpretations of those rules:
[L]aw is a process of elimination where a judge eliminates theories
until he arrives at the appropriate solution.... [W]hen law is
indeterminate, elimination is justification. Consequently, if judges
eliminate theories on the basis of emotional attachments, they decrease
the legitimacy of their legal analyses. Accordingly, if other judges have
no way to know that the biased judge's reasoning is illegitimate, and
adopt the same reasoning, the eventual judicial decision will be less
146. Id. at 167 (internal quotations omitted).
147. Id. at 166.
148. Id.
149. Suazo, 867 P.2d at 166.
150. It was an explicit nod to the idea of liability based less on whether defendant had the
requisite mental state and more on whether defendant's actions, given the entire transaction including
the victim's behavior, were culpable. According to George Fletcher, "[tihe important lesson to be
drawn from comparative negligence and from the history of provocation is that it is possible to
distribute guilt among the parties to a criminal transaction." George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures:
Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1538 (2002).




Without relying on hidden judicial revolutions, the non-specific victim
liability defense properly frames the issue as one of the defendant's actions in the
context of the victim's behavior. In this sense, the law is not merely about
whether the defendant had the requisite mens rea for a particular crime. Rather,
the law is about whether, regardless of the technicalities of requisite intent, the
defendant should be exculpated for his actions. This is more fair because it does
not arbitrarily penalize defendants who are charged under statutes requiring
lower degrees of intent.
One might then say that the evaluative or prescriptive approach of
provocation, which requires reasonableness, is adequate because it concentrates
on the overall moral culpability of the defendant rather than formulaically on
mens rea. Even the prescriptive approach of provocation law, however, is
problematic. It ends up providing a defense to those the law should find morally
culpable. The doctrine does so partly because it wavers between concentrating
on subjective intent and applying inadequate reasonableness standards. The fact
that the defendant is nonetheless guilty of manslaughter, rather than fully
exculpated, does not adequately remedy the doctrinally flawed analysis.
A poignant example of this problem with provocation is the doctrine's
ability to provide a defense to abusive husbands who kill their battered spouses.
Often these killings depend on the wife's adulterous behavior or some other
"provoking" conduct. Scholars note that the wife's adultery category in early
provocation law was the paradigmatic case of provocation: "[t]he 'adultery
category' was recognized in the earliest cases as the highest form of provocation.
In fact, one of the earliest cases to delineate the various forms of 'adequate
provocation,' notes that adultery is the 'highest invasion of property,' and thus
represents the 'highest' form of provocation. '" 153 Throughout the years, some
courts have expanded the reach of the adultery category, 154 to include situations
152. Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1068 (2002) (footnote
omitted).
153. Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 80 (1992) (footnote omitted). Other historical categories of
provocation: (1) a violent assault; see, e.g., Sikes v. Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 956, 961 (Ky. 1947)
(holding violent assault as basis for provocation defense), overruled in part by, White v.
Commonwealth, 360 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1962); State v. Ponce, 19 S.E.2d 221, 223 (W.Va. 1942) (holding
battery as basis for provocation defense); (2) an unlawful arrest; see, e.g., State v. Burnett, 188 S.W.2d
51, 54 (Mo. 1945) (holding unlawful arrest may be adequate provocation); and (3) mutual combat; see,
e.g., State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119, 122-24 (Iowa 1980) (acknowledging mutual combat as adequate
provocation, but finding it not appropriate in present case).
154. Coker, supra note 153, at 81 observes:
Modern reformation of voluntary manslaughter doctrine has, if anything, tended to expand
the circumstances under which the "adultery category" applies. While some jurisdictions
have strict rules requiring that the act of adultery be actually witnessed by the defendant, or
that the couple be married as opposed to unmarried lovers-the modern trend away from
strict categories to a "reasonableness" standard has allowed wife killers to include a wider
range of circumstances.
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in which the killer does not directly view the adultery155 and other "reasonable"
circumstances.
1 56
The criticism lodged by feminist scholars is that the adultery category of
provocation serves as a vehicle to mitigate the punishment of abusive husbands
who kill their wives. Statistics bear out that the vast majority of wife killings,
including those purportedly premised on provocation, occur in the context of an
already abusive relationship. 157 The adultery category of provocation under
current law is problematic not only because of its factual application in a
patriarchal system, but also because its exposure of core defects in the doctrinal
construction of provocation doctrine. 58
As a primary matter, there is the question whether adultery should justify159
killing at all, even if the husband was not previously abusive. There is no doubt
that society, at the time of the initial development of the provocation doctrine,
society was incredibly different from what it is today. Adulterous acts were
arguably not as common, and certainly not as accepted or expected as they are in
the United States today, especially if the adulterer was a woman. 16° Some
studies show that today adultery is quite common1 6' and the response of the
overwhelming majority of those confronted with an adulterous spouse is to take
action short of killing. 16
2
155. "Admissions by wife to husband of adulterous relationship with another man, coupled with
conduct, or conduct alone, may authorize the jury to find a voluntary manslaughter verdict." Vick v.
State, 156 S.E.2d 125,126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
156. "[T]he modern trend away from strict categories to a 'reasonableness' standard has allowed
wife killers to include a wider range of circumstances." Coker, supra note 153, at 81.
157. See generally id. (arguing that adultery gives wife-killers "wide range" of excuses).
158. The problem with the provocation doctrine cannot be rectified by mere external changes,
like changing patriarchal belief systems in society. The way the law is structured is defective both
practically and theoretically leading to unfair results, namely that those who ought to be punished are
not punished. This evidences the additional need for internal reform.
159. "Justify" is used here in a non-technical sense to denote the judgment in provocation law
that the existence of certain factors make the defendant less morally culpable for his crime. As a
technical term, "justification" defenses are distinguished from "excuse" defenses. The term "justify" is
used in a colloquial context and not to refer solely to situations in which a technical justification
defense applies. This section does not seek to distinguish between justification and excuse.
160. Eighteenth century England considered adultery one of the highest invasions of property:
[J]ealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property .... If a thief
comes to rob another, it is lawful to kill him. And if a man comes to rob a man's posterity
and his family, yet to kill him is manslaughter. So is the law though it may seem hard, that
the killing in the one case should not be as justifiable as the other.
Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115 (1707). In the history of adultery in American law,
adulterous men and women were treated quite differently. See, e.g., Reed, 59 S.W.2d at 123 (holding
wife who killed her husband's lover was not entitled to benefit of state statute justifying husband's
homicide undertaken after wife's adultery).
161. According to one study, approximately 70% of married men cheat on their wives, and 50%
of married women cheat on their husbands. Bonnie Eaker Weil, Is Your Marriage at Risk?: A Chat
with Psychologist Bonnie Eaker Weil (June 18. 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
communityfDailyNews/chat-cheating06l8.htmI (last visited Mar. 5,2004).
162. In her new book. Living History, Hillary Clinton claims that when she found out the truth
about Bill's affair with Monica, she wanted to "wring Bill's neck." HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
As a defense of intent negation, the provocation doctrine counsels that so
long as the adulterous act in fact moved the defendant to act in the heat of
passion, he may assert the defense. 163 The implication of this, however, is that no
matter what the defendant's anger is based on, whether racism, sexism, or
something else, so long as the defendant was angered such that the crime was not
premeditated, he has a defense to first degree murder. Remember, however,
that as a mechanism of intent negation, the defendant should still be convicted of
second degree murder, like any other heat-of-passion murderer. 164 There is the
issue of whether passion, which, though very real, is based on bigoted beliefs,
should be permitted to negate intent or volition. 165 To delve into this issue,
however, requires an exhaustive analysis of the mens rea requirement in
substantive criminal law, which is beyond the scope of this project. The
argument here is that provocation should not allow an abusive wife-killer to have
his first degree murder charge mitigated to manslaughter.
The feminist critique is that provocation law, as a prescriptive defense,
should not absolve men whose anger is informed by patriarchal beliefs of
liability. Now, one may respond that adultery would anger any man or woman,
sexist or not. The operative issue, however, is whether it would anger a
reasonable person enough to kill. Additionally, although adulterous wife killings
arguably are not a product of sexist ideology, other kinds of wife-killings
mitigated by provocation law definitely have patriarchal implications. The
provocation defense has been premised not only on adultery, but also on
completely legitimate if not encourageable victim behavior. Victoria Nourse
observes:
A significant number of the reform cases I studied involve no sexual
infidelity whatsoever, but only the desire of the killer's victim to leave
a miserable relationship. Reform has permitted juries to return a
manslaughter verdict in cases where the defendant claims passion
because the victim left, moved the furniture out, planned a divorce, or
sought a protective order. Even infidelity has been transformed under
reform's gaze into something quite different from the sexual betrayal
we might expect - it is the infidelity of a fiancde who danced with
another, of a girlfriend who decided to date someone else, of the
divorcee found pursuing a new relationship months after the final
LIVING HISTORY 471 (2003). Would we have considered it reasonable if she really had strangled the
Commander-in-Chief to death?
163. See Forehand, 171 So. at 242-43 (requiring sufficient provocation to excite anger or create
sudden impulse to kill in order to exclude premeditation).
164. See id. at 243 (stating heat of passion may reduce crime from first degree murder, not
entirely excuse actor).
165. Whether the law should allow subjective intent negation premised on the existence of sexist,
racist, homophobic, or other socially undesirable beliefs is another interesting issue that I will discuss
later. See generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994) (commenting on racial beliefs and
stereotypes negating subjective intent); Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BuFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 97, 132-45 (2002) (arguing that modern application of provocation defense is more sexist than
traditionalist application).
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decree. In the end, reform has transformed passion from the classical
adultery to the modern dating and moving and leaving.
166
There can be little doubt that those men who kill women for attempting to
leave them are moved to passion because of their internalization of chauvinistic
and oppressive beliefs concerning the proper role of women. Thus, the problem
with provocation law is that it does not provide an adequate mechanism for
judging which types of victim behaviors the law should permit to excuse the
defendant's act of killing.167 Rather than focusing on whether the provocation at
issue was in fact adequate to move the defendant to kill, the law should
concentrate on whether the victim's behavior is wrongful enough to permit
people to indulge their passions and kill based on that behavior. 168 In this sense,
166. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1332-33 (1997).
167. Kahan and Nussbaum argue that provocation law does, and historically has, embodied an
"evaluative" view of emotion whereby legislatures and courts express, not only what provoking acts
empirically move people to passion, but also which emotional responses to provocation are morally
correct. They assert:
[Early] authorities clearly conceived of the categories in evaluative terms. The categories
embody judgments about what kinds of goods are appropriately valued and by whom. The
common law authorities, for example, viewed adultery as "the gravest possible offence which
a wife can commit against her husband" and "the highest invasion of [his] property" by
another man. The infidelity of an unmarried woman, however, was "entirely different," for
"the man has no such right to control the woman as a husband has to control his wife The
law must thus treat an enraged man who kills his girlfriend's lover differently from an
enraged man who kills his wife's paramour (even if both men are to be punished), not
because their emotions are different in intensity, but because their emotions reflect
valuations of honor and dignity that it would be morally obtuse to equate.
[W]hereas the early authorities constructed rigid legal categories to reflect what they
perceived as objectively grounded evaluations, contemporary authorities make the adequacy
of provocation an issue of fact for the jury so that the law may assess emotions against the
background of community mores. Nevertheless, while many courts no longer purport to
specify all the provocations that are adequate as a matter of law, they still occasionally
identify particular ones that are not.
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 133, at 307-10. While it may be an accurate historical and
contemporary observation that an underlying strain of logic in provocation law was to declare
prescriptively what would and could not be grounds for provocation, there are nonetheless serious
flaws in this approach. First, the express logic of provocation is that it is a mens rea issue; that is, at
least in part, a subjective rather than objective or prescriptive inquiry. Adhering to this explicit
justification, many courts will not engage in the evaluative discourse suggested by Kahan and
Nussbaum. This, in turn, leads to a disparate and arbitrary application of the provocation law.
Second, as I have suggested before, legal rules should be expressed affirmatively rather than hidden
contradictorily in case law. Finally, even if evaluative, the current evaluative mechanism in
provocation law, namely reasonableness, is flawed for reasons I discuss below.
168. Thus, the law can express authoritative disavowal for certain wife-killings (premised on
behavior which is not wrongful enough), but not for others. Joel Feinberg characterizes one of the
purposes of punishment as allowing the state to express "authoritative disavowal" of the acts of those
offending social norms. He states, "Punishing the [criminal] is an emphatic, dramatic, and well-
understood way of condemning and thereby disavowing, his act." JOEL FEINBERG, DOING &
DESERVING 102 (1970) (emphasis in original). Feinberg characterizes such prescriptive
determinations as part of the purpose of criminal punishment. He gives an example of the law
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provocation law can be normative because it does more than merely reflect the
passions of the defendant. Rather, it informs the defendant, and thereby society,
as to what may and what may not legitimately arouse passion.169
At this point, defenders of the provocation doctrine could argue that the
"reasonableness" requirement doctrinally addresses the problem of applying the
defense to those defendants and acts that ought to be condemned. The
reasonableness inquiry allows the law to exclude those whose reactions to
adulterous behavior fall outside the norm. 170 Depending on how subjectively the
law defines them, 171 reasonableness requirements offer more or less protection
disavowing paramour killings even when the majority of society agrees with the practice:
In the state of Texas, so-called paramour killings were regarded by the law as not merely
mitigated, but completely justifiable. Many humanitarians, I believe will feel quite
spontaneously that a great injustice is done when such killings are left unpunished ....
[They may feel] that paramour killings deserve to be condemned, that the law in condoning.
. them ... expresses the judgment of the "people of Texas" in whose name it speaks, that
the vindictive satisfaction in the mind of a cuckolded husband is a thing of greater value than
the very life of his wife's lover. The demand that paramour killings be punished may simply
be the demand that this lopsided value judgment be withdrawn and that the state go on
record against paramour killings and the law testify to the recognition that such killings are
wrongful.
Id. at 102-03.
169. This argument is an outgrowth of a certain deconstructive approach to the law most
commonly associated with Critical Legal Studies. Critical theorists posit that law by and large reflects
norms created by an entrenched majority. Thus, laws appearing on their face to be neutral both in
substance and procedural enactment, are in fact borne out of a non-neutral power structure in society.
See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (analyzing criticlal legal
studies movement); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE (David Kairys, ed., rev. ed.
1990) (examining law from viewpoints of class, race, and sex); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983) (criticizing institutional forms of democracy and
economics). This Article recognizes that victim liability law, as currently formulated, necessarily
leaves room for sexist, racist, and homophobic sentiments to enter the assessment of what constitutes
adequate and reasonable provocation. Having so deconstructed the provocation law, my
reconstructive aim is to propose a law which allows jurists to account for these sentiments and prevent
them from entering the legal analysis.
170. This illuminates yet another tension in the criminal law. Some of our criminal law instincts,
informed by our retributionist side, tell us that a person who acts out of passion and without deliberate
forethought should be less culpable than someone who acts deliberately. But our other instincts,
informed by our utilitarian side, tell us that those dangerous people who let the slightest provocation
easily move them to rage and killing are precisely the type of people the criminal law should remove
from society.
171. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,816-17 (N.D. 1983):
Courts have traditionally distinguished between standards of reasonableness by
characterizing them as either "objective" or "subjective." An objective standard of
reasonableness requires the factfinder to view the circumstances surrounding the accused at
the time he used force from the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable and prudent person.
Ordinarily, under such a view, the unique physical and psychological characteristics of the
accused are not taken into consideration in judging the reasonableness of the accused's
belief .... Under the subjective [reasonableness] standard the issue is not whether the
circumstances attending the accused's use of force would be sufficient to create in the mind
of a reasonable and prudent person the belief that the use of force is necessary to protect
himself against immediate unlawful harm, but rather whether the circumstances are
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against the "deviant" defendant. 172  Defined subjectively, reasonableness
depends more on the defendant's belief system and less on a fictional reasonable
(non-deviant) person's belief system. Defined more objectively, reasonableness
rests on the application of society-wide standards. 173  Whether defined
subjectively or objectively, there are problems with the reasonableness inquiry in
provocation law.
First, it is difficult to conceptualize how adultery alone would move a
"reasonable" person, under almost any standard, to take a life, no matter how
egregious the circumstances. 174  Thus, by carving out a category explicitly
including adultery, the law of provocation is essentially self-contradictory. It
counsels the jury to consider only reasonable provocations while formally
recognizing a category that consists nearly exclusively of unreasonable
provocations.
In addition, the fact that men prevail on provocation claims when they kill
wives who attempt to leave them is strong evidence that the reasonableness
requirement is not working. The reasonableness inquiry of provocation law has
been unsuccessful in eliminating the "deviant" class of defendants, who are too
easily inclined to kill. A simple extralegal analysis of provocation law might
reveal that the problem is simply one of sexist juries ignoring the reasonableness
prong and finding provocation where there is an unreasonable, easily-provoked
defendant. 75 Based on this, one might say an extra-legal solution is appropriate:
that is, changing society's attitude towards domestic violence. 176 One compelling
response to this contention is that the law itself ought to affirmatively eliminate
or at least police the borders of the operation of patriarchy in the criminal
system. 1
77
sufficient to induce in the accused an honest and reasonable belief that he must use force to
defend himself against imminent harm.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
172. The term "deviant" is meant to denote a defendant whose reaction is outside the norm.
173. See infra Part V.E for a further discussion of reasonableness and the distinction between
objective and subjective reasonableness.
174. Interesting anecdotal evidence may be found from a recent survey of my Criminal Law class.
I asked the students whether they thought it reasonable to kill an adulterous spouse. About half
thought it was reasonable. I then asked whether under the most extreme circumstances any of them
could imagine themselves killing an adulterous spouse. Only three answered in the affirmative. What
this demonstrates is that the law and popular culture have sent a message that killing an adulterous
spouse, and paradigmatically an adulterous female spouse, is reasonable. Our own internal moral
meters, however, seem to counsel differently.
175. This could also be a problem of sexist juries believing that domestic violence and the
behaviors attached thereto are reasonable. See Gena L. Durham, Note, The Domestic Violence
Dilemma: How our Ineffective and Varied Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71
S. CAL. L. REv. 641, 647 (1998) ("When the police did make arrests, prosecutors would frequently
drop domestic violence cases, sometimes because of their own ambivalence about domestic violence
and sometimes because of their acknowledgment that juries, which reflect society's attitudes about
domestic violence, might be reluctant to convict.") (footnotes omitted).
176. The argument is that the text of existing law does not create the problem, but rather its
application by ordinary members of society in a patriarchal environment.
177. One can draw an analogy in the jury selection arena. Although, in a vacuum, the availability
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A critical intra-legal examination of the reasonableness requirement
compels another response. The problem goes deeper than mere jury
nullification because it arises from the legal implications of the reasonableness
standard in provocation law. Requiring people to act reasonably, even
objectively reasonably, 178 does not provide adequate protection against sexist
defendants who kill their wives. 179 This is because statistical typicality often
defines objective reasonableness. Consequently, where racism or sexism is
prevalent in society, a defendant can be a "reasonable" racist i80 or a
"reasonable" wife-killer. Jody D. Armour discusses the problem with victim
liability law allowing defendants to rely on purportedly non-deviant racist
beliefs:
[There is a] fallacy of equating reasonableness with typicality. With
respect to race, prevailing beliefs and attitudes may fall short of what
we can fairly expect of people from the standpoint of what Professor
Eisenberg refers to as "social morality." If we accept that racial
discrimination violates contemporary social morality, then an actor's
failure to overcome his racism for the sake of another's health, safety,
and personal dignity is blameworthy and thus unreasonable,
independent of whether or not it is "typical." Although in most cases
the beliefs and reactions of typical people reflect what may fairly be
expected of a particular actor, this rule of thumb should not be
transformed into or confused with a normative or legal principle.
Nevertheless, this is precisely the error the "Reasonable Racist" makes
in claiming that the moral norm implicit in the objective test of
reasonableness extends no further than the proposition that "blame is
reserved for the (statistically) deviant." 181
The problem with reasonableness, then, is one of application. If
reasonableness requirements do incorporate prescriptive notions of morality,
then the concept of "reasonable" provocation would likely prevent mitigation
for wife abusers or racists. Reasonableness, however, as Armour observes, is
often equated with typicality or prevailing yet undesirable norms. In this
circumstance, reasonableness devolves into the jury's assessment of a "typical"
belief. The criticism then is that the law should not recognize killing as a
reasonable response to adultery or attempting to leave one's husband, despite
of peremptory challenges to parties in a prosecution appears to be fair and unbiased, racist sentiments
in society cause racist application of this neutral tool. The legal doctrine set forth in Batson v.
Kentucky policed the actual practice, rather than just the doctrine, of the peremptory strikes process to
make it consistent with Equal Protection. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
178. See supra note 171 for a discussion of reasonableness in State v. Liedholm.
179. Subjective reasonableness offers less protection against the reasonable racist, because the
jury is invited to determine whether the actions were reasonable "to the defendant."
180. According to Jody D. Armour, "The Reasonable Racist asserts that, even if his belief that
blacks are "prone to violence" stems from pure prejudice, he should be excused for considering the
victim's race before using force because most similarly situated Americans would have done so as
well." Armour, supra note 165, at 787. Moreover, the ability to use such a defense exposes
fundamental flaws in the legal construction of self-defense. Id. at 787-89.
181. Id. at 789-90 (quoting MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 15 (1988)).
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the purported empirical prevalence of the view that it is a reasonable
response. 182 This type of analysis is reflected in judicial decisions that refuse to
allow jurors to consider certain legitimate victim behavior as provocation, even if
that behavior is disfavored by society on bigoted grounds:
[W]hile many courts no longer purport to specify all the provocations
that are adequate as a matter of law, they still occasionally identify
particular ones that are not. Some (but not all) courts, for example,
have refused to permit defendants to present voluntary manslaughter
theories in cases in which their victims have made homosexual
advances toward the defendant or engaged in similar behavior. These
decisions... do not assume that the asserted provocations were
insufficient to destroy the defendants' volition; indeed, many of these
cases have excluded expert psychiatric testimony designed to show
exactly that. Rather they deem the provocations insufficient because
they conclude that the law should criticize rather than endorse the
evaluation of the victim's identity implicit in the defendant's rage.
183
The fact, however, that some judges, in practice, read an element of
wrongful victim behavior into the provocation law does not solve the problem.
First, not all judges interpret provocation law this way, leading to disparate
results. 184 Second, if the law is to make an affirmative normative statement that
it will only justify killing on the part of those defendants who responded
reasonably to wrongful conduct, the law as explicitly formulated should reflect
that statement. 185 The law should authoritatively disavow killings predicated on
less than wrongful conduct. 186  The incorporation of the wrongfulness
182. An anti-majoritarian, positivist argument is that the law ought to dictate rather than merely
reflect the prevailing mores of society.
183. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 133, at 310 (footnotes omitted). Some judges exclude
homosexual advance from adequate provocation on the basis of "reasonableness." See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that "whatever a person's
views about homosexuality, the law does not condone or excuse the killing of homosexuals any more
than it condones the killing of heterosexuals"). Other courts determine that killing based on
homosexual advance is per se unreasonable. See id. (stating that law does not recognize homosexual
activity as sufficient provocation to reduce unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter). These
courts do not leave it up to the jury to determine whether the killing was socially typical.
Consequently, although these courts use the term "reasonable," in fact they are declaring that
homosexual advance is not wrongful conduct such that it could ever justify killing. Id.
184. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of judicial arbitrariness.
185. Again, a silent revolution is not enough. See supra note 151-52 and accompanying text for
an advocation of the explicit creation of new legal rules.
186. Under the law thus formulated, provocation would not be available to defendants even if
they reasonably reacted to the provocation, so long as the victim's acts were not sufficiently wrongful.
Consequently, this reflects the notion that law prescribes what people ought to do or value rather than
merely reflecting what people in fact do or value. Being reasonable or within the statistical norm gives
way to being legal in a way specified particularly by law.
A problem, however, remains: retroactivity. The reasonable yet illegally acting defendant can
claim that he did not know that only certain reasonable provocations excused his conduct and that he
was merely reasonably reacting to the circumstances. While compelling, in American law, the
reasonable and good faith belief that your acts are legal is a mistake of governing law and generally no
excuse. See, e.g., People v. Mayer, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("It is an emphatic
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requirement in the victim liability defense will allow the law to be prescriptive.
The law will be able to dictate presumptively those victim behaviors that
legitimately reduce defendant culpability.
The critic may nonetheless object that even the requirement of
"wrongfulness" rather than "reasonableness" may bring up the above problems.
For example, a racist might believe that an interracial couple kissing in the park
are behaving "wrongfully," and a homophobe could term a homosexual advance
"wrongful" conduct. The fact is that defining right and wrong, like defining
reasonable and unreasonable, is a tricky enterprise. If one defines wrongfulness
completely objectively and without reference to any contemporary beliefs, it can
seem hopelessly arbitrary. If one defines it with reference to prevailing norms,
the definition is vulnerable to Armour's criticism of reasonableness standards.
This does not mean, however, that the addition of the requirement of
"wrongfulness" to the provocation equation is meaningless. By requiring that
the victim has acted wrongfully, the law sends a powerful message that only bad
acts on the part of the victim can trigger the legal mechanism which allows the
defendant's behavior to be assessed in context. If the victim has not acted
wrongfully, the defendant does not have a defense. It does not matter how
reasonably the defendant has acted in response to the victim's non-wrongful
behavior. This itself is a moral choice and a policy choice. One certainly could
argue that if a defendant is reasonably provoked, he is less culpable, regardless
of whether the victim acted wrongfully. Based on the foregoing arguments,
however, this Article contends that lessening liability because of victim conduct
only makes moral sense in cases where the victim has acted wrongfully.
Turning back to the adultery context, one might claim that adultery, in most
cultures, is wrongful. Thus, even with the wrongfulness requirement, the law
may nonetheless permit batterers to kill their abused but adulterous wives.
There are two immediate responses. First, the non-specific victim liability
defense can define wrongfulness in such a way as to exclude adultery from its
ambit.187 Second, critics of provocation in the adultery context contend that
provocation law should only provide a defense to a person who
uncharacteristically killed because of extraordinary circumstances.1 8 8 It should
not provide a defense to men with previous histories of violence:
Homicide law divides sane individuals who intentionally kill into two
major categories: those who premeditate murder and those who act in
the heat of passion. Social stereotypes of wife-killing that characterize
the killer as a previously non-violent man who "snapped" under
postulate of both civil and penal law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof.").
This emphasizes the principle that law is a prescriptive rather than descriptive enterprise.
187. See supra Part V.A for an argument that the law is arbitrarily incomplete because the law
does not cover many crimes and victim behaviors.
188. This contention is, of course, based on an assumption about the nature of criminal sanctions,
namely, that only good, non-criminal people should receive the benefit of the provocation defense.
The counterargument is that even provocation of the criminally predisposed is possible. This debate is
most starkly exemplified by the arguments over the predisposition requirement in entrapment. See
infra Part V.C for an argument that juries may synthesize victim precipitation unfairly.
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pressure, roughly parallel the understandings which underlie heat-of
passion doctrine. However, this social stereotype is grossly inaccurate
when applied to men who are identified as "batterers" and when
applied to the general category of husband-wife killings. Violence
perpetrated by abusive men is purposeful, not spontaneous; the
majority of men who kill their wives have a documented history of
violent assaults.1 89
The current provocation law does not formally distinguish predisposed killers
from those who kill uncharacteristically. The non-specific victim liability
defense, by contrast, requires that the defendant not be predisposed to the
criminal act. Thus, those husbands predisposed to violence against their wives
would not be able to claim the defense. The decision to include a requirement of
lack of predisposition has benefits and drawbacks. Part V.D will discuss these in
detail.
Consequently, the non-specific victim liability defense is more coherent
than existing law because it eliminates many of the irrational classifications that
occur under current law. In addition, this defense is more desirable because it is
more prescriptive than the existing law. The non-specific victim liability defense,
which is based on wrongful rather than merely provoking conduct, sends the
message that the government only permits private citizens to harm in response to
legally sufficient wrongful conduct. In doing so, it allows judges and juries more
room to take into account the fairness of the treatment of the victim (essentially,
to what extent the victim deserved the defendant's conduct) and not just the
mens rea of the defendant.1 90 Interestingly then, as it impacts the preexisting law
of provocation, the non-specific victim liability defense is in fact more victim-
friendly. It affirmatively states that criminal responses to less than wrongful
victim behavior are not tolerable.
C. In the Current System, Juries May Synthesize Victim Precipitation Unfairly
Even outside the self-defense and provocation context, victim behavior
evidence is introduced into the trial in a variety of ways. For example, wrongful
victim behavior evidence, brought into the trial as background evidence,
evidence of intent, or evidence of credibility,1 91 is in fact assessed by juries, t92 but
189. Coker, supra note 153, at 93.
190. The defendant who kills his wife for threatening to leave him could qualify for a provocation
defense. See supra note 166 and accompanying text for a discussion of how many spouse murders
involve no infidelity, just the victim's desire to leave the relationship. A defendant in such a case
would not, however, qualify for the victim liability defense because threatening to leave one's husband
is not a wrongful act.
191. Generally, prior wrongful behavior is inadmissible. However, it may be admissible if
independently relevant in proving more than just the bad character of the witness. See FED. R. EVID.
404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ....
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without guidance as to the proper assessment of that evidence. This evidence
could include past victim behavior that has nothing to do with the instant crime,
yet the jury will hold it against the government. 193 Similarly, juries will take into
account precipitate victim behavior that is not wrongful, but merely negligent, to
acquit defendants often in a way that is disempowering to women and
minorities. t94 This is most starkly exemplified by jurors' syntheses of precipitate
behavior in rape trials, but it can also happen with race and socioeconomic
status. 195 A non-specific victim liability defense would formalize doctrinally 96
192. See Gobert, supra note 11, at 538 (discussing how jurors take into account victim
precipitation); see generally HARVEY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)
(discussing empirical study of juror attitudes).
193. In the rape context, shield laws emerged as a response to jurors engaging in this type of
faulty analysis. Though past sexual conduct evidence had little, if anything, to do with consent, the
jury would hold the evidence against the government's case. Martha Chamallas observes:
In the courtroom, the language of lawyers, judges, or even witnesses can highlight or
"prime" familiar images in the mind of jurors and increase the chance that jurors will resort
to biased prototypes in deciding whether a crime or injury occurred or whether legal
protection is warranted. To prevent activation of biased prototypes, exclusionary rules such
as rape shield laws are sometimes useful to prevent the jury from receiving information that
might lead them to commit the fundamental attribution error and to ascribe the cause of the
rape to the victim's character.
Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747,803-04 (2001).
194. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the negative impacts of focusing on precipitate behavior.
A famous study of American juries in the 1960s revealed the following:
[The] rewriting of the law of rape to accommodate the defendant when the female victim has
taken the risk is on occasion carried to a cruel extreme. There are cases in which the
situation is clearly aggravated by extrinsic violence, but the jury is still lenient to the
defendant. In one such case the judge tells us: This was a savage case of rape. Jaw of
complaining witness fractured in two places. Nevertheless the jury acquits when it learns
that there may have been intercourse with the complainant on prior occasions. In another
case the jury's reaction is equally disturbing. Again the rape appears to have been brutal.
Three men kidnap a girl from the street at 1:30 in the morning, take her to an apartment, and
attack her. The judge states: It developed that the young unmarried girl had two
illegitimate children; also defendant claimed she was a prostitute. No, evidence of
prostitution was introduced except by defendant's testimony. He calls the [not guilty] verdict
"a travesty of justice."
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 192, at 251.
195. In the rape context, jurors focus on whether the victim "deserved" to be raped rather than
whether there was consent:
Although the material fact to be decided is whether or not there was consent, the jury sets
aside this inquiry and instead decides whether or not the complainant is "responsible" for or
"deserves" the ensuing rape: In 1989, a circuit court jury in Florida acquitted [a] 26-year-old
[defendant] of abducting a 22-year-old woman at knife point and repeatedly raping her. The
jury based its finding partly on the fact that she was wearing a lace miniskirt without
underwear. In explaining the decision of the three-man, three-woman jury, foreman Roy
Diamond said: "We felt she asked for it for the way she was dressed."
Gruber, supra note 4, at 211 (quoting Lani Anne Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for
a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1123 (1993)). In terms of race and
socioeconomic status, experts claimed that the jury's acquitting of famed subway gunman Bernard
Goetz was based, at least in part, on impermissible stereotyping and reliance on past criminal acts of
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that which currently occurs on informal or less formal levels. By doing so, the
defense could serve the purpose of policing the jury by telling jurors exactly what
to do with evidence of victim wrongfulness, which particular evidence is relevant
to the defense, and the parameters of the defense.
197
D. Victim Precipitation Evidence Currently Enters the Criminal Process on an
Ad Hoc Basis
Both prosecutors and judges take into account wrongful victim conduct to
varying degrees depending on the facts of the case, the defendant, or their
particular viewpoints and prejudices. Prosecutors account for victim
precipitation at the charging and plea bargaining stages on an ad hoc basis. As a
consequence, victim wrongfulness lessens defendant liability to varying degrees,
based not on any set of standards, but rather on the whim of the prosecutor. The
most obvious problem with an unfettered exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
that similarly situated defendants are treated differently. This, in turn, causes
certain offenders to be punished too lightly and certain innocent defendants to
forgo trial in fear of a harsher sentence if they are convicted by the jury.198
In addition, the existence of an abundance of discretion can also allow
undesirable prejudices to enter prosecutorial decisions:
Prosecutors also rely on assumption of risk principles in their decisions
to prosecute rape cases. Surprisingly, these principles often slip,
perhaps subconsciously, into their arguments during trial. One
prosecutor argued in closing: "You wouldn't let a burglar go free
because the door was not locked. Don't let a rapist go free because [a
the victims. See Carter, supra note 77, at 421 (describing society's view of Bernard Goetz as heroic
victim).
196. Rather than existing as a silent revolution in the law by unlikely judicial interpretation, the
victim liability defense will formulate doctrinally the boundaries of wrongful victim behavior that serve
to limit defendant liability. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text for the argument
advocating explicit creation of legal rules.
197. This can be achieved both by lawyers arguments as to the relevance of evidence as well as
the judge's instructions. The presumption then is that jurors follow instructions. See Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985) ("[W]e adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our
constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions."); Parker v. Randolph,
442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) ("A crucial assumption underlying [the jury] system is that juries will follow the
instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to
instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because
the jury was improperly instructed.").
198. Prosecutorial discretion has two main problems, which have been discussed exhaustively in
legal literature: (1) punishing offenders too lightly in the name of convenience and, conversely, (2)
creating a system in which innocents are compelled to declare themselves guilty so as to avoid harsher
punishment in the event of an unsuccessful trial. These criticisms are made both by defendant and
victim advocates. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 752 (1996) ("Until recent times, opponents of plea bargaining tended to view it as
unnecessarily compromising rights of the defendant. Recently, however, plea bargaining has come
under attack from those who believe it has resulted in insufficient punishment for offenders.")
(footnote omitted).
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woman] is too dumb not to make herself an easy mark." 199
There are circumstances in which legitimate predictions of the success of a
self-defense claim lead a plea offer favorable to the defendant. Other times,
however, prosecutors will make good plea offers, not for legitimate legal reasons,
but rather based upon the presupposition that juror prejudice will lead to
acquittal. A defendant accused of violently raping a prostitute, for example, may
receive a better plea offer than a defendant who committed a less egregious
sexual assault against a non-prostitute.
The non-specific victim liability defense could help police the boundaries of
prosecutorial discretion by offering, at least, more of a basis for predicting what
might happen at trial, thereby reducing arbitrariness.2°° In addition, such a
liability defense can help control prosecutors by sending a message that victim
wrongfulness, rather than mere negligence, bad character, or imprudence, is at
the heart of the defense.
Similarly, judges assess victim behavior during sentencing on an ad hoc
basis.20 1 The problem here is that, much like prosecutorial discretion, judicial
discretion as to victim precipitation inserts arbitrariness into the process. Judges
will be moved to different degrees by victim wrongfulness and, especially
without guidelines, will sentence similarly situated defendants vastly
differently.
202
In modern criminal law, however, sentencing is regulated by guidelines in
many jurisdictions. Some guidelines contemplate the assessment of victim
conduct. For example, Guideline § 5K2.10 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
"Victim's Conduct (Policy Statement)," provides, "[ilf the victim's wrongful
conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court
199. Gruber, supra note 4, at 218-19 (quoting GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 175 (1989)) (footnote omitted).
200. Arbitrariness is ultimately symptomatic of any system in which there is prosecutorial
discretion and does not just specifically attach to victim precipitation cases. As a matter of my own
experience and common sense, however, the more certain the results of the potential trial, the more
uniform plea bargaining and charging decisions become. Thus, a law that makes the impact of victim
conduct evidence at trial more uniform will also make plea bargaining and charging more determinate.
201. See Gobert, supra note 11, at 539 (discussing studies indicating ways in which judges
incorporate victim behavior into sentencing).
202. Compare United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding downward
departure pursuant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003) not warranted based
on victim Abner Luima's alleged illegal conduct and resisting arrest as provoking violent police
assault), with United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding downward
departure pursuant to U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003) warranted based on
victim Rodney King's alleged illegal drunk driving and resisting arrest as provoking violent police
assault). Granted, these two cases are factually distinct both in the behavior of the victims and the
assault committed by the police officers. Nonetheless, they illustrate the narrow or expansive
treatment of § 5K2.10 based on the ideology of the judge. In the Volpe case, the court indicated that §
5K2.10 was inappropriate all together because of the sexual nature of the attack, thus giving § 5K2.10 a
narrow interpretation. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 93. In Koon, under the guise of § 5K2.10, the judge
took into account not only Rodney King's "wrongful" behavior, but also the fact that the state jury
acquitted Koon and the "punishment" he received from massive media coverage. Koon, 833 F. Supp.
at 785-86, 790-93. Thus, the court read § 5K2.10 in an incredibly expansive manner.
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may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and
circumstances of the offense." 20 3
It is true that guidelines like this standardize to some degree the judicial
application of victim liability concerns. Pursuant to the federal sentencing
guidelines, however, victim conduct manifests as a grounds for downward
departure. 20 4  Under federal law, departures are technically discretionary
decisions by the judge.205 Thus, although the judges do have decisional appellate
cases to guide their assessment of victim behavior, there is still an element of
arbitrariness to the application of victim behavior to guideline sentences.
Moreover, the practical reality is that downward departures were intended by
the legislature to be, and in fact are, rare. 206 To the extent that justice requires
that defendants who respond to wrongful victim behaviors be treated differently
than defendants who do not, downward departures are probably the least
effective method of achieving just results. 207
In addition to arbitrariness and efficacy concerns, there are other practical
and philosophical reasons why victim wrongfulness should properly be addressed
at the liability phase of a criminal prosecution. As a practical matter, one can
assert that the most important decisions regarding the effect of a penal law on
the defendant should be made by juries. This Article does not necessarily
endorse the concept that juries are universally better arbiters of fact than judges.
Nonetheless, the contention is that our system assumes, arguably correctly, that
juries are the most ideal fact-finders. They are chosen at random, do not have
political or personal designs, and can most fairly decide the facts of a case.20 8
One could say, judges, especially in this victims' rights era, might be afraid to
apply victim liability rules during sentencing in fear of the perception that they
are not "tough on crime" or that they let the defendant go "on a technicality. '" 20 9
On a philosophical level, there is a difference between the facts of a criminal
transaction that determine liability and those that guide sentencing. 210  If
203. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 630 (8th Cir. 2003) (deciding that trial court's
discretionary denial of downward departure was not reviewable by Court of Appeals).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 325 F.3d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that facts
underlying downward departure must be "sufficiently extraordinary to take the defendant out of the
heartland of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines").
207. This is precisely because they are intended to occur rarely. See, e.g., United States v. King,
280 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that downward departure is only warranted in "extremely
rare cases") (quoting United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999)).
208. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604,
632 (1994) ("Juries are undoubtedly better fact finders than judges about conventional affairs ....").
209. This problem is often encountered in the application of the exclusionary rule. According to
Donald Dripps, "Exclusion, however, suffers a serious psychological problem. Judges are reluctant to
free obviously guilty criminals. Trial judges, therefore, tilt fact-finding against exclusion, while
appellate judges give constitutional rights crabbed and grudging interpretations. As a result, it is fair
to say that the Fourth Amendment is still underenforced." Donald Dripps, The Case for the
Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001).
210. This idea, that certain factors properly belong at trial rather than sentencing, underlies the
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something negates or lessens criminal liability, that is, the moral and legal
culpability of the defendant, it properly belongs at the liability phase. This is
why lack of intent, self-defense, and provocation are all defenses to the crime,
and not simply factors in sentencing. Sentencing arguably takes into account
non-transactional factors, factors that generally speak to the defendant's (and
victim's) character 211 rather than specifically to what occurred between the
defendant and the victim. 212 It is true that sentencing guideline litigation,
reflected by the Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey213 and its
progeny, has highlighted that the line between liability factors and sentencing
factors is quite blurry.214 Nonetheless, there is no good reason for insisting that
the general assessment of victim liability should occur only at the sentencing
level.
The non-specific victim liability defense will put the power to lessen the
defendant's liability or punishment back in the jury's hands. The elements of the
defense will be argued by counsel, and the judge will charge the jury with
determining whether the elements were factually present. The decision will no
longer be left to the caprice of the judge during sentencing.
E. The Current Law Contains Technical Limitations that Unfairly Exclude
Defendants
Perhaps the most salient example of an existing defense in criminal law
based solely on wrongful victim conduct is self-defense. 215 Self-defense operates
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Court, noting the
"Framers' fears that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion," observed
that "practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a
jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond reasonable
doubt .... [T]he reasonable doubt requirement has a vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent
reasons." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84 (internal quotations omitted).
The disjuncture here is that the Court's decision was specifically limited to purported
"sentencing" factors that allowed the judge to increase the statutory maximum. One could find some
connection between a factor that would allow punishment greater than the statutory maximum and
factors, like victim wrong-doing, that would call for punishment under all statutory minimums (that is,
no punishment at all).
211. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the assessment of defendant
and victim characters during sentencing.
212. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines explicitly recognize background and character as a basis
for determining a sentence. According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, "[i]n determining the
sentence to impose within the guideline range ... the court may consider, without limitation, any
information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise
prohibited by law." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2003).
213. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
214. This is because there are more subtle lines drawn between mere sentencing factors and trial
factors. See generally Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land": Statutory
Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 379, 389 (2002) (discussing,
in part, the uncertainty of the boundaries of Apprendi).
215. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of self-defense. The fact that
victim behavior and even character is at the center of self-defense is evidenced in laws that permit "a
person charged with homicide or assault to prove, in support of a self-defense claim, that the alleged
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to absolve the defendant of liability when the victim has engaged in imminently
life-threatening conduct, such that defensive force is necessary (or the defendant
reasonably believes this to be the case). 216 A reasonable mistake of fact defense
(that is, the defendant may still avail herself of self-defense where there was
actually no imminent threat but she was reasonably mistaken that there was) is
built into the definition of self-defense. 217 In its simplest form, as in jurisdictions
where there is no duty to retreat,218 the self-defense rule is expansive, allowing
for the use of deadly force even when retreating safely is an option. Some
jurisdictions emphasize mainly the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that
the danger is imminent, 219 while others focus additionally on whether the amount
of force employed was reasonable. 220 Some self-defense formulations set forth
victim had a bad general reputation for violence." Peraita v. State, No. CR-01-0289, 2003 WL
21246440, at *13 (Ala. Crim. App. May 30, 2003).
216. See People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 245 (Cal. 1974) (articulating that homicide is justifiable
under circumstances set forth in Penal Code § 197); Shafer v. State, 13 S.E.2d 798, 802 (Ga. 1941)
(holding that where person kills in self-defense "such homicide is justifiable"); People v. Motuzas, 185
N.E. 614, 617 (Ill. 1933) (noting "[o]ne may intentionally kill in self-defense and not be guilty of
murder.") (footnote omitted); People v. Jones, 145 N.E. 110, 114 (I11. 1924) (stating that defendant
who believes he is in danger of great bodily injury should be found not guilty); Thomas v. State, 262
A.2d 797, 800 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (describing when killing in self-defense is excusable); Perez v.
State, 300 P. 428, 429 (Okla. Crim. App. 1931) (recognizing and defining "justifiable homicide in self-
defense"); State v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46, 50-51 (Utah 1938) (stating that homicide is justifiable to defend
from imminent danger); Smith v. Commonwealth, 182 S.E. 124, 127 (Va. 1935) (distinguishing
between justifiable and excusable homicide).
217. See, e.g., Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 816-17 (describing standard by which accused's mistake is
to be judged reasonable). The determination of reasonableness may be either objective, subjective, or
something in between. Compare United States v. Scout, 112 F.3d 955, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1997); State v.
Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 751 (Conn. 1995); Brown v. United States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C. 1992);
State v. Stallings, 541 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Iowa 1995); Buchanan v. State, 567 So.2d 194, 198 (Miss 1990);
State v. McKoy, 422 S.E.2d 713, 716 (N.C. 1992); State v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1021, 1026 (N.J. 1999) (all
applying objective reasonableness standards), with Brown v. State, 528 S.E.2d 868, 870 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000); People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681, 700 (Ill. 1999); Milam v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.
1999) (all applying subjective reasonableness standard).
218. Some jurisdictions require retreat, see, for example, FLA. STANDARD CRIM. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS. 3.6(f):
Retreat. Read in all cases:
The fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify [his or her] use of force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm if by retreating [he or she] could have avoided the
need to use that force. However, if the defendant was placed in a position of imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm and it would have increased [his or her] own danger to
retreat, then [his or her] use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was
justifiable.
Others do not. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) ("There is no
duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force justified by subsection A of this
section.").
219. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) (describing Connecticut's
requirement that force used in self-defense be both necessary and reasonable).
220. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 807 A.2d 500, 508-09 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (describing North
Carolina's imminent danger standard for assessing reasonableness of defendant's belief); see also
LAFAVE, supra note 116, at § 5.7, 5.7(b) ("In determining how much force one may use in self-defense,
the law recognizes that the amount of force which he may justifiably use must be reasonably related to
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concrete parameters of the defense. For example, certain self-defense rules
predicate the duty to retreat on attendant facts such as who was the first
aggressor, 221 and whether the initial threatening act occurred inside a
curtilage. 2 2 These particular parameters, as well as the narrow nature of the
wrongful behavior committed by the victim (imminently threatening behavior),
serve to place limits on the criminal law's recognition of the right to use deadly
force. 223 The idea is that the criminal law countenances the private use of deadly
force solely in the narrowest of circumstances.
The incredibly specific nature of self-defense has created difficult problems,
as well as a vast collection of literature, regarding non-paradigmatic cases of self-
defense.224 By this, I mean self-defense cases that do not neatly fit into the
factual framework of warding off an immediate aggressor, for example, battered
women who kill their sleeping abusers.225 While confrontational cases in which
battered women ward off immediate attack are intuitively easier to fit into the
the threatened harm which he seeks to avoid.").
221. See, e.g., People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 344 (Colo. 2000) (holding that "under Colorado law
only an initial aggressor has a duty to retreat").
222. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 278 § 8A (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) ("There shall be
no duty on said occupant to retreat from such person unlawfully in said dwelling.").
223. See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71
N.C. L. REV. 371, 378 (1993) (asserting that imminence requirement serves as condition precedent to
self-defense with "goal of limiting self-defense only to those who act out of the most dire necessity").
224. The most problematic and controversial non-paradigmatic case of self-defense is arguably
the battered woman who kills her sleeping husband. This situation is the subject of a near anthology
of legal literature. See generally David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome
in the Age of Science, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 67 (1997) (providing that traditional criteria of self-defense
may not be met in cases involving battered woman syndrome); Rosen, supra note 223 (analyzing
imminence of danger requirement in context of battered women cases); Robert F. Schopp et al.,
Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45 (1994) (arguing that use of battered woman syndrome may harm defendant's
claim of self-defense).
225. Perhaps the most famous case of nonconfrontational self-defense is Norman. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals's holding that the defendant, who had killed
her sleeping batterer after suffering years of abuse and death threats, could not assert self-defense.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13. The Supreme Court opined:
The evidence in this case did not tend to show that the defendant reasonably believed that
she was confronted by a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm. The evidence
tended to show that no harm was "imminent" or about to happen to the defendant when she
shot her husband. The uncontroverted evidence was that her husband had been asleep for
some time when she walked to her mother's house, returned with the pistol, fixed the pistol
after it jammed and then shot her husband three times in the back of the head. The
defendant was not faced with an instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being
killed or seriously injured. Instead, all of the evidence tended to show that the defendant
had ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing further abuse by her
husband. There was no action underway by the decedent from which the jury could have
found that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe either that a felonious assault
was imminent or that it might result in her death or great bodily injury. Additionally, no
such action by the decedent had been underway immediately prior to his falling asleep.
Id. Quite clearly, the thrust of the holding is that the imminence requirement, when viewed as a
condition precedent, precludes a self-defense claim in the nonconfrontation scenario.
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traditional self-defense framework because they mirror paradigmatic self-
defense scenarios, 226 the same cannot be said of nonconfrontational situations. 22 7
As the women's movement progressed in the last twenty years, domestic
violence became a subject of legal and social interest and debate.228 Concurrent
with the increasing awareness of domestic violence issues came the development
of a legal debate over battered women who kill their batterers. Because of the
technical requirements of imminence and necessity, jurors and judges had a
difficult time fitting battered women, especially those who killed sleeping
abusers, into the self-defense framework. Courts and juries struggled to see how
a battered woman, whom they believed could have left the relationship, killed
out of "necessity" or how a sleeping batterer or man or husband could be an
"imminent" attacker. 229 In addition, jurors doubted the veracity of the claims of
abuse, believing that if abuse had occurred, the woman would have left.230 In
226. One expert has argued that the controversy over battered woman syndrome and all of its
attendant problems has been quite overstated because, in fact, most battered women kill in
confrontational situations:
Two hundred twenty-three cases were identified as meeting the definition established for
battered women's homicide cases. These cases generated a total of 270 opinions. The
incidents, rather than the opinions, were used as the base for this portion of the Article's
analysis. Of the 223 incidents comprising the base, 75% involve confrontations. Twenty
percent are nonconfrontational cases (4% "contract killings," 8% sleeping-man cases, and
8% defendant as initial aggressor during a lull in the violence). In the remaining 5%, the
appellate opinions did not include a discussion of the incident facts introduced at trial. As
the breakdown indicates, the appellate opinions do not support the conclusion that most
battered women kill during nonconfrontational situations.
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 396-97 (1991) (footnotes omitted). But see CHARLES P. EWING,
BATIERED WOMEN WHO KILL 34 (1987) (asserting that two-thirds of such killings occur in
nonconfrontational situations). The obvious response to Professor Maguigan is that even if only
comprising 20% of the total killings, there must be some analysis of whether the law treats this 20% in
a logical, consistent, and coherent manner.
227. See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 12 (describing battered wife who killed sleeping husband); see
also Ex Parte Haney, 603 So.2d 412, 416-17 (Ala. 1992) (alleged battered wife ordered hit-man killing
of husband); People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding battered woman
hired hit-man to kill husband); Lentz v. State, 604 So.2d 243, 245-46 (Miss. 1992) (illustrating battered
woman shot decedent in two physical locations and decedent had tried to retreat); Leidholm, 334
N.W.2d at 813-14 (describing battered woman killed sleeping husband).
228. Richard D. Friedman and Bridget MeCormack observe, "Over the last decade, legislatures,
courts, law enforcement authorities, and the public have shown an increased awareness of the extent
and seriousness of domestic violence. Efforts to curb this terrible problem have intensified at the
national, state, and local levels." Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1171,1181 (2002). For an excellent discussion of domestic violence, feminism, and law,
see generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000).
229. See supra note 224 and accompanying text for a discussion of battered woman's syndrome,
self-defense, and imminent danger.
230. Schopp et al. describe how juries synthesize a woman's failure to leave as relevant to her
credibility:
Some advocate expert testimony as relevant to the credibility of the defendants' testimony.
Many cases involve such intense and prolonged patterns of abuse that many jurors might
doubt the defendants' credibility. These jurors might conclude that the defendants must be
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response, defense attorneys began to offer expert psychological evidence to show
the jury why a battered woman would reasonably believe that she faced
imminent danger such that killing was necessary. Such evidence could also show
why the battered woman stayed in an abusive relationship. 231
This evidence, known as "battered woman syndrome" evidence, was
developed by studies performed in the 1970s and 1980s by Dr. Lenore Walker. 232
Dr. Walker hypothesized that women in battering relationships exhibited
correlative factors such as traditional attitudes toward the role of women,
external locus of control, low self-esteem, and depression. 233 Dr. Walker also
contended that battered women suffered from "learned helplessness," a
condition whereby the subject having been repeatedly exposed to adverse stimuli
later fails to take advantage of apparent opportunities to escape the adverse
situation.234 As a result of these factors and conditions, battered women remain
in abusive relationships and suffer reduced motivation to escape from them. 235
exaggerating the abuse because no one would have remained in the relationship if such
abuse had actually occurred. Such doubts might then lead the jurors to generally discount
the defendants' testimony.
Schopp et al., supra note 224, at 52 (footnote omitted). Some experts contend that the focus on the
woman's obligation to separate is, indeed, misplaced. This uninformed focus underpins many of the
problems that have arisen concerning the stereotypical views of the battered woman. Martha
Mahoney observes:
Law assumes-pretends-the autonomy of women. Every legal case that discusses the
question "why didn't she leave?" implies that the woman could have left. We need to
challenge the coercion of women's choices, reveal the complexity of women's experience and
struggle, and recast the entire discussion of separation in terms of the batterer's violent
attempts at control. Although it is still focused on successful and final separation as the key
event, the recently developed term "postseparation woman abuse" begins to grapple with
the problem of revealing the issue of power and control in women's experience of violence.
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 64 (1991) (footnote omitted).
231. Experts remark:
Courts and commentators contend that expert testimony regarding the battered woman
syndrome in general and learned helplessness in particular can correct this tendency to
discount the defendants' testimony by enabling the jurors to understand that the defendants
could have remained in these relationships for extended periods despite severe and frequent
abuse. These witnesses explain that defendants who suffer learned helplessness either fail to
perceive available alternatives to the relationships or are unable to exercise these options.
Thus, learned helplessness supports the credibility of these defendants by rendering
plausible their testimony that they remained in battering relationships for extended periods
despite enduring severe abuse.
Schopp et al., supra note 224, at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
232. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) (describing
Dr. Walker's research, its impetus, and its findings).
233. Id. at 75-85.
234. Id. at 86 ("The theoretical concept of 'learned helplessness' has been adapted to this
research to explain why women find it difficult to escape a battering relationship.").
235. Dr. Walker explains:
[T]he women's experiences of the noncontingent nature of their attempts to control the
violence would, over time, produce learned helplessness and depression as the "repeated
batterings, like electrical shocks, diminish the woman's motivation to respond." (Walker,
[Vol. 76
2003] CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN AN ERA OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 697
Resorting to syndrome evidence to solve the difficulties in the
nonconfrontation scenario, however, is a sub-optimal evidentiary solution to a
doctrinal problem. The introduction of battered woman syndrome evidence is
problematic for several reasons. First, it does not logically make the
nonconfrontational killing scenario fit the imminence and necessity
requirements. Because of this, critics argue that introduction of syndrome
evidence is a clever yet impermissible way to get evidence of the victim's prior
crimes in front of the jury.236 Second, there are problems inherent in the reliance
on a psychological condition to justify the defendant's behavior. Some experts
argue that the science itself is flawed,237 while others point out that
characterizing abused women as suffering from a "syndrome" has a socially
stigmatizing effect. 238 Third, because of these doctrinal and practical problems,
battered woman syndrome evidence is treated vastly differently from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction and even from judge to judge in similar factual scenarios.2 39 As a
1979). If a woman is to escape such a relationship, she must overcome the tendency to
learned helplessness survival techniques-by, for example, becoming angry rather than
depressed and self-blaming; active rather than passive ....
Id. at 87.
236. Critics claim that the criminal trial is no place to advance even a socially-desirable agenda:
Domestic violence is appalling and each member of this Court empathizes with the victims
of this degrading conduct. However, our empathy and distress with the violence which
affects our society cannot be substituted for a rule of law which limits the scope of appellate
review to the facts presented by the case. In addition, any rule of law must be applied
equally to each citizen, regardless of gender.
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 16 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
237. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 224, at 106-07 (footnote omitted):
The sine qua non of the scientific enterprise is testability. Importantly, however, Sir Karl
Popper, the philosopher of science most closely associated with this insight, originally
described it as "falsifiability." The main point, he urged, was that scientific hypotheses gain
strength and are corroborated through their ability to withstand attempts at falsification.
This failure to subject syndrome research to falsification attempts is perhaps the greatest
weakness of the battered woman syndrome theory. The researchers have ceased to be
scientists, if they ever were, for they are not interested in truly testing their hypotheses.
They merely want to obtain some confirmation in order to fulfill a political agenda. The
difficulty in conducting social science research, therefore, does not lie in the subject's
complexity, but rather in the condemnation that would result from unpopular findings.
Legal scholars can be sympathetic to this difficulty, but they should not succumb to the
mistaken belief that these politically motivated observations are valid in any empirical sense.
(citing KARL POPPER, CONJECTURE AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWrH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
33-59 (1963)).
238. See Mahoney, supra note 230, at 4 (footnotes omitted):
Psychological analysis, in particular, has responded to the sharp demand for explanation of
women's actions in the self-defense cases. Yet the sociological and psychological literature
still reflect some of the oppressive cultural heritage that has shaped legal doctrines. Even
when expertise is developed by feminists who explain that women act rationally under
circumstances of oppression, courts and the press often interpret feminist expert testimony
through the lens of cultural stereotypes, retelling a simpler vision of women as victims too
helpless or dysfunctional to pursue a reasonable course of action.
239. Compare Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 90-91 (S.C. 1992) (holding self-defense may be
satisfied when battered woman believes she is in imminent danger, even though there is no imminent
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result, focusing on battered woman syndrome evidence is a misplaced focus.
Rather than using syndrome evidence to try to make the facts of the battered
woman's case fit the technicalities of self-defense, the focus should be placed on
a critical analysis of the technicalities of self-defense that prevent the battered
woman from successfully utilizing the defense.
While battered woman syndrome evidence would be less controversial if it
actually did make the nonconfrontational killing situation compatible with the
imminence and necessity requirements, the syndrome does not logically do so.
Turning to imminence first, self-defense often requires as a condition precedent
to the use of deadly force that grievous bodily injury to the defendant be
"imminent. '240 "Imminence" is defined by courts as denoting a temporal
relationship between the defensive force and the attack by the victim. Thus,
harm to the defendant is "imminent" when, at the time the defendant used the
deadly force, there was an "immediate, real threat to one's safety, '24t or "some
act menacing present peril. '242 Scholars observe:
A standard allowing defensive force only when necessary to prevent an
threat present), with State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding battered
woman syndrome is insufficient to sustain claim for self-defense when there is no imminent serious
physical injury from husband).
240. See, e.g., People v. Williams, No. 238124, 2003 WL 1985255, at *1 (Mich. App. Apr. 29,2003)
("A person is acting in justifiable self-defense if, under all the circumstances, he honestly and
reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it is necessary
for him to exercise deadly force."). The requirement that harm to the defendant be imminent is
similar to the requirement that that the use of deadly force be "immediately necessary." See, e.g.,
State v. Faust, 660 N.W.2d 844, 873 (Neb. 2003) (footnote omitted) ("To successfully assert the claim
of self-defense, a defendant must have a reasonable and good faith belief in the necessity of using
force and the force used in defense must be immediately necessary and justified under the
circumstances."). However, they are not the same thing. "Immediately necessary" means that the
defensive force necessarily must be used in temporal proximity, but it does not imply that the attack
on the part of the victim is to occur in temporal proximity. In other words, although defense force is
necessary now, the victim's attack may be set to occur at a later date. See Schopp et al., supra note
224, at 67-68 (footnote omitted):
The central question involves the appropriate relationship between the necessity and
imminence requirements. A standard allowing defensive force only when immediately
necessary to prevent unlawful harm treats imminence of harm as a factor regarding
necessity. That is, the defensive force is justified only if necessary to prevent an unlawful
harm, and the imminence of that unlawful harm contributes to, but does not completely
determine, the judgment of necessity. In unusual circumstances such as those confronted by
the desert hiker or by some battered women, defensive force may be immediately necessary
to prevent unlawful harm, although that harm is not yet imminent. In these cases,
imminence of harm does not serve as a decisive factor in the determination of necessity.
Thus, the requirement that force be immediately necessary does not appear to pose significant
problems in the nonconfrontation scenario. It may be the case that a battered woman needs to use
force immediately against her sleeping abuser because this is her only opportunity to prevent
undeniable yet delayed bodily injury or death. See Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Comment, Is Imminence
Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-defense Doctrine with the Battered Woman Syndrome,
20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191, 209-10 (stating that "necessity is not logically dependent on imminence").
241. Commonwealth v. Sands, 553 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Va. 2001) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 399 (7th ed. 1999)).
242. Byrd v. Commonwealth, 16 S.E. 727, 729 (Va. 1893).
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imminent harm ... treats imminence of harm as an independent
requirement for justified force in that the force must be necessary and
the unlawful harm must be immediately forthcoming. Such a standard
does not allow defensive force necessary to prevent delayed unlawful
aggression, even if the present situation represents the last opportunity
to prevent such harm. 243
This temporal denotation comports with the plain meaning of the term
imminent.244 What is clear from the legal and literal definition of "imminent" is
that it denotes some specific length of time,245 which openly excludes delayed
attacks. Thus, a defendant is justified in resorting to deadly force to prevent
current (or very near future) but not deferred attacks.
The problem in the nonconfrontation scenario is that the attack the
battered woman seeks to prevent is to occur at some future time. The idea is
that introducing battered woman syndrome will bridge the gap by showing either
that the attack is in fact imminent or that the battered woman reasonably
believed that an attack was imminent. Obviously, the victim's psychological
condition cannot make the perceived attack factually imminent. The question
then is whether the psychological condition can show that the battered woman
reasonably believed the attack was imminent. Battered woman syndrome simply
cannot lead to the logical conclusion that the battered woman reasonably
believed an attack from her sleeping husband was immediately forthcoming.
Battered woman syndrome is purportedly a psychological condition that creates
a barrier to a battered woman's ability to utilize non-violent avenues of escaping
an abusive relationship.246  However, battered woman syndrome does not
indicate that syndrome sufferers entertain the general perception that an attack
from their batterer is continuously imminent, even when the batterer is sleeping.
It may be the case that the defendant's past experiences inform her belief that
attacks are constantly forthcoming, but this has little relationship to
psychological battered woman syndrome evidence:
[A] defendant has experienced an extended pattern of battering and
puts forward a plausible claim of reasonable belief that an attack was
forthcoming, but her evidence for this claim makes no reference to the
battered woman syndrome or any of its components.... Expert
testimony regarding the syndrome, however, would not necessarily
support the defendant's story. As described, this defendant does not
suffer from the battered woman syndrome. If she did, an expert could
testify that she suffered depression, decreased self-esteem, and learned
243. Schopp et al., supra note 224, at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
244. The full definition is "imminent-I: ready to take place: near at hand: impending: hanging:
threateningly over one's head: menacingly near." WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INT'L DIcTIONARY 1130
(1993).
245. Although there is some line drawing to be made, imminent implies at least within a matter
of minutes, if not seconds. It certainly would not encompass an attack that is to come later in the day
or week from someone who is currently asleep.
246. See Schopp et al., supra note 224, at 54 (stating that "both learned helplessness and the cycle
of violence affect the battered woman's decision to remain in the battering relationship and reduce her
motivation to escape") (footnote omitted).
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helplessness, but this testimony would not support the contention that
she reasonably believed an attack forthcoming because these
characteristics do not increase the reliability of her beliefs or the
accuracy of her predictions. 247
Consequently, the existence of battered woman syndrome does not appear
to be relevant to the issue of whether the defendant reasonably believes the
attack is imminent. As a result, even the legitimate introduction of battered
woman syndrome on other grounds, 248 would not have helped Judy Norman249
satisfy the imminence requirement. Ms. Norman, after years of horrific abuse,
shot her sleeping husband. °50 Even if the jury, taking into account battered
woman syndrome, were to conclude she was generally reasonable in her use of
deadly force, it could not fairly conclude that she reasonably believed the attack
was "imminent." The only way that the jury could come to such a conclusion
would be if its members misunderstood battered woman syndrome to mean they
could ignore the imminence requirement all together.25' In fact, experts argue
247. Id. at 71-72. Courts, however, have precisely interpreted battered woman syndrome
evidence to mean that the battered woman reasonably believes a non-imminent attack is imminent.
See Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12 ("For the battered woman, if there is no escape or sense of safety, then the
next attack, which could be fatal or cause serious bodily harm, is imminent.").
248. For example, courts have deemed battered woman syndrome as relevant to whether or not
the defendant reasonably believed she could safely retreat. See Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 821.
249. See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 12 (discussing concerns with imminence requirement and
rejecting defendant's arguments).
250. The following testimony was adduced at trial:
The defendant testified that her husband had started drinking and abusing her about five
years after they were married. His physical abuse of her consisted of frequent assaults that
included slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her with various objects, and throwing
glasses, beer bottles and other objects at her. The defendant described other specific
incidents of abuse, such as her husband putting her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee
on her, breaking glass against her face and crushing food on her face. Although the
defendant did not present evidence of ever having received medical treatment for any
physical injuries inflicted by her husband, she displayed several scars about her face which
she attributed to her husband's assaults.
The defendant's evidence also tended to show other indignities inflicted upon her by her
husband. Her evidence tended to show that her husband did not work and forced her to
make money by prostitution, and that he made humor of that fact to family and friends. He
would beat her if she resisted going out to prostitute herself or if he was unsatisfied with the
amounts of money she made. He routinely called the defendant "dog," "bitch" and
"whore," and on a few occasions made her eat pet food out of the pets' bowls and bark like a
dog. He often made her sleep on the floor. At times, he deprived her of food and refused to
let her get food for the family. During those years of abuse, the defendant's husband
threatened numerous times to kill her and to maim her in various ways.
Id. at 10.
251. The fear critics have expressed is that any time battered women syndrome evidence is put
forth, the jury will acquit without regard to the law of self-defense and without correctly analyzing the
role of the syndrome evidence. Such evidence likely describes severe and repetitive abuse. Thus, it
"would elicit highly emotional reactions from many ordinary people, including jurors." Schopp et al.,
supra note 224, at 74 (footnote omitted). In Leidholm, another case involving the killing of a sleeping
batterer, the court appears to completely side-step the imminence issue and view battered woman
syndrome as indicating the reasonableness of the killing generally, without regard to the particular
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that this is precisely how battered woman syndrome is used, that "the battered
woman syndrome theory has been used to carve out an exception to the
traditional self-defense requirements for a class of sympathetic defendants who
used force when it was necessary to prevent an inevitable, although not
imminent, attack.
'252
The problem again is that by interpreting syndrome evidence in this
manner, judges and jurors are waging a legally underhanded revolution against
the imminence requirement in self-defense. 253 Certainly, our system of criminal
justice should not rely on a plainly incorrect application of scientific evidence to
legal standards to achieve a desired result2 4 In addition, not all courts and
juries will synthesize battered woman syndrome evidence in this manner. For
example, Judy Norman was convicted of manslaughter after a jury trial in which
the judge did not instruct the jury on self-defense. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that Ms. Norman could avail herself of self-defense,
notwithstanding the imminence requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the
appellate decision, ruling that the imminence requirement prevented the judge
from instructing the jury on self-defense in Ms. Norman's case. 255 To the extent
that society believes that Judy Norman, who suffered terrible abuse at the hands
of her husband and faced near certain, although not imminent death, should not
be branded a murderer and face years in jail or worse,25 6 the law ought to reflect
that belief.257 The reliance on an evidentiary misapplication to achieve a just end
has compelled critics to argue that "battered woman syndrome illustrates all that
elements of self-defense. 334 N.W.2d at 817-20. The court required the use of an instruction on
battered woman syndrome, without particular attention to its relation to the specific elements of self-
defense:
The instruction on battered woman syndrome was designed to support Leidholm's claim of
self-defense by focusing the jury's attention on the psychological characteristics common to
women who are victims in abusive relationships, and by directing the jury that it may
consider evidence that the accused suffered from battered woman syndrome in determining
whether or not she acted in self-defense.
Id. at 819.
252. Burke, supra note 8, at 275.
253. See supra note 224-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial treatment of
imminence and self-defense in the battered woman context.
254. In other words, if it is not an immoral act when the battered woman kills the sleeping
batterer, then the law must affirmatively express that a defendant may have a justification or excuse in
the situation where she reasonably kills an eventual but non-imminent attacker.
255. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 10-12.
256. Lynne Henderson expresses the frustration of the feminist movement over Judy Norman's
situation: "One need not be a complete determinist to recognize that Judy Norman had no more
escape than a prisoner held by terrorists. Indeed, such victimization can and does deprive individuals
of autonomy and condemns them to terror and hypervigilance." Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice?
Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1596, 1620-21 (1996).
257. See Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1282 n.162 (1987) ("If the
requirements of imminence, necessity and proportionality are to be abandoned for battered women
defendants, then legislatures, not courts, should address the situation by drafting statutory definitions
of self-defense that encompass the plight of the battered woman.").
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is wrong with the law's use of science." '258 The non-specific victim liability
defense eliminates the problem of fitting the nonconfrontation scenario with the
imminence requirement because imminence is not an element of the defense. In
this sense, the defense protects defendants who respond to both imminent
threats of harms and delayed threats of harm.
Turning to necessity, courts generally require that the defendant's use of
deadly force be necessary to prevent the injury.2 59  Whether or not the
nonconfrontation situation fits with the necessity requirement depends on
whether "necessary" is given a strict or expansive definition. The strictest
definition of a necessary act would be that the act is the sole way to achieve the
desired result-that is, the act is a necessary precondition of the result.26° Under
this definition, the defensive act of the battered woman must have been the
absolute sole method of saving her life. This incredibly strict definition,
however, would likely undermine the bulk of self-defense claims, not just those
in the battered woman scenario. Even when someone is staring down the barrel
of a gun, there is at least a possibility that she could survive by utilizing other
methods than defensive attack, such as hiding or running. Richard Rosen
observes "[i]n fact, the law never requires the necessity to be absolute before
allowing self-defense. The possibility always exists that a person attacking
another with a gun will change his mind, or miss, or have a heart attack before
pulling the trigger." 26' Thus, it seems untenable to define necessity in the self-
defense context in such a strict manner.262
Necessity, in the context of self-defense, however, must have some meaning.
Perhaps it means that the deadly force is "necessary" when killing the victim is
the most effective method of saving the defendant's life. 263 This definition,
258. Faigman & Wright, supra note 224, at 68.
259. See supra note 220 and accompanying text for a discussion of use of deadly force.
260. This is a common understanding of "necessary condition". If X is a "necessary condition" of
Y, then Y cannot hold unless X occurs. In the self-defense context, then, defensive force is only
necessary if there is no other way to achieve the result of self-protection. The definition of necessity
can be even stricter. For example, regarding the formal necessity defense, there is a strain of thought
that even when a reasonable person would have engaged in the conduct under the circumstances, it is
not thereby necessary. Pursuant to this logic, even preventing your own starvation by killing another
is not "necessary." See The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884) ("We are often
compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not
ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might
himself have yielded to it ....")
261. Rosen, supra note 223, at 396.
262. In addition, self-defense doctrine may give more leeway to the defendants for another
reason. It would be an onerous burden in the highest extent to expect a defendant facing an attack,
with emotions running high, to sort out what her alternatives are. There is a heat of passion strain in
self-defense. The law recognizes that the defendant is not in a condition to assess whether defensive
force is the sole alternative. Rather, she is forced to quickly react on instinct to a volatile situation that
she did not create. The interesting issue then becomes: Can this heat of passion type argument justify
the use of deadly force in non-heated, non-confrontational situations where alternatives are available?
Certainly, one could argue that a battered woman who kills her sleeping husband has a higher
obligation to think through all the alternatives than one facing an immediate attack.
263. This idea seems to underpin some of the judicial analyses refining the duty to retreat. For
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however, seems to give license to kill when there is a mere shadow of a threat.264
Consequently, necessity must speak not only to the relationship between the
defensive force and preventing death or harm, but also to the likelihood that the
harm would occur in the absence of the defensive force.
265
So where is the line? No future result is 100% certain. Even when a person
is staring down the barrel of a gun and the gunman pulls the trigger, there is a
remote possibility that the bullet will miss all together. If there is a 51% chance
that in the absence of deadly defensive force, the defendant will die at the
victim's hands, is the defensive force then "necessary?" A sensible definition of
"necessary" is that an action is necessary simply when it is reasonable given the
circumstances. 266 Necessity can then be assessed in terms of a "practical lack of
alternatives. '" 267 As a result, the most logical and fair definition of necessity
ultimately devolves into a reasonableness requirement.
The problem is that judges leave it up to the jury to determine the meaning
of necessity, generally only requiring that the deadly force be necessary to a
reasonable person in the defendant's position.2 68 Jurors are then free to apply
their own determinations of what "necessary" means. It makes sense that jurors
example, the Leidholm court observed:
If the facts and circumstances attending a person's use of deadly force against an assailant
who is a cohabitant are sufficient to create in his own mind an honest and reasonable belief
that he cannot retreat from the assailant with safety to himself and others, his use of deadly
force is justified or excused, and his failure to retreat is of no consequence.
334 N.W.2d at 821. Thus, although Leidholm had an alternative to using deadly force-retreating-
she need not resort to the alternative if it was not a "better" alternative to her than killing. See Burke,
supra note 8, at 284 ("The duty to retreat does not require the actor to retreat at all costs.") (footnote
omitted).
264. This would, of course, depend on how bad the alternatives must be in order to resort to
deadly force. In the Leidholm case, the court never addressed whether retreat would have to pose
some danger, substantial danger, or near certain death. 334 N.W.2d at 820-21. Certainly, if retreat
only posed a remote possibility of a future attack (whereas killing the husband eliminated the
possibility of future attack), even though retreat would be arguably more dangerous to Leidholm than
killing, it likely should be considered a viable alternative.
265. There must be a balance between the risk of harm to the defendant (and along with it
society's disapproval of unchecked aggression) and the value of the life of the attacker. See David A.
J. Richards, Symposium, Rights, Resistance, and the Demands of Self-Respect, 32 EMORY L.J. 405, 425-
26 (1998) (suggesting self-defense represents "a fair balance of interests of both parties in basic
physical integrity: the substantial interests of the unjustly attacked to repel the attack by force
necessary in the circumstances, and the interest of the aggressor by requiring necessity and a degree of
proportionality").
266. See FLA. STANDARD CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.6(f) ("The defendant cannot justify the use of
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless [he/she] used every reasonable means within
[his/her] power and consistent with [his/her] own safety to avoid the danger before resorting to that
force.").
267. Under this definition, whenever someone reasonably resorts to the use of deadly force, the
deadly force is deemed necessary. Thus necessity is not a total lack of alternatives, or even a severe
lack of alternatives. Rather, necessity is formulated as a "practical lack of alternatives." Murdoch,
supra note 240, at 217-18.
268. See CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 5.12 ("[T]he killing must be done under a well-founded belief
that it is necessary to save one's self from death or great bodily harm.").
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will apply a plain meaning of necessary as being "compulsory" or "required. '269
They can then conclude that the defendant has to have no other alternative than
to kill. When assessing a situation like Judy Norman's, the jury could reason that
because Mr. Norman was asleep, leaving was an alterative to killing. 270
Consequently, the killing was not necessary. The question then becomes
whether the defendant was reasonable in her mistaken belief that killing was
necessary. Relevant to this very question, defense attorneys introduce battered
woman syndrome. They argue that a battered woman believes that it is
necessary to kill when others would not reasonably so believe. As with
imminence, this is a misplaced focus. The concentration should be on the proper
definition of necessity rather than using battered woman syndrome to make the
nonconfrontation scenario compatible with a strict necessity requirement.
The problem with the use of battered women syndrome here is that it does
not logically show that killing was the battered woman's sole alternative or that
she reasonably believed it was her sole alternative. While learned helplessness
purportedly explains why the battered woman does not take advantage of
available alternatives,27 1 it does not indicate that the battered woman reasonably
believes that no alternatives exist. Nothing about the battered woman syndrome
demonstrates that battered women are deluded into believing it is physically
impossible to leave the home. Rather, the syndrome explains why learned
helplessness causes battered women to stay, despite the possibility that they
could leave. 272
269. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 776 (10th ed. 1993) ("necessary: 1 a:
of an inevitable nature: inescapable b:(1) logically unavoidable (2): that cannot be denied without
contradiction c: determined or produced by the previous condition of things d: compulsory 2:
absolutely needed: required.").
270. There is evidence that this is exactly how jurors reason. When assessing the battered woman
who kills, they often focus on why she did not exercise the alternative of leaving. For example, in
Leidholm, the Supreme Court of North Dakota distinguished between a defendant who was actually in
danger (justification) and one who was not actually in danger but reasonably thought she was (excuse),
stating:
A defense of excuse, contrarily, does not make legal and proper conduct which ordinarily
would result in criminal liability; instead, it openly recognizes the criminality of the conduct
but excuses it because the actor believed that circumstances actually existed which would
justify his conduct when in fact they did not. In short, had the facts been as he supposed
them to be, the actor's conduct would have been justified rather than excused.
334 N.W.2d at 814-15. The court assumed a priori that defendant Leidholm, who killed her sleeping
batterer, could only prevail under an excuse theory. Id. The court thereby presumed that Leidholm
was mistaken and that defensive force was not actually necessary.
271. See supra note 246 for an explanation of learned helplessness.
272. This is a subtle, but important difference. The difference is between someone who falsely
believes that killing is the sole method of saving her life and the person who knows that there are
alternatives to killing but just cannot take advantage of them. Let me illustrate this in the non-abuse
context. Take two people suffering from different psychological conditions: the first is delusional and
the second suffers from severe agoraphobia. The first person actually believes that there is no world
outside of his house. He thinks that if he steps out his front door he will fall into nothingness. Thus,
the first person never leaves his house. The second person knows that there is a world outside his
house, but because of his psychological condition, he cannot get himself to leave the house. The
battered woman, if the syndrome is to be believed, is more analogous to the second person. She
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This is not to say factors other than the existence of battered woman
syndrome, for example, whether the defendant had had a prior bad experience
with an attempt to leave, could explain the belief that killing is the only
reasonable choice:
Expert testimony regarding depression, decreased self-esteem, learned
helplessness, or other psychological characteristics of the defendant
does not show the defendant's 'reasonableness' [as to the necessity of
her actions] .... The evidence required to establish the defendant's
reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force must demonstrate the
pattern of battering and the lack of available legal alternatives to
defensive force, rather than the presence of the battered woman
syndrome.
273
Indeed, when discussing the battered woman's reasonable mistake as to
necessity, domestic violence advocates point to the lack of resources for battered
women, poor police response, and the like to conclude that battered women in
fact do not have reasonable alternatives. 274 This may be true, but it does not
really relate to the abused woman's mistaken perception. In fact, such
arguments make reasonable mistake beside the point.2 75 The lack of viable
social responses to domestic violence indicate that the battered woman's
defensive force was actually necessary, when necessity is defined in terms of
reasonableness. This evidence relates to whether the defendant chose a
reasonable or viable alternative and not to whether she mistakenly believed that
killing was the only alternative.
Thus, necessity is defined in terms of reasonableness or as a practical lack of
knows that it is possible to leave the home, but because of her condition she will not do so. See supra
note 235 and accompanying text for a description on how learned helplessness may prevent a battered
woman from taking advantage of possible alternatives. Does the second person's situation make it the
case that he believes that staying in the house is necessary? In a sense, both no and yes. He knows it is
not "necessary" because he knows he can leave the house at any time. On the other hand, he is in a
psychological state where he cannot leave the house. In this sense, staying in the house may be
deemed to be "necessary." It can be deemed a necessary act if "necessary" is defined as an act which,
because of a psychological predisposition, the person must do. If, however, necessity is defined in this
manner, how can the jury be expected to distinguish between a reasonable person who is
psychologically predisposed to kill, even though there are other options, and an unreasonable person
who is psychologically predisposed to kill, even though there are other options? Because of this
problem, the better way to define a "mistaken belief of necessity" is a belief that no other alternatives
exist. Battered woman syndrome does not inform the issue under this definition of necessity.
Understand, however, that I am purposely not arguing that there are, in fact, good alternatives
for battered women. I understand that social services, legal recourse, and the like are lacking. This
underscores even more the need for a definition of necessity that allows for the existence of
alternatives, albeit poor alternatives. Under such a definition of necessity, it may be absolutely true
that given the lack of programs for abused women, resorting to deadly force is a good, reasonable, or
effective option, thereby making it necessary. Again, however, under a strong definition of necessary,
it cannot be said that killing is the sole option.
273. Schopp et al., supra note 224, at 87 (footnote omitted).
274. See id. at 76-87 (discussing lack of alternatives).
275. This is because the lack of viable alternatives explains not simply why the battered woman
thought defensive force was necessary, but why defensive force was actually necessary. Thus, the
focus need not be on a purported mistake of fact.
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alternatives276 under the circumstances, the relevant inquiry is whether the
choice to kill was a reasonable alternative. The jury is then directed to consider
whether, given the lack of resources for battered woman and the history of abuse
and threats, the battered woman had a practical lack of alternatives to killing.
The jury need not find that there were no other alternatives to killing.
Consequently, the jury can more easily decide that the killing was necessary
because of the facts of the situation. The jury does not have to analyze the issue
as one of mistake of fact. Rather than forcing the jury to conclude that the
battered woman was mistaken as to the necessity of her actions, the flexible
definition of necessity allows the jury to determine that the battered woman was
correct in her assessment of the necessity of her actions under the circumstances.
The more flexible definition of necessity allows the focus to be on the behavior
of the abuser and whether, without defensive force, there was a real possibility
that he would kill the battered wife, rather than on the psychological deviance of
the defendant.
One may at this point contend that the law need not change because
battered woman syndrome evidence, even if misapplied, has the practical effect
of allowing battered women in the nonconfrontation scenario to avail themselves
of self-defense. The response is first that law and society cannot allow a just
result to rest on misuse of scientific evidence. 277 Second, there are the problems
with battered woman syndrome mentioned earlier, which merit further
discussion here. Experts argue that the science underlying the syndrome itself,
including the methods of gathering and analyzing the data, is methodologically
unsound. 27 8 Even a cursory examination of Dr. Walker's conclusions reveal that
they are almost oxymoronic. If the battered woman suffers from learned
helplessness, external locus of control, and traditional attitudes, then it is difficult
to understand how this woman ends up committing the ultimate untraditional,
self-controlled act of self-help: homicide. 279
Moreover, battered woman syndrome evidence is stigmatizing because it
shifts the jury's focus from the reasonableness of the defendant's response to
wrongful conduct to the battered woman as a psychologically impaired being.280
276. There is a difference between saying that deadly force was "reasonably necessary" (and
defining necessity strictly) and defining a necessary choice as a "reasonable choice under the
circumstances." The former means that a reasonable person would consider killing the sole
alternative. The latter means that the deadly force was a reasonable choice, although not the sole
alternative.
277. See Mihajlovich, supra note 257, at 1282 n.162 (arguing that legislatures, not courts, should
create laws that account for battered woman killing situation).
278. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 224, at 76-78 (observing that "Walker's methodology,
unfortunately, contains at least five readily identifiable flaws [which] are blatant violations of some of
the most elementary aspects of the research method" and describing flaws).
279. See Schopp et al., supra note 224, at 58:
It would be more consistent with the theoretical and empirical foundations of learned
helplessness theory to contend that battered women who do not kill their batterers suffer
learned helplessness and that battered women who kill their batterers differ from those who
do not precisely because those who kill do not suffer learned helplessness.
280. See, e.g. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West 1999) (equating battered woman syndrome with
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By pointing to psychological differences between battered women and "normal"
women, defense attorneys make an incorrect assumption about the way jurors
reason. It is unlikely that the jury, in acquitting the defendant, found the
battered woman's acts to be "reasonable" because she is psychologically deviant
from the average woman. More likely, jurors acquit a battered woman precisely
because they can identify with her thought processes given her unique set of
circumstances, which were created by the victim's own wrongful conduct. 281 The
problem with battered woman syndrome then is that it stigmatizes the battered
woman in an effort to justify her acts, when her acts could be otherwise justified
as reasonable.
282
Our moral sensibilities dictate that a person who responds to a delayed, yet
undeniable, attack should be protected from criminal liability. The technical
requirements of self-defense exclude such a defendant from its protective wing.
Thus, the non-specific victim liability defense, which eliminates imminence and
replaces necessity with a balancing test, is a better alternative. The defense
focuses on the severity of the defendant's conduct in the context of the victim's
wrongful behavior and takes away the stringent imminence and strict necessity
requirements that seem logically to exclude battered women from self-defense.
Battered women who kill are not the only recipients of the defense's benefits.
The defense can also apply to defendants who respond to continued patterns of
harassment and threats at the hands of gang members, bullies, drug dealers, or
insanity and requiring procedure whereby defendant must submit to examination by court-appointed
psychiatrist). Experts note the oxymoronic nature of characterizing battered women as
psychologically impaired and then asking the jury to find their actions "reasonable":
Jurors should not, for example, consider the evidence from the perspective of a "reasonable
delusional paranoid schizophrenic" or "reasonable sociopath." Nor should they consider the
evidence, as the battered woman syndrome theory suggests, from the perspective of a
reasonable person who suffers from a condition that induces irrational beliefs about her
ability to leave an abusive relationship or unreasonable perceptions about threats that are
non-existent.
Burke, supra note 8, at 293.
281. Consequently, they take into account her subjective experiences of being battered, but not
necessarily her deviant psychological state in determining her actions to be reasonable. By this, I give
credit to jurors for doing precisely what Schopp et al. claim should be the analyses behind necessity.
They are assessing the battered woman's situation rather than her psychological state. Critics of the
battered woman syndrome have advocated an approach whereby jurors view battered women as
"rational actors." See id. at 290 (predicting that use of rational actor approach would ensure proper
application of self-defense to only those situations where "a reasonable person would have believed
that defensive force was necessary"). I am arguing here that jurors who acquit do so despite evidence
of psychological deviance and because they can identify with the woman as a rational actor.
282. By focusing on wrongful victim behavior rather than psychological deviance, the law can
avoid stigmatizing women by branding them with a "syndrome." Martha Mahoney observes:
Expert testimony, designed to overcome these stereotypes and help show the context for the
woman's actions, has through the pressures of the legal system contributed to a focus on
victimization that is understood as passivity or even pathology on the part of the woman.
This image further promotes many cultural stereotypes, and may contribute to further
stigmatizing of battered women and further denial by women of the dangers they face
through domestic violence.
Mahoney, supra note 230, at 42 (footnote omitted).
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other criminals.
A critic could argue that requirements like imminence and necessity should
not be abandoned because they are effective gatekeepers. The first response to
this contention is that a balancing of interests justifies the elimination of these
requirements. Simply, the costs of keeping strict imminence requirements in
self-defense (people who reasonably use force to prevent near-certain but not
imminent death are prosecuted to the full extent of the law) outweigh the
benefits (self-defense remains a narrow defense and self-help is discouraged).
The imminence requirement's tendency to exclude those defendants who kill in
justified but non-imminent situations makes it a technical requirement that
should be abandoned. This Article is certainly not the first to advocate
eliminating imminence as an independent requirement of self-defense. Alafair
Burke observes:
Because the requirement of imminenc[e] is an imperfect proxy to
ensure that a defendant's use of force is necessary, a better standard
would require that the use of force be necessary. Requiring that the
defendant have a reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary
for self-protection avoids by definition the extension of the defense to
unnecessary and therefore unjustified uses of force.2 83
Professor Burke, however, points to the gate-keeping functions of necessity
as adequate limitations. Thus, the contention may be that the non-specific victim
liability defense should contain a provision that the crime committed by the
defendant be a "necessary" response to the wrongful victim behavior. Ridding
victim liability law of the necessity requirement seems by all appearances to be
extremely radical in that it hopelessly delimits the defense. It gives the
impression that it invites vigilantism. As I have shown above, however, only
under the most severe and strained definitions of necessity284 can one distinguish
a necessary action from a reasonable, prudent, or desirable action.285 In fact,
where self-defense is purely subjective, necessity can mean even less than
objective reasonableness (i.e., defensive force was necessary "in the defendant's
mind"). 286 It is clear that in the existing law of self-defense, the use of defensive
283. Burke, supra note 8, at 279-80 (footnotes omitted). See Rosen, supra note 223, at 404
(footnotes omitted):
Using a necessity rule instead of an imminence rule imports no new norms into the law of
self-defense; it merely changes the locus of decision making. Under the current criminal
justice scheme, the legislature, or, in common-law jurisdiction, judges, already have decided
that a killing to prevent a non-imminent threatened harm can never be a necessary
killing .... Removing or modifying the imminence rule shifts the locus of decisionmaking to
jurors, allowing them to weigh the evidence and make their own decision on necessity in a
suitable case.
284. That is, necessity as denoting that the defendant's acts are the only available response to the
victim's conduct. In other words, there is an absolute lack of alternatives. See supra note 266 and
accompanying text for this stricter definition of necessity which takes reasonableness into account.
285. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text for an alternative definition of necessity
which takes reasonableness into account.
286. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 468 N.E.2d 763, 764-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (entitling
"paranoid" defendant to assert self-defense based on subjective honest belief of necessity of using
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force does not have to be "absolutely necessary," in the sense that it must be the
defendant's only alternative and harm to the defendant in the absence of the
force must be certain. The current law accounts for metaphysical contingencies
and existing alternatives. The fourth element of the non-specific victim liability
defense comprises a balancing test that allows the jury to weigh the defendant's
response against the victim's conduct and assess whether the existence of
alternatives to the criminal response makes the defendant culpable of some
offense. As a result, the defense practically captures the often-applied (and most
sensible) meaning of necessity.
As an alternative to limiting the defense through imminence and necessity
requirements, the non-specific victim liability defense will be self-limited in other
ways. It requires that the victim has engaged in objectively wrongful behavior
rather than subjectively provoking conduct, 287 to which the defendant must
respond in an appropriate and non-culpable manner. The defense also requires
that the defendant demonstrate a lack of predisposition to commit the crime. 288
The predisposition requirement serves a gate-keeping function to ensure that the
defendant's criminal act was truly induced by wrongful victim behavior, rather
than emanating from criminal inclination. 289
Consequently, the non-specific victim liability defense can refine self-
defense law in such a way as to provide a logical legal remedy to some tricky
gender-related problems involving domestic violence victims. It can do so by
concentrating on those elements that relate more sensibly to the moral
culpability of both the defendant and victim than more arbitrary and problematic
elements, like imminence, contained in the existing victim liability doctrines.
V. THE NON-SPECIFIC VIcTIM LIABILITY DEFENSE
The non-specific victim liability defense consists of the following four
elements:
1. The victim of the crime engaged in sufficiently wrongful conduct;
2. The victim's conduct caused the defendant to commit the charged
offense;
3. The defendant was not predisposed to commit the charged offense;
and
4. The defendant's response balanced against the victim's wrongful
conduct dictates that the defendant should be exculpated or his
punishment mitigated.
This section will discuss each element in turn.
deadly force).
287. See supra Part IV.B for explanations of the drawbacks to the provocation requirement.
288. See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the predisposition requirement in the non-specific
victim liability defense.
289. See infra Part V.C for a fuller discussion of predisposition in the context of the entrapment
defense.
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A. The Victim of the Crime Engaged in Sufficiently Wrongful Conduct
Premising victim liability on "wrongfulness" inevitably requires an inquiry
into the legal meaning of the term "wrongfulness." The near-impossible task is
to define with precision the contours of the term. How are legislatures, courts,
and jurors to judge wrongfulness in the context of the non-specific victim liability
defense? 290 This inquiry is essential if the non-specific victim liability defense is
to provide more social control over the "provoked" abusive spouse than existing
legal doctrine. 291 Tautologically, one could say that wrongful behavior is conduct
a reasonable person would consider to be wrongful. To engage in such
reasoning, however, would be ultimately self contradictory, as only a purely
prescriptive definition of wrongfulness can overcome the "reasonable racist" and
provoked abuser problems.
Implicit in the criticism of provocation law in Part IV.B is the contention
that wrongful victim behavior denotes something stronger than merely sub-
optimal, negligent or even undesirable behavior. Through a strong wrongfulness
requirement, the victim liability defense can be more prescriptive than current
provocation doctrine, which makes the defense contingent on the defendant's a
posteriori reaction to the victim's acts. Those victim acts, themselves, often
range from merely negligent or sub-optimal behavior (a verbal argument with a
spouse) to encourageable behavior (attempting to leave an abusive spouse).
Even defining "wrongfulness" as "bad" or "immoral," however, is not
necessarily sufficiently prescriptive. It is true that defining wrongful as bad or
immoral would tend to solve both the reasonable racist problem, because it is
not bad to be African-American, and the problem of the batterer who kills his
wife who attempts to leave him, because it is not bad to attempt to leave your
abusive spouse. There is still, however, a problem with the provocation category
of adultery. This is because adultery, as a matter of common sense and current
social belief, is a bad act. One certainly could not identify adultery as good or
even neutral. Thus, in order to overcome the adultery problem, "wrongful" must
have a more stringent technical meaning.
Perhaps we should define a "wrong" as an intentional violation of a legal
norm. 292 Indeed, under current law, courts and theorists define "wrongful"
simply as something that is contrary to law.293 Contrary to law is, in turn, defined
290. George P. Fletcher observes that the meaning of wrongdoing must be something more than
merely a breach of legal or moral rights:
It is unclear, however, what constitutes wrongdoing. Defining wrongdoing as the violation
of rights is unhelpful, for that definition only raises other questions: Who has rights and what
is their content? Therefore, to understand the nature of wrongdoing, we should seek a
substantive theory of wrongdoing-an account of what is wrong and why it is wrong.
George Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REv. 347,347 (1996).
291. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of how the non-specific victim liability defense
improves upon the provocation requirement.
292. This would exclude adultery from wrongdoing in many jurisdictions where adultery is not a
legal violation sanctionable in itself by law, but merely a moral violation. But see Commonwealth v.
Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Mass. 1983) (affirming conviction under criminal adultery statute).
293. See, e.g., State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266, 1277 n.5 (N.M. 1996) (defining "conscious
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as a breach of a legal obligation. Consequently, a "wrongful" death is one in
which the person who caused the death breached a legal standard of care.294
Under such a reading of wrongfulness, a defendant could avail herself of the
non-specific victim liability defense only when the victim engaged in illegal
conduct. There is then the further question of whether the defense may be
premised on illegal tortious conduct that is not criminal.295
An argument for limiting the defense to situations in which the victim has
committed a crime is that if the defense is premised on anything less than
criminal behavior on the part of the victim, then there likely would be a
proportionality problem. The defendant will be excused for responding to non-
criminal behavior with a criminal act. One could respond, however, that the
lack-of-predisposition and balancing requirements provide sufficient safeguards
against the proportionality problem. The argument is that legally-disposed,
appropriate actors will not act disproportionately harmfully even when they
respond to bad yet legal victim behavior. 296 Moreover, one could argue that
proportionality is beside the issue. As long as the defendant is responding to
wrongful behavior and acting morally appropriately, he is absolved of liability.
One might contend that requiring people to act proportionally in all situations is
too much of an onus.297
There are, however, other arguments in favor of a narrow definition of
wrongfulness beside the proportionality argument. When wrongfulness is
defined as a breach of a non-legal norm (moral, religious, or social norms, for
example), a bright-line test is abandoned in favor of a definition which is flexible,
yet extremely difficult to administer. 298 Several questions arise, the most obvious
being: Which norms should apply? May the defendant respond to conduct that
wrongdoing" as "the purposeful doing of an act that the law declares to be a crime").
294. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PRO. § 3-901(e) (2003) (Wrongful Death
Definitions) (defining "wrongful act" as "act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which would
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.").
295. An example of this might be negligent conduct which results in a harm that may be
sanctioned civilly but constitutes no crime. For example, a patron of a restaurant might sue for a slip
and fall caused by the restaurant's wet floor. Although the patron could very well prevail on the tort
action, there is no recognizable crime of negligently leaving a restaurant floor wet. The criminal law
has no general negligence prohibition although negligence may be the specified mens rea in designated
offenses, for example, negligent homicide.
296. This, however, depends largely on the meaning of appropriate and disproportionate. One
could say that morally appropriate actions are always proportionate. Conversely, one could argue that
some reasonable acts are not proportionate. Take the case of State v. Norman, where the court held
that a battered wife who shot her sleeping husband was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-
defense because there was no evidence she had reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily
harm. 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989). One could easily make the argument that one who responds to past
beatings by killing the batterer does not act proportionally because she is responding to acts that fall
short of killing with a killing. Consistent with this characterization, one could also claim that it was
perfectly appropriate, on balance, for Ms. Norman to kill in order to save herself from future death.
297. See supra note 262 for an explanation of why such a requirement is so unreasonable.
298. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 314, 316 (1992) (describing balancing tests as
"flexible" and bright-line rules as supporting "settled expectations").
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is wrongful in his culture or must it be the prevailing culture? 299
Merely being contrary to law may not even be strong enough to capture the
essence of wrongfulness. Indeed, many extremely petty and hardly harmful
actions are made illegal by some criminal code.3°° Part IV argued that the
concept of victim wrongfulness must not derive from the defendant's subjective
moral code or even from majoritarian sentiments, but rather be declared
affirmatively by law. 30 1 The definition of "wrongful" for the purposes of the
defense must reflect some idea of that which ought to be discouraged because of
some innate immoral character, rather than that which is merely unpopular. 30 2
This brings up the following prickly question: If not from society's pre-existing
notions of right and wrong, from what source should lawmakers and legal
decision-makers derive the definition of wrongful behavior?30 3 Perhaps the
299. See infra notes 363-68 for a discussion of cultural defenses.
300. There are some obvious objections to definitions of wrong-doing based merely on the
preexisting legislative declarations. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice
of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 966 (2002) ("Though the defendant has not engaged in
morally culpable wrongdoing, she has nonetheless committed a legally defined criminal offense and
has violated the legal rights (even if not moral rights) of another."); see also William J. Stunt,
Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1735-36 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001)) ("Notice what happens
when the law goes farther than it should down the road of equating wrongdoing with illegality: we give
police officers and prosecutors the power to define illegality. Positive law no longer equals moral
law-on the contrary, the positive law disappears, replaced by official whim.").
The difficulty of equating wrongdoing and illegality is illustrated in the Supreme Court case,
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). In that case, Atwater was driving a truck with her
two children beside her. Neither she nor her two children were wearing seatbelts. A police officer
pulled Atwater over for the seatbelt violation, a misdemeanor traffic offense for which the maximum
penalty was a $50 fine. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324. He then subjected Atwater to verbal insults, refused
to allow her to drop her children off at a friend's house, and placed her under full custodial arrest. Id.
at 323-24. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter held that the arrest did not violate the constitution
because Atwater had violated the seatbelt laws. Id. at 354. Souter saw no reason to designate that
certain petty crimes should not subject the perpetrator to full custodial arrest. Id. In essence, Souter
put all criminal acts, from the pettiest to the most serious, on the same moral and procedural footing
for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. Justice O'Connor's dissent advocates a balancing
approach, distinguishing between the types of crimes that do not entitle the police to engage in a full
custodial arrest (fine-only traffic offenses where the officer has no articulable reason for a full arrest)
and crimes that entitle the police to engage in a full custodial arrest (all other crimes). Id. at 365-67
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
301. See supra Part IV.B for further insight concerning this argument.
302. This is especially important if there are racist or patriarchal dispositions in society informing
the majorities desire to discourage minorities from participating in acceptable if not legitimate
behavior. Some men feel that adultery is acceptable if perpetrated by men but wrong if perpetrated by
women. For example, a survey of college students revealed that "male respondents found betraying a
lover more acceptable than betraying a friend, but only when the perpetrator of the betrayal was
male." Kristina M. Wasson, Young Men, Women Show Different Attitudes Toward Sexual Infidelity,
Scholar Finds, Stanford Online Report (May 17, 2000), at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/may
17/feldman-517.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
303. Here one confronts the ever-present philosophical problem of first principles. Ultimately,
one can formulate either a consequentialist contingent meaning of wrong (society determines what is
or is not wrong), or one can base criminal prohibitions on first principles (the law declares a priori that
which is wrong). The problem is that either the basis of the definition is contingent or arbitrary.
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answer lay in some formulation of illegality "plus." "Wrongfulness" for the
purposes of the victim liability defense could be defined as conduct both
contrary to the law and "shocking to the conscience" or "inherently harmful.
' 3°4
A quick-witted critic is undoubtedly ready to respond that this definition
merely begs other questions. What is "inherently harmful?" What is "shocking
to the conscience?" Whose conscience is involved? Can one bring in
majoritarian sentiments? The question of the definition of a term like
wrongfulness is capable of infinite reduction. This does not mean, however, that
it is a fruitless task to define it. The term "wrongful" has a venerable place in
many areas of American law.305 A multitude of statutes, torts, criminal offenses,
and defenses utilize the term "wrong" or its derivatives. This Article suggests
that to begin the journey of legal definition of wrongful conduct, one should start
Richard Ned Lebow describes the tension as follows:
Philosophers from Kant on struggled to build an alternative metaphysical foundation for
ethics; they failed because there are no incontrovertible first principles. Attempts to base
such systems on feeling and customs are all open to the challenge of being arbitrary and
culturally biased.
Richard Ned Lebow, Ethics and Interests, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 75 (2002). The tension
between the arbitrary nature of first principles and the contingent nature of consequentialist
justifications has led some reformers, most notably the pragmatists, to reject this particular
justificatory enterprise all together. Thomas Grey observes:
[Charles Sanders] Pierce reversed the Kantian hierarchy, and assimilated all human science,
speculative philosophy, and moral inquiry into the category of the pragmatic. All
judgments-scientific and moral as well as prudential and technical-were contingent,
probabilistic, relative to a situation and to the interests of an agent or a community of agents.
Thought was no longer to be conceived as something distinct from practice, but rather it
simply was practice, or activity, in its deliberative or reflective aspect.
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN L. REV. 787, 803 (1989) (citing Charles
Sanders Pierce, What Pragmatism Is, para. 412 (1905), in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE, 273-74 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ.
Press (1934)) (footnotes omitted).
In Kant's defense, he probably would not agree that the basis for his moral theory, the categorical
imperative, is completely arbitrary. Kant premises his moral theory on non-contradiction (logic).
Non-contradiction is at once a necessary and contingent part of the human conditions (both a priori
and synthetic). In over-simple terms, Kant postulates that human beings must engage in logical
constructs and thus non-contradiction is a priori or prior to experience. However, it is contingent in
the sense that human beings did not have to be "hard-wired" in such a manner. Thus, Kant's moral
first principles comes from the a priori conditions of human cognition.
304. In fact, courts have defined "wrongful" in such a manner in other contexts. See, e.g., Marie
Y. v. General Star Indem. Co., 110 Cal. App. 4th 928, 953 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("Conduct may be
wrongful because.., the act is inherently harmful."); California Cas. Mgmt. Co. v. Martocchio, 11 Cal.
App. 4th 1527, 1532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding act that is "inherently harmful ... must be held
wrongful as a matter of law") (quoting B & E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 8 Cal. App.
4th 78,99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
305. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-8A-602 (1999) ("Partner's power to dissociate; wrongful
dissociation"); ALASKA STAT. § 31.30.010 (Michie 2002) ("Damages for wrongful extraction of oil or
gas"); ARIZ. STAT. § 29-706 (West 1998) ("Limitation on distributions; wrongful distribution;
treatment as income"); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 490.010 (West 1979 & Supp. 2004) ("Wrongful
attachment defined"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-59-113 (2003) ("Wrongful use of inedible meat-
penalty"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3721 (2003) ("Survival of actions and causes of action; wrongful
death actions").
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with the concept of an illegal act that shocks the conscience. Legislatures, courts,
and the public can further define the term in context over time.
B. The Victim's Conduct Caused the Defendant to Commit the Charged Offense
In order to assert the victim liability defense, there must be some
ontologically significant connection between the wrongful behavior of the victim
and the otherwise criminal behavior of the defendant. The connection must be
more than purely a temporal one. Saying that the victim's wrongful behavior
caused the defendant's criminal act means more than merely saying that the
victim's behavior preceded the defendant's act in time. Thus, a defendant who
planned to assault a victim and was screamed at in a provoking manner by the
victim just prior to the planned assault cannot avail herself of the defense.30 6 In
the above example, the provoking conduct of the victim is not a but-for cause 30 7
of the defendant's assault, although it may be a simultaneously sufficient
cause. 308 The defendant would have committed the assault regardless of the
victim's actions, so one could not say that "but-for" the victim's acts the crime
would not have occurred. 30 9 The provoking act, however, was sufficient to cause
the assault even in the absence of the defendant's pre-existing inclination to
commit the crime. The question is why require that the wrongful victim conduct
be a but-for cause of the defendant's crime? The reason for requiring but-for
causation is that the law should only reduce liability for those acts that are truly
consequences of victim wrongfulness. A person should not be acquitted if he
acted on internal criminal inclinations, even if, in fact, a non-disposed person
would have been justified in committing the crime.
One might respond that if part of the purpose of victim liability is to
differentiate good victims from bad victims, then why not sanction the wrongful
victim behavior by application of the victim liability defense even where the
wrongful behavior is not the but-for cause of the defendant's act? The answer is
306. Under most legal formulations of proximate cause, which include but-for cause, the
screaming did not cause the assault. See CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 8.55 (5th ed., West 1988) (defining
"proximate cause of a death" as "a cause which in the natural and continuous sequence produces the
[result] and without which the [death] would not have occurred").
307. But-for causation refers to the concept that "a defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if
the event would not have occurred but for that conduct but is not a cause of the event if the event
would have occurred without it." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 194 (2000).
308. A rare exception to most formulations of causation, which require some but-for connection,
is the doctrine of simultaneously sufficient causation:
[A]n exception for cases of multiple causation has to be inserted into the definition [of
causation]. It is possible for two sufficient causes, C1 and C2, to be present together, so that
E follows both, when usually it follows only one or the other. Both C1 and C2 are causes,
even though in the particular situation one or other (as the case may be) was not necessary
to be present. An example is where two fatal wounds are given independently at the same
time.
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 380-81 (Stevens & Sons 2d ed. 1983). Under
this formulation if it is the case that the screaming would have provoked the defendant in the absence
of his predisposition to assault, then it is a simultaneously sufficient cause.
309. See supra note 307 for a discussion of but-for causation.
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that requiring but-for causation strikes a balance between the interests of the
defendant, the victim, and society. In terms of the defendant, the premise of the
victim liability defense is that those who merely respond to harmful victim
behavior by committing crimes are less culpable than those who act criminally
for other impermissible reasons. 310  When a defendant acts based on
impermissible impulses, like his own criminal inclinations, rather than the
wrongful victim behavior at hand, he is not less criminally culpable. In terms of
society, the premise is that society has an interest in punishing those who are
truly dangerous rather than those who respond to extraordinary circumstances.
Even current victim liability law distinguishes reasonably provoked (good)
defendants from unreasonably provoked (bad) defendants who are dangerous to
society. 311  By doing so, the provocation doctrine can protect against
unreasonably provoked, dangerous defendants asserting provocation. By
requiring but-for causation, the victim liability defense can protect against
dangerous, criminally predisposed defendants who seek to assert the defense.
As for victims, the premise of the defense is that the wrongful victim does
not have a legitimate interest in the punishment of criminal conduct that her own
wrongful actions caused. This principle does not necessarily mean that the
wrongful victim does not have an interest in punishing crimes perpetrated on her
that were not caused by her wrongfulness.312 It is true that by allowing the
defense in the absence of but-for causation, the defense may serve an interest in
reducing victim wrongfulness in the sense that victim wrongfulness is
punished,313 whether or not it truly induced the criminal act. Eliminating the
but-for causation requirement, however, would prioritize punishing the victim's
wrongful act over punishing the defendant's criminal act.3 14 Consequently, the
victim liability defense properly distinguishes between dangerous (and arguably
immoral or bad) defendants who would commit bad acts regardless of the
victim's conduct, and those who commit bad acts only when sufficiently
provoked. 315
310. See supra note 26 for the distinction between a defendant's culpability for harming an
"innocent victim" and his culpability for harming a "reprehensible" victim.
311. This is the case even though reasonable provocation and unreasonable provocation can
equally interfere with the defendant's mens rea.
312. The victim can be wrongful in her actions and yet wronged in that the crime perpetrated on
her had nothing to do with her wrongful actions.
313. The defendant is released and potential victims are encouraged not to engage in wrongful
behavior.
314. One might then bring up a hypothetical case where a victim's wrongdoing, although it did
not induce the defendant's criminal act, was more immoral and severe in degree than the defendant's
crime. Shouldn't this victim be discouraged? The answer is that if the victim's act is worse than the
defendant's criminal act, then most likely the victim would be subject to separate criminal penalties
himself. Releasing the defendant in this case will serve only to encourage the defendant's criminal
behavior.
315. A parallel can be made in the provocation. Theorists observe that it should only apply to
men who uncharacteristically kill. See Coker, supra note 153, at 93 (characterizing violence by
"abusive men" as "purposeful" and violence by "previously non-violent [men]" as "spontaneous").
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This distinction is important for retributive316 and utilitarian 317 reasons. On
the retributive side, the motivations for committing an act are important. An
actor is not morally culpable when he committed the act for justified or excused
reasons. On the other hand, an actor may be morally culpable when, despite the
fact that justifying reasons exist, he acted on other non-justifying reasons. 318
Turning to the utilitarian arguments, a utilitarian would say that criminal law is
about deterring, reforming, or incapacitating those who pose a danger to society.
Those people whose criminal acts are premised solely on the wrongfulness of
another party are arguably less dangerous and less likely to re-offend than those
whose criminal acts are premised on a violent propensity.319
The inquiry then turns to whether the wrongful behavior of the victim
should be more than merely a but-for cause of the defendant's criminal act.320
Say, for example, a burglar robbed a man's house. Based on this robbery, the
man became very disgruntled with the degradation of modern society. The man
began reading extremist separatist literature and refining his skills as a sniper.
The man decided that his first victim in a string of undesirables he sought to
eliminate would be the burglar, who had just completed a two-year sentence for
the burglary. The man stakes out the burglar and shoots and kills him. It is true
in this case that the burglar's wrongful and criminal act was a but-for cause of the
316. Retributivism is most often associated with the work of Immanuel Kant, who opines:
Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means of promoting another
good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be
imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one
man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another
purpose ....
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (W. Hastie trans., 1887), reprinted in SANFORD H.
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
102, 103 (Little, Brown and Company 6th ed., 1995) (emphasis in original).
317. A utilitarian doctrine, "in its purest and simplest form is a moral doctrine which says that the
right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome." Samuel
Scheffler, CONSEQUENTIALSIM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Oxford University Press Samuel Scheffler ed.,
1988).
318. Take for example a hit-man who sets out to kill a victim. The hit-man enters the victim's
house. The hit-man sees the victim and takes out his gun to shoot. The hit-man then notices that the
victim is, herself, pointing a gun at him. At this point the hit-man has two reasons in his mind for
killing the victim: (1) to finish the job, and (2) to protect his life. Reasonably fearing imminent death,
the hit-man shoots and kills the victim. Can it then be said that the hit-man has acted justifiably
merely because the second condition was present? As a practical reality, in most courts, the defendant
hit-man would not be able to avail himself of self-defense. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 462 S.E.2d
492, 499 (N.C. 1995) ("[T]he purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter even accidental killings from
occurring during the commission of a dangerous felony. To allow self-defense, perfect or imperfect, to
apply to felony murder would defeat that purpose .... ).
319. See supra note 26 for the distinction between a defendant's culpability for harming an
"innocent victim" and his culpability for harming a "reprehensible" victim.
320. But-for causation alone is rarely adequate in the law. There must be proximate causation or
legally significant causation. See, e.g., Tenn. Corp. v. Lamb Bros. Constr. Co., 265 So.2d 533,536 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (refusing to apply "but-for" standard of causation because in any sequence of
events first act could be considered "but-for" cause, yet not actually be proximate cause).
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defendant's commission of murder.321 Clearly, however, the defendant in this
case deserves punishment and should not be able to use the victim liability
defense. Now, one might point out that the defendant in this case will fail the
third and fourth requirements: lack of predisposition and the balancing test.322
Even so, the causal connection between the wrongful act of the victim and the
criminal act of the defendant seems quite remote. 323 The question is, if temporal
remoteness is the concern, what additions must be made to but-for causation?
One answer might be to put a "cooling time" limit on the proximity of the
wrongful victim behavior to the criminal response. "[C]ooling time," as noted
before, however, is problematic in that it seems to arbitrarily exclude those who
should be able to prevail on victim liability defenses. 324 Consequently, it may be
more useful to look at the above problem not as one of temporal proximity, but
one of intervening cause. In the above scenario, one could argue that the
defendant's own free will, as evidenced by all the actions undertaken in between
the burglary and the murder, broke the necessary chain of causation.325
As a result, inherent in the victim liability defense is a certain concept of
proximate cause whereby the wrongful act of the victim causes the defendant's
criminal conduct, unbroken by an intervening event. Admittedly, this is quite
conceptually prickly when the intervening event is the operation of the
defendant's own free will, because it can slip down a slope into speculative
arguments about the operation of the human mind and the human will. One is
forced to confront the issue of whether one human being's act can truly ever
321. Another example is an abusive husband who beats his wife so badly that a high probability
exists that he will kill her one day. He gets in a verbal argument with his wife. During the argument,
she throws a knife in his direction, but it does not hit him. On this particular occasion, absent the knife
throwing, he may or may not have decided to beat her up. Because she threw the knife, however, he
decides to beat her up and, in fact, kills her. In this instance, the wife acted wrongfully by throwing the
knife, and that wrongful conduct was a but-for cause of the killing. Yet it seems that the defendant
should not be off the hook in this case. Distinguishing this defendant from others more deserving of
the defense could be accomplished though the lack-of-predisposition requirement. See infra Part V.C
for a discussion of the lack-of-predisposition requirement. It can also be achieved, in part, through the
definition of causation as something more than mere but-for causation.
322. One might argue that the defendant has become predisposed to commit murder through his
reading of extremist literature. Although, on the flip side, this predisposition predates the murder but
not the wrongful act of the victim. Clearly, however, it is not, on balance, an appropriate reaction to
hunt down and kill a burglar two years later. Admittedly though, many prosecutors would cringe at
the thought taking such a defendant to trial and letting a jury decide whether or not his actions were
appropriate, in light of the hatred most people bear for criminals.
323. Many formulations of proximate cause involve a requirement that the result must not be too
remote from the initiating action. See, e.g., Getreu v. Lebowitz, 556 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (requiring "direct and proximate link" as opposed to "one that is indirect and remote" in order
to establish causation).
324. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text for a criticism of "cooling time"
requirements.
325. Courts often hold that an intervening act breaks the chain of causation. See, e.g., Herzberg
v. White, 66 P.2d 253, 257 (Ariz. 1937) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 ("An
intervening force is defined as being one that actively operates in producing harm after the original
actor's negligent act or omission has been committed.")).
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"cause" another person to do anything.326 More confounding is the question of
whether a person's own free will can interfere with the causal connection
between his own actions and another's provocation. 327 What is clear, however, is
that inherent in the idea of a causal link between the victim's wrongful behavior
and the defendant's response is that, due to the victim's behavior, the
defendant's will was overborne to the extent that he acted uncharacteristically
criminal-that he acted in a manner he otherwise would not have.
C. The Defendant Was Not Predisposed to Commit the Charged Offense
The non-specific victim liability defense incorporates a requirement that the
defendant not be predisposed to commit the crime. This requirement has been
added by virtue of some of the concerns addressed above in the context of
proximate causation. Namely, the victim liability defense is meant to protect
only those whose acts are truly caused by victim wrongfulness and not by the
defendant's preexisting criminal inclinations. The requirement of lack of
predisposition has many other benefits, but it also has serious drawbacks.
On the benefits side, the lack-of-predisposition requirement serves a very
important gate-keeping function in that it narrows the field of defendants to
which the defense applies by drawing a clear line between dangerous, easily-
provoked defendants and those who responded uncharacteristically to harm.
328
Thus, the same retributivist and utilitarian arguments underlying the proximate
cause requirement apply here. From a retributive perspective, the lack-of-
predisposition requirement acts as a safeguard to ensure that the defendant in
fact acted from justified motives rather than from his own evil inclinations. From
a utilitarian perspective, the requirement ensures that dangerous people are not
326. This is clearly assumed in many cases where the criminal act is a predicate for a resulting
harm, but there is some operation of free will in between. See United States v. Hamilton, 182 F. Supp.
548, 551 (D.D.C. 1960) (assuming arguendo that shooting victim freely pulled out his breathing tubes
thereby causing death, but finding no intervening cause of death). It is not without controversy,
however.
327. It appears to be at the heart of the cooling time requirement that there comes a point in time
where the operation of the defendant's rational mind should intervene against his provoked mind. See
Gresham v. State, 115 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Ga. 1960) (reasoning that "sufficient cooling time" allows "for
the voice of reason and humanity to be heard").
328. In the entrapment context, predisposition is described as follows:
A predisposition inquiry focuses on when the defendant made the decision to commit the
criminal act, which hopefully will provide a reliable indication of whether she made that
decision of her own free will. This, in turn, is presumed to be evidence of whether the
defendant poses a danger to society. If the defendant made the decision prior to the
government's inducement, then she is considered to have had the requisite mens rea and is
culpable for her criminal conduct. Conversely, if she made the decision to participate after
the government induced her to act, then the inducement is presumed to have been the causal
source of her decision and she is not held culpable. The most compelling justification for this
distinction is that the principal purpose of a legal penalty is to protect society from those
who would harm it, not from those whose wrongful conduct consists solely of a failure to
exercise self-restraint in the face of government-generated temptation and encouragement.
Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System of Defenses, 25 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 463, 474-75 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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given a free pass based on the defense. Only those who are not dangerous by
nature, but merely reacted to extraordinary circumstances, can benefit from the
defense.
There are, however, several negatives to the lack-of-predisposition
requirement. First, there is the issue of whether predisposition to commit crimes
should have any philosophical significance to punishment.329  To fully
comprehend this question, one must wade into the murky waters of the nature of
human actions and, indeed, whether certain empirical indices can specify who is
"bad" and who is "good." More importantly, there is the issue of whether an
administrable and fair definition of predisposition can be laid out. In addition,
from a very practical perspective, one might argue that the predisposition
requirement might undermine the whole of the defense in that defendants who
might otherwise avail themselves of the defense would be afraid to assert the
defense because of its potential to make admissible otherwise irrelevant prior
crimes evidence. 330 The most persuasive argument against the predisposition
requirement is that it unfairly punishes a defendant not for his criminal actions in
the instant case, but rather, merely because of character. 331
329. Some theorists advocate foregoing the existential question of who is and who is not
predisposed to commit crimes and, instead, adopt a market-inducement analysis of predisposition:
There is a deeper difficulty with the controversy over the two tests for entrapment. The
controversy is premised on the existence of a real something-state of mind, character,
whatever-that is referred to as "predisposition." This assumption is false. We assume that
there are a few people who would not commit any criminal acts no matter what the
provocation or enticement. We will not refer further to such saintly, or misguided,
individuals. Everyone else, we assume, has a price. That price may be quite high, for
example because a person puts a high value on her good name, but it exists. If this
assumption is true, then everyone except saints is predisposed to commit crimes. But, that in
turn means that "predisposition" cannot usefully distinguish anyone from anyone else. The
only salient question is whether a person's price has been met, not whether he has one, since
by hypothesis everyone but the saintly does.
The real point is that talk of "predisposition" is meaningless and commits an existential
fallacy. A person who takes the bait has had his price met; a person who does not, has not.
But, the person who does not take the bait almost surely would take a higher, even if greatly
higher, bait. The failure to take this one is evidence of his price, but not of predisposition.
Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 413 (1999)
(footnotes omitted).
330. Justice Frankfurter observed in Sherman v. United States:
The danger of prejudice [from predisposition evidence], particularly if the issue of
entrapment must be submitted to the jury and disposed of by a general verdict of guilty or
innocent, is evident. The defendant must either forego the claim of entrapment or run the
substantial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a criminal record or bad
reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt of the specific offense of which he stands
charged.
356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
331. Essentially the issue is to what extent the defendant's character as a human being should
play a role in whether or not he deserves punishment. Justice Frankfurter criticized such a
consideration as follows:
[Piredisposition evidence has often been admitted to show the defendant's reputation,
criminal activities, and prior disposition .... Furthermore, a test that looks to the character
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Prior to further discussing the benefits and drawbacks of including a lack-of-
predisposition requirement in the victim liability defense, it is necessary to
attempt to define specifically the meaning of predisposition. The most logical
place to look is the doctrine of entrapment. 332 Under the subjective approach to
entrapment, which is the dominant approach today, in order to assert
successfully the defense, a defendant must show not only that she was induced by
government conduct to commit the crime, but also that she was not predisposed
to commit the crime. 3 3  The controversy over the subjective approach to
entrapment versus the objective approach, which looks to the outrageousness of
the government conduct 33 4 rather than the predisposition of the defendant, has a
and predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the
underlying reason for the defense of entrapment. No matter what the defendant's past
record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the
estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be
tolerated by an advanced society.
Id. at 382-83 (Frankfurter J., concurring).
332. Entrapment is a defense based on improper government conduct which induces the
defendant to commit the crime. There are two approaches, objective and subjective. The objective
view of entrapment frames the defense as a way to control outrageous conduct of the government.
Consequently, under the objective view, the particular frame of mind of the defendant is not as
important as the objective conduct of the government:
The objective test recognizes that the true foundation of the entrapment doctrine rests in a
public policy which protects the purity of government and its processes. According to the
objective test, if the method of encouragement used was likely to induce an ordinary law-
abiding citizen to commit the offense, then the case should be dismissed. This holds true
even if the defendant was a hardened criminal ready and willing to commit the offense at
any opportunity.
Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobsen: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment, and
Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 836 (1992) (internal citations
omitted). This approach is currently followed by a minority of states and the Model Penal Code. Id.
at 835.
Conversely, the subjective approach frames the entrapment defense as a question of the
defendant's mindset. The essential issue is whether the defendant was a willing participant in the
crime or an unwilling innocent ensnared in the government's plan. As a result, the subjective view
focuses on the predisposition of the defendant:
The subjective test of entrapment thus focuses exclusively on the defendant's predisposition;
the nature of the police conduct involved is irrelevant. Hence, though an otherwise innocent
defendant who the police lead into crime is entitled to the defense because he is not
blameworthy, a predisposed defendant is considered blameworthy if led into the same
criminal act. This approach bases the entrapment defense on a core principle of criminal
law-that defendants who are not culpable should not be punished. Because entrapment
bears on the guilt or innocence of the accused, the issue must be submitted to the jury.
Id. at 834 (internal citations omitted). The academic debate over which approach should reign
continues, although a divided Supreme Court adopted the subjective approach in Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932). The Court reaffirmed the subjective approach in Jacobson v. United
States, 503 U.S. 540,542 (1992) and Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382.
333. See Lord, supra note 328, at 470 ("The gravamen of the subjective approach to entrapment
is not the amount of government participation, but rather the defendant's willingness to commit the
crime.").
334. See id. at 492 ("The gravamen of the objective view of entrapment is whether the police
conduct falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
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long history rooted partially in divided Supreme Court jurisprudence. 335
As with the victim liability defense, predisposition in entrapment
jurisprudence allows juries and courts to distinguish between people who
uncharacteristically committed crimes based on government inducement and
those who would have committed the same or similar crime even if inducement
had not been present at all. Explaining the predisposition requirement, the
Supreme Court declared in Sherman v. United States, "To determine whether
entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. ' 336 Predisposition
evidence was used as a tool to show that law enforcement targeted, and even
induced a criminally-inclined person to commit a crime, but did not create an
extraordinary situation that would have induce an innocent person to commit a
crime. 337
The main criticism of the subjective approach to entrapment concerns the
nature of the entrapment doctrine. Critics argue that the doctrine derives not
just from a concern over the defendant's culpability, but rather from a concern
about government overreaching. Whereas the subjective approach centers on
the issue of whether or not the defendant is culpable for his crime, the objective
approach centers on the quality of the government's conduct in achieving an
arrest, regardless of whether the person targeted turns out to be a criminal.338 In
this sense, the objective approach adopts a means-based perspective (outrageous
government conduct is not justified even when the end result is that a criminal
has been caught) and the subjective approach adopts an ends-based perspective
(outrageous government conduct is justified when a criminal is caught). Thus,
the objection to the subjective approach is that when the criminal is predisposed,
the government gets a free pass to engage in conduct that should be actively
discouraged by the law.339 The objective approach to entrapment, then, is
power.") (internal quotation omitted).
335. See supra note 328 for a discussion of the predisposition inquiry.
336. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
337. Justice Hughes, writing for the plurality in Sorrells, opined:
[T]he issues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the controlling question
whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the government is seeking to
punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.
If that is the fact, common justice requires that the accused be permitted to prove it. The
government in such a case is in no position to object to evidence of the activities of its
representatives in relation to the accused, and if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of
entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.
287 U.S. at 451.
338. See supra note 331 for a discussion of how prior criminal conduct of a defendant does not
excuse police conduct.
339. Justice Roberts explained in his dissent in Sorrells:
Whatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous infractions of law these will
not justify the instigation and creation of a new crime, as a means to reach him and punish
him for his past misdemeanors. He has committed the crime in question, but, by
supposition, only because of instigation and inducement by a government officer. To say that
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analogous to the exclusionary rule.34 ° Its practical effect is to allow a defendant
to go free, not because the defendant is not culpable, but rather to discourage
the government from engaging in undesirable, even unconstitutional, behavior.
The objective approach serves primarily as a government incentive-fixing
function.
On this point, however, there is a significant disjuncture between the
entrapment scenario and the victim liability defense scenario. In a subjective
entrapment jurisdiction, if the induced defendant is predisposed to committing
the crime at issue, the government gets its conviction and receives absolutely no
sanction for its wrongful overreaching. Thus, the government has no incentive to
discontinue the undesirable actions. In the victim liability scenario, the induced
but predisposed defendant is also convicted. The difference, however, is that the
victim has suffered a harm at the hands of the defendant, which is itself incentive
to discontinue the wrongful behavior. Consequently, the victim liability defense
has more leeway to focus on the moral culpability of the defendant. The victim
liability defense need not have the same incentive-fixing concerns as the
entrapment doctrine. It can be more fully centered around defendant
culpability.
Aside from the distinction between objective and subjective entrapment,
there is still the question of the meaning of "predisposition." Some theorists
suggest that predisposition is merely a function of inducement. 341 In other
words, a person is predisposed to commit a crime if it took very little inducement
to cause the person to commit the crime. Under this approach, predisposition in
the victim liability defense scenario would merely be a function of the first,
second, and fourth elements of the defense. Thus, a person is not predisposed
when the victim acted sufficiently wrongfully, the victim's behavior caused the
crime, and the defendant acted appropriately on balance. The inquiry becomes
more complicated, however, considering the above discussion of causation.
such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered innocuous by the fact
that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously transgressed is wholly to disregard
the reason for refusing the processes of the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction.
It is to discard the basis of the doctrine and in effect to weigh the equities as between the
government and the defendant when there are in truth no equities belonging to the latter,
and when the rule of action cannot rest on any estimate of the good which may come of the
conviction of the offender by foul means.
287 U.S. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
340. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) ("The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through
the rule's general deterrent effect.").
341. Louis Michael Seidman observes:
[S]o long as one equates "predisposition" with a readiness to commit crime, no definition of
"predisposition" can be complete without an articulation of the level of inducement to which
a "predisposed" defendant would respond. Furthermore, the "predisposed" cannot be
distinguished from the "nondisposed" without focusing on the propriety of the government's
conduct-the very factor that the subjective approach professes to ignore.
Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 S.
Cr. REV. 111, 118-19 (1982) (citation omitted).
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Predisposition must have some meaning apart from the other elements in order
to inform whether or not the victim's behavior indeed caused the criminal act. In
other words, the defendant's predisposition, or lack thereof, helps determine
whether the victim's acts truly induced the behavior or whether some other
factor (the defendant's pre-existing behavioral dispositions) induced the
behavior. In this sense, predisposition is less defined by inducement as
inducement is defined by lack of predisposition.
If not a function of inducement, then, what is predisposition? Some
theorists suggest that predisposition to commit a crime does not really exist.3 42
Rather, in the entrapment context, emphasis should be placed on whether the
defendant has committed the crime in response to market or extra-market
forces, which is essentially the difference between responding to every-day
situations and extraordinary situations.343 Under this definition, the touchstone
of "predisposition" is that it "identifies reliably those who are and are likely to
be involved in criminality under real conditions." 344 This definition, however,
seems to further beg the question. Whenever outrageous government conduct
or wrongful victim behavior exists, the defendant has been placed in an
extraordinary or extra-market situation to which he responded. The relevant
question is whether the extra-market force was a critical factor in the defendant's
decision to engage in a crime. What informs this inquiry is whether or not the
defendant acted uncharacteristically.
Consequently, the touchstone of predisposition seems to be the character of
the defendant. Evidence that a defendant acted uncharacteristically criminally
or characteristically criminally can come in many forms. Most commonly,
predisposition evidence takes the form of evidence of similar past crime.345 But
other evidence might suffice, for example, a confession that the defendant would
have commit the crime in the absence of the inducement, statements to others
that indicate the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, or other
circumstantial evidence.
342. See Allen et al., supra note 329, at 413 who discussed:
The real point is that talk of 'predisposition' is meaningless and commits an existential fallacy. A
person who takes the bait has had his price met; a person who does not, has not. But, the person who
does not take the bait almost surely would take a higher, even if greatly higher, bait. The failure to
take this one is evidence of his price but not of predisposition.
To some extent, the above argument is simply a game of semantics. Predisposition to commit
crime may be nothing more than a person's psychological state of willingness to engage in illegal
behavior in conditions under which most people or most reasonable people would not. Allen et al.
would say that the difference is predispositions focus on the past behavior of the defendant, whereas a
market test focuses on whether the bait used was ordinary or extraordinary. If it was ordinary, then
even a first time offender poses a continuing threat. Id. at 419. Not to belabor the issue, but in this
day, predisposition inquiries may focus on the past acts of the defendant, but they may also focus on
the defendant's instant behavior, for example, whether he exhibited willingness or enthusiasm for the
criminal plan.
343. Id. at 417-20.
344. Id. at 419.
345. See supra note 191 for a discussion of the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes.
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The obvious criticism is that criminal law should not punish for character. 346
Imagine a defendant who, though predisposed to commit the crime, in fact acted
solely in response to wrongful victim behavior and not from his criminal
disposition. In this scenario, there is both justification and predisposition. 347
Indeed, there may be situations in which a criminally-inclined person did not in
fact act on his criminal inclinations when responding to wrongful victim
behavior, but rather on his reasonable inclinations. It does seem, at first blush,
ultimately unfair to exclude this person from the class of defendants to which the
victim liability defense applies simply because of his past behavior. 348 This
perception, that to exclude the above defendant is unfair, however, is itself based
on a significant assumption about the nature of criminal prohibitions and
punishment. The assumption here is that criminal law and punishment is about
punishing a "bad act" rather than a "bad person." 349
If the predisposition prong of the victim liability defense is interpreted as
excluding reasonably induced yet predisposed defendants, then the defense
applies only to "good" induced defendants as opposed to "bad" induced
defendants. This may seem like an unusual concept. One would have a hard
time imagining a self-defense rule that excluded defendants who were
predisposed to kill from the defense, even when they killed because they
reasonably feared imminent bodily injury.350  However, even apart from
entrapment, there are existing defenses that distinguish between bad defendants
and good defendants who respond to similar stimulus in committing their crimes.
The insanity defense, particularly as defined by the M'Naghten rule,
requires not only that the defendant suffer from a disease of the mind but also
346. See supra note 339, quoting Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Sorrells that the
"demerits" of a defendant alone do not justify punishment.
347. This puts retributive and utilitarian sentiments at war with each other. In the retributive
sense, the defendant is not culpable because he would not have committed the crime in this particular
instance without the unfair governmental influence. Utilitarian concerns, however, are furthered by
the defendant's punishment because his predisposition indicates that he is a danger to society.
348. Allen et al. observe that "[e]ntrapment could mean, but does not in the cases so far as we
can tell, something about character," but this idea "falls under the weight of the general disinclination
to punish for character alone." Allen et al., supra note 329, at 414.
349. Some theorists posit that, although arguably it should not be, criminal law has become all
about managing types of people. See Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the
New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 456 (1998) (describing Kansas's Violent Sexual
Predator Act as a tool for managing sexual predators). One argument holds that:
[A]ll entrapment in an important sense involves punishment for character. It almost
invariably involves governmental activity whose explicit purpose is social hygiene-to clear
the streets of individuals who have and will commit crimes-and is usually targeted at types
of criminality that cannot easily be prosecuted in other ways ....
Allen et al., supra note 329, at 419. The ultimate question of the extent to which criminal character has
a place in the penal law is well beyond the scope of this article.
350. There are, however, a multitude of ways a clever prosecutor can get the evidence of the
defendant's violent propensity in front of the jury. For example, it might come in as evidence of
intent, motive, or absence of mistake. If the defendant testifies, it might be used as impeachment
evidence. See supra note 191 for a discussion of past crimes evidence.
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that the defendant be unable to distinguish right from wrong. 351 This latter
requirement has been interpreted to mean that because of the defendant's
mental defect, the defendant thought her conduct to be morally right.
352
Moreover, courts have defined this idea of morally right as objectively morally
right, the operative issue being whether society would agree with the delusional
defendant's assessment of morality.353 Take then, for example, two defendants
who both suffer from diagnosed schizophrenia and commit murders during
schizophrenic delusions. In Defendant 's delusion, God tells him to build a
church. Defendant 1 feels his wife is undermining God's plan so he kills her.
35 4
In Defendant 2's delusion, his business partner is stealing from him. Defendant
2, in response, kills his partner. Both defendants suffer from the same mental
defect (schizophrenia) that caused both to engage in the same conduct (killing).
Under the M'Naghten rule, however, Defendant 1 could likely be acquitted as
insane and Defendant 2 determined sane and convicted.
The difference between Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, under M'Naghten
and its progeny, is that Defendant l's actions can be seen as objectively moral
because, within his delusion, they were sanctioned by God. One could say that it
is objectively moral to obey God. Defendant 2's actions, though delusional, were
based on anger, greed, or revenge. It is not objectively moral to kill based on
anger, greed, or revenge. Thus, even if Defendant 2 honestly believed his actions
to be moral, they were not objectively moral. As a consequence, although both
killers are equally mentally diseased, and both killings occurred because of the
disease, Defendant 1 is declared insane and Defendant 2 is declared sane.
In the above hypothetical, there is no medical difference between the
diseased minds of both defendants, and no psychological reason to call one
insane and the other sane. The difference at the heart of the insanity doctrine is
that Defendant 1 has a correct internal moral meter whereas Defendant 2 does
not. The insanity doctrine is a legal, not a medical concept. As a legal precept,
insanity, as defined by M'Naghten and its American progeny, acquits defendants,
not simply because insanity interferes with mens rea and volition, but because
within the defendant's delusion, the defendant makes correct moral choices.
Essentially, the M'Naghten rule will only allow "good" insane killers off the
hook. It will not allow the "bad" insane killer to go free. Consequently, implicit
in the M'Naghten rule is the idea that criminal law is not only about punishing
acts, that is, determining whether, in the instant situation all the elements of the
351. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,722-23 (H.L. 1843).
352. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 135 (Colo. 1992) (construing M'Naghten to require that
insane defendant believe that her acts are "morally" right).
353. See id. at 139 (stating that "the phrase 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' refers
to a person's cognitive inability, due to a mental disease or defect, to distinguish right from wrong as
measured by a societal standard of morality").
354. These facts closely mirror those of Serravo, except that instead of killing his wife, Serravo
stabbed her, and she survived. Id. at 130-31. The court ruled that such facts could support a
conclusion that because of the defendant's mental disease he lacked the ability to distinguish right
from wrong. Id. The court opined that Serravo's belief that God ordered him to build the complex
could show that he believed stabbing his wife to be morally correct. Id. at 130.
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criminal act were present. Rather, criminal law additionally takes into account
the nature of the actor. Like the insanity defense, the victim liability defense can
seek to distinguish between good (non-disposed) people who respond criminally
to wrongful victim behavior and bad (criminally disposed) people who respond
criminally to wrongful victim behavior.
Consequently, there are two possible responses to the objection that the
lack-of-predisposition requirement unfairly punishes defendant for past acts and
character: (1) The fact that some predisposed yet induced defendants may be
eliminated from the defense is simply an unavoidable cost of narrowing the
defense; and (2) it is legitimate for defenses to distinguish, as the insanity
doctrine does, between good people who commit criminal acts in response to
extraordinary stimuli and bad people who similarly commit criminal acts.
D. The Defendant's Response Balanced Against the Victim's Wrongful Conduct
Dictates that the Defendant Should be Exculpated or Punishment Mitigated
The final element of the non-specific victim liability defense requires the
judge or jury to balance the defendant's criminal conduct against the victim's
wrongful conduct to determine the appropriate level of liability. A critic may be
quick to point out that this requirement seems to undercut some of the benefits
of the defense by reintroducing the reasonable racist and provoked abuser
problems discussed in Part IV.3 55 The argument is that in balancing the conduct
of the defendant and victim, the jury could take into consideration racist,
homophobic, or patriarchal norms.
Turning to the issue of reasonable racists, the problem of reasonable racists,
provoked abusers, and homophobic killers occurs because provocation and self-
defense allow the defendant's "reasonable" assessment of the victim's behavior
to control whether the defense is applicable. Thus, the homophobe's action of
killing a man who makes a pass at him could be considered "reasonable
provocation" even under an objective reasonableness standard if the jury
determines that it is statistically typical to be provoked by a homosexual
advance. 356 The action could be considered reasonable provocation under a
subjective reasonable analysis if the jury determines it is reasonable for someone
with the homophobe's background to be provoked by a homosexual advance.
Either way, the law is left little room to dictate that certain victim behaviors
should not provoke a criminal response, even if the defendant or society believes
they should. The wrongfulness requirement allows the law to dictate
presumptively that only certain victim behaviors allow the law to assess the
defendant's criminal act in the context of the victim's conduct. Thus, the
reasonable racist problem is solved on the front end by dictating that only
wrongful behavior is grounds for the defense.
Applying the non-specific victim liability defense to People v. Goetz
355. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the victim liability defense.
356. See supra notes 125 and 183 and accompanying text for a discussion of the view that
homosexual advances constitute per se inadequate provocation.
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provides an example of the role of wrongfulness. 357 In that case, if victim
wrongdoing was a predicate to Goetz's defense, Goetz would have to show that
the boys in the subway were acting contrary to law in a way that shocked the
conscience. Because the victims did not do anything illegal that was shocking to
the conscience, 35 8 Goetz would not be entitled to assert the non-specific victim
liability defense. The question of whether Goetz reasonably feared the victims
because he was brought up racist 359 would never even arise.
The question then becomes whether incorporating a balancing test on the
back end reintroduces the problem. Perhaps, one could imagine a situation in
which an African-American man committed the "wrongful" act of punching a
white man 360 who in turn shot him. The white man then argues that he
"reasonably" responded to the victim's wrongful conduct because, according to
his racist upbringing, it is an act worthy of death for a black man to punch a
white man. The jury is then charged with balancing the action of the defendant
against the harm committed by the defendant. Obviously, most juries would find
the response so disproportionate as to warrant severe punishment. One might,
however, be able to imagine a jury willing to acquit because it is either itself
racist or extremely sympathetic to the subjective mental state of the defendant.
While the aforementioned situation is unfortunate, it is not a problem endemic
to the non-specific victim liability defense. First of all, the problem of jurors
relying on racist belief systems in their decisions is one that can occur in any area
of the law. The non-specific victim liability defense's incorporation of
"wrongfulness" and elimination of reasonableness at least does not allow a legal
mechanism for introducing racist or patriarchal norms into a trial. As for jurors
who are moved by the subjective beliefs of the defendant, this is not necessarily a
problem with the defense. The struggle over how objective or subjective the law
should be is not new361 and perhaps insoluble.
357. 497 N.E.2d 41, 47-48 (N.Y. 1986).
358. Evidence revealed that the boys, one or two of the victims, "approached Goetz... and
stated 'give me five dollars."' Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43.
359. See Carter, supra note 77, at 421 for a discussion of the racial implication of Goetz's defense.
360. Technically, this is a simple battery. There is a real question of whether this would qualify
as "wrongful" conduct when "wrongful" is defined as illegal and shocking to the conscience.
361. This is reflected in the debate over the meaning of "reasonableness." See George P.
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 I-ARV. L. REV. 949, 953 (1985) (theorizing that common
law reliance on reasonableness leads to "flat" legal thinking and an ignorance regarding criminal law
distinctions); Stephen G. Gilles, Symposium, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816 (2001) (evaluating
reasonable person standard under Restatement tort law analysis); Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the
Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of
Reasonableness in Self-defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 88-90 (1998) (criticizing
objective reasonableness standard in criminal law); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A
Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 229 (1982) (articulating differences between justification
and excuse defenses for criminal conduct); Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of
Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of
Injurers and Victims, 78 GEO. L.J. 241, 242 (1989) (critiquing objective reasonableness evaluation as
unfair to those who generally fail to take proper care).
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Purely objective standards require defendants to conform with standards of
morality completely independent of any of the individual defendant's
characteristics, beliefs, or background. Objective standards require the
defendant to act like a fictional reasonable man who acts neither in accordance
with culture nor with past personal experience. 362 Plainly, the more objective the
standard, the clearer the line between criminal and non-criminal behavior.
Objective standards presuppose a uniform logical construct that can be applied
universally to all actors. The problem with objective reasonableness standards is
that this uniform logical construct simply does not exist. What is reasonable to
an Anglo-American, Christian woman may be very different from what is
reasonable to a Saudi Arabian, Muslim man.363 Those opposed to so-called
"cultural" evidence in criminal trials would respond that those not from the
"culture" of the United States are on notice of the criminal standards embedded
in the culture and should conform to them, even if to do so is against their
culture. 3
64
This response may seem inadequate for several reasons. First, it requires a
precise determination of the culture of the United States.365 Implicitly, also, the
prevailing culture is assumed to exclude rather than incorporate foreign
cultures. 366 Second, even if the defendant is on notice of American culture,
362. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,816-17 (N.D. 1983) (noting objective reasonableness
is based on fictional reasonable man).
363. Not only is it a fact that the United States contains a diversity of cultures with a diversity of
social norms, Multiculturalists contend that the law should not reflect ethnocentric values but rather
should ensure that "each [culture] has the right to form its own identity and nourish its own sense of
what is rational and humane." Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (1996) (quoting Stanley Fish,
Boutique Multiculturalism or Why Liberals Are Incapable of Thinking About Hate Speech 1, 8
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review)). See also Anita Christina Butera,
Assimilation, Pluralism, and Multiculturalism: The Policy of Racial/Ethnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001):
From the Multicultural approach, each racial/ethnic group gives its specific and unique
contribution to the ongoing evolution of the larger national culture. There is no implicit
assumption of superior/inferior cultures and/or racial/ethnic groups. In this sense, the
contributions of the specific groups to the national societal 'mosaic' is greater than the sum
of its individual racial/ethnic components.
364. See Coleman, supra note 363, at 1098:
[T]he use of cultural 6vidence risks a dangerous balkanization of the criminal law, where
non-immigrant Americans are subject to one set of laws and immigrant Americans to
another. This is a prospect that is inconsistent not only with one of the law's most
fundamental objectives, the protection of society and all of its members from harm, but also
with the important human and civil rights doctrines embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause. Thus, society as a whole is best served by a balance that avoids the use of
discriminatory cultural evidence.
365. In the case of Coleman's argument, the law assumes that the existing law and jurors'
predispositions regarding the term "reasonable" are adequate reflections of the prevailing culture. Id.
at 1155 n.293.
366. Leti Volpp argues that not only is it racist to assume that the dominant European culture is
superior, but also that culture must take into account the effect of dominant cultures on the
development of subordinate cultures:
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foreign cultural norms appear to be relevant still when, for example, heat of
passion is the benchmark of the defense. In this case, despite outward
assimilation, the defendant may have been moved to passion based on the
culture ingrained in the sub-conscious for years. Imposing an objective standard
does not account for the effect of culture on mens rea.367 Thus, it seems then that
the more subjective standard has many benefits it allows for more flexibility and
takes into account the diverse nature of our society.
On the other hand, subjective standards of conduct carry with them several
problems. One problem is the possible stigmatizing affect that cultural evidence
may have on members of diverse cultures. Based on the application of this
evidence in high profile criminal trials, society members might begin to identify,
for example, Asian culture with wife-beating or baby killing.
368
[D]escrib[ing] the "culture" of non-Europeans in terms such as "time-honored," "tradition"
and "practice," portraying members of a community as behaving solely in accordance with
ancestral ritual ... prohibits the realization that "culture" can encompass information about
social context that implicates an individual's relationship to the "dominant" community or
the state. Discussions of "culture" are frequently used to preclude consideration of the way
the state or dominant community affects what is constructed as "culture." For example, the
notion of a "culture of poverty" tends to absolve the government or dominant community
from any responsibility for economic devastation in African American communities. The
description of the exploitation of immigrant garment workers by immigrant sweatshop
owners as "cultural," thereby erasing the complicity of transnational corporations (garment
industry manufacturers and retailers) and the state (government agencies), is another
example. A more expansive vision of what constitutes "culture" can be used in the context
of what are asserted as "cultural defenses." Cultural evidence should include information on
the ways the state, transnational corporations, and the dominant community affect an
immigrant, through such factors as immigration status, the inaccessibility of the local police
department, economic constraints, racism and anti-immigrant violence, and the lack of
accessible shelters for battered immigrant women.
Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture". Gender, Race, Nation and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1573. 1591-92 (1996 (citations omitted).
367. Kay L. Levine articulates two ways in which cultural evidence may be relevant to the
defendants mens rea. She suggests that a "cultural reason" argument can be used to negate a required
specific intent by showing an alternate motivation for the criminal act and used to show the
defendant's belief's to be "reasonable" where such a showing is required under the law. Kay L.
Levine. Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural Defense
Strategies. 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39,49-56 (2003).
368. In Washington State, a Chinese defendant was convicted of first degree manslaughter after
smashing his wife's head with a hammer after he suspected her of having an affair. This prompted
Stan Mark, program director at the Asian American Legal Defense Fund to complain, "It has nothing
to do with his being Chinese or having a Chinese background. In modern China, under Socialist law, it
is not acceptable conduct." Weisberg, supra note 18, at 526. Leti Volpp argues that such
stigmatization is particularly evident when the defendant is a person of color:
Cultures that are thought to lag behind are often differentiated from the hegemonic
culture by race. When people of color are assumed to "lag" because they are governed by
cultural dictates, their cultural values stand in stark contrast to reason, supposedly a
characteristic of the West. The notion that non-Western people are governed by culture
suggests they have a limited capacity for agency, will, or rational thought.
The assumption that people of color are governed by cultural dictates is not only
dehumanizing, it is also depoliticizing because such thinking often leads us to neglect the
power of "noncultural" forces in shaping reality.
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The most difficult problem with subjective standards is the problem of
reasonable racists discussed above and in Part IV. In Bernard Goetz's case, 369
the New York Court of Appeals invited the jury to take into account the
defendant's "circumstances," which:
encompass more than the physical movements of the potential
assailant.... [They] include any relevant knowledge the defendant had
about that person. They also necessarily bring in the physical
attributes of all persons involved, including the defendant.
Furthermore, the defendant's circumstances encompass any prior
experiences he had which could provide a reasonable basis for a belief
that another person's intentions were to injure or rob him or that the
use of deadly force was necessary under the circumstances. 370
Goetz became the "reasonable" frightened, gun-toting, disgruntled subway-
rider. Critics characterized this invitation as authority for the jury to take into
account Goetz's racist perceptions. While the judge in this case did not, nor
would any judge, explicitly ask the jury to think about the case from the
perspective of a "reasonable racist," subjective standards allow such an inquiry
to occur implicitly:
To many, allowing the reasonableness of Goetz's actions to be judged
in light of his past "victimization" by black youth is tantamount to
saying that individuals should not be legally required to avoid being
racist. 37
1
Thus, the basic criticism of subjective standards is that the law is
inadequately equipped to prescribe appropriate moral norms. Jody Armour
asserts:
[Tihe concrete reality of racially charged self-defense arguments is
readily apparent, and the legal propriety of such strategies must be
evaluated. I contend that even though a supposed assailant's race may
be formally relevant under self-defense doctrine, courts must refuse to
allow race-based claims of reasonableness-whether explicit or
covert-to figure in self-defense cases. 372
There must be some mental dispositions which courts and legislatures
declare as per se criminal regardless of the defendant's particular background. I
will admit that this line is difficult to draw, especially in cases where defendants
are raised in foreign cultures, which appear to some extent to the Western eye to
be racist, sexist, and/or classist, and have incorporated these belief systems into
their lifestyles.373 These are tough cases because, on the one hand, their culture
Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89. 96-97 (2000) (citations
omitted).
369. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
370. Id. at 52.
371. Heller, supra note 361, at 88 (citation omitted).
372. Armour, supra note 165, at 785.
373. Sherene Razack recognizes the difficulty of these issues:
Culture talk is clearly a double-edged sword. It packages difference as inferiority and
obscures gender-based domination within communities, yet cultural considerations are
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truly does dictate these beliefs, on the, other hand, there is a very good argument
that our law ought authoritatively disavow these beliefs. 374 In the end, the victim
liability defense, like any defense, will be thrown into the objective-subjective
debate. 375 The victim liability defense, at least on the front-end, eliminates the
reasonable racist problem when the defendant has committed a criminal act
against a non-wrongful victim.
The importance of the flexibility given to the jury by the balancing test
should not be understated. One of the most salient fears and pervasive criticisms
of the non-specific victim liability defense is that it will invite vigilantism. The
concern is that the defense will encourage people to choose criminal retaliation
rather than rely on law enforcement for vindication of criminal laws. The
balancing test allows the jury to take into account, for example, the legal options
available to the defendant, the extent to which the defendant planned the
criminal behavior, and other factors that brought about the crime. If the jury
determines that the defendant responded to wrongful victim conduct, but should
have chosen an alternative action, the jury could find the defendant liable for a
crime, but less liable than a defendant who committed similar criminal behavior
not in response to wrongful victim conduct.
E. The Practical Application of the Non-Specific Victim Liability Defense
Having elucidated to some degree the meanings of the elements of the
defense, the issue becomes how the defense will operate. The defense will
operate as an alternative to existing specific victim liability defenses. The
difficulty here is that some of the defenses, like provocation, merely mitigate
punishment while others, like self-defense, result in total exculpation. Even
among the current victim liability defenses that result in total exculpation, there
are doctrinal differences. Some of the defenses serve to "justify" the defendant's
actions, while others merely "excuse" it.
In determining whether the non-specific victim liability defense should
mitigate or exculpate, I find the distinction between excuse and justification
unhelpful in two ways. 376 First, both excuse and justification serve as complete
important for contextualizing oppressed groups' claims for justice, for improving their access
to services, and for requiring dominant groups to examine the invisible cultural advantages
they enjoy.
Sherene Razack. What is to be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye? Culture, Race, and
Gender in Cases of Sexual Violence. 19 SIGNS 894. 896 (1994).
374. See Coleman. supra note 363. at 1138 (arguing that by allowing cultural evidence in domestic
violence cases "a message is sent to the affected communities that men can continue to subordinate
women and children as they allegedly were accustomed to doing in their country of origin").
375. One possible resolution to the objective/subjective divide is found in the Model Penal Code.
In the context of self-defense, under the Model Penal Code, a reasonable mistake as to the need to use
deadly force will exculpate the defendant. An unreasonable but honest mistake will exculpate the
defendant on charges requiring an intent of knowledge or purpose. If the defendant's honest mistake
was reckless or negligent, however, then she can still be guilty of a crime with the requisite intent of
recklessness or negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(B) (1962).
376. Kahan & Nussbaum similarly observe that the justification/excuse distinction does not
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defenses to criminal liability.377 Second, a critical examination of the distinction
between justification and excuse reveals a very unclear and tenuous divide.378 In
operate as a neat divide, or a conceptually important one regarding the defense of provocation:
It is widely assumed that "justification" and "excuse" embody normative distinctions that
generalize across criminal defenses. Justifications are said to identify acts that produce
morally preferred states of affairs. When complying with the law would result in greater
harm than would breaking it, for example, a defendant may assert the justification of
"necessity"; an individual who kills another to protect his own life may assert the
justification of self-defense, because the law prefers the death of the wrongful aggressor to
the death of the law-abiding citizen. In addition, justifications are said to be "universal" and
"objective"; because they single out acts that produce superior states of affairs, justifications
are indifferent to the identity of the actor or her motive for doing the act.
Excuses, in contrast, are said to identify circumstances in which an act is wrongful but the
actor blameless. For example, a person whose will is overborne by a threat may be able to
assert the excuse of "duress" even if her act imposes a greater harm than is threatened to
her. Moreover, excuses are said to be "subjective" and "individualized." They are
concerned with how the defendant's particular circumstances affected her capacity or
opportunity to obey the law.
The common law formulation of voluntary manslaughter does not fit neatly into either of
these categories. Consider again the parent who is convicted of manslaughter after killing a
man who has abused her child. By mitigating her punishment, the law presumably does not
imply that the man's death, by itself, produces a better state of affairs. Moreover, application
of the doctrine to the angry parent does not satisfy the objectivity and universality conditions
of justification: it was necessary for the parent to show that she killed out of anger and not
for some other reason; and certainly no other person could have killed on the parent's behalf
and still have been entitled to present a manslaughter theory. Nor does voluntary
manslaughter appear to satisfy the conditions of "excuse" in this setting. It would not be
necessary for the parent to show that her anger deprived her of the capacity to obey the law;
but even if she could, that would not be sufficient unless she could also establish that the
victim's acts were adequate to provoke a reasonable person.
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 133, at 318-20 (citations omitted).
377. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 567 ("Justifications exonerate conduct as right, and
excuses exonerate persons as blameless for wrongful conduct"). Thus, the appeal to the distinction
between justification and excuse will not ultimately resolve whether the victim liability defense should
be mitigation or a complete defense.
378. Identifying a singular strain of logic underlying the categories of mitigation, justification, and
excuse defenses is incredibly difficult. Under the most simplistic view, justification defenses "are said
to identify acts that produce morally preferred states of affairs" whereas excuse defenses "are said to
identify circumstances in which an act is wrongful but the actor blameless." Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 133. at 318-19. Thus, a person acting in self-defense is said to be justified because she has
prioritized her own innocent life over the life of the wrongful aggressor. A person acting under duress
who, threatened with death, kills an innocent is merely excused because her life was not necessarily
worth more than the innocent decedent's life. The categories get much more complicated when
mistake of fact is put into the situation. Is the defendant who mistakenly but reasonably believed that
he killed a wrongful aggressor justified or excused? Does it matter that the relevant fact distinguishing
between justification and excuse is unknown to the defendant? Also confounding is the fact that
justification and excuse are treated, for the most part, alike under the law in that they both result in
total exculpation. Provocation, on the other hand, is treated as a lower level of excuse because the
defendant is still punished. Thus, the parent who kills her child's murderer is in fact more culpable
than the person who kills the innocent because she is under duress or the person who kills upon the
reasonably mistaken belief that another is about to kill him. The question is why this ordering makes
sense? It cannot really be said that the latter two defendants have produced a consequentially better
state of affairs in society than the former. As a result, the distinction between justification and excuse
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addition, in one sense, the victim liability defense appears as justification because
the harm befalls a wrongful victim and not merely a negligent or unwitting
victim. 379 On the other hand, the defense can seem like excuse because the
defendant asserting the defense may have engaged in reasonable but not optimal
or even encourageable behavior.380 The critical point is that under either a
traditional justification or excuse analysis, fulfilling the elements of the defense
would make the defendant not guilty of any crime.
Thus, the most important question regarding the practical effect of the
defense is whether it will exculpate or mitigate. Like the line between
justification and excuse, the division between exculpation and mitigation as it
exists now is quite convoluted and imprecise. As mentioned before in Part IV.B,
the provocation doctrine itself straddles the line between being a method of
negating intent, thereby reducing the level of the homicide offense, and being an
independent reason to determine that the defendant has acted in a less morally
culpable manner. 381  As a defense of intent negation, provocation is
straightforward. It operates like any other evidence the defendant can use to
show he lacked the required intent for first degree murder.382 This is not to say
that the presence of passion actually negates pre-meditation. Certainly, one
versed in the understanding of human cognition could determine that a person
can be both passionate and pre-meditate a murder. The fact is, however, that the
distinction between first-degree and second-degree murder assumes to some
degree that passion and pre-meditation are mutually exclusive. 3 83 Thus, as an
intent inquiry, provocation is not a special doctrine. It operates like any other
is not helpful to this project.
379. See Burke, supra note 8, at 242-43:
Justification defenses operate when the defendant's act is the morally preferred option.
Because justified acts are viewed as objectively preferable. the psychological, subjective
peculiarities of the defendant are generally irrelevant to the application of the justification
defense. In contrast, excuse defenses apply when the act itself is harmful, but when
something about the actor relieves her of moral culpability for the wrongful act.
(internal quotations omitted).
380. This may be in the case where a killing was a reasonable response to wrongful victim
behavior, but other reasonable alternatives were available. This scenario seems to fit excuse better
than justification. Excuse, however, is not often defined this way. Rather, excuse is often confounded
with reasonable mistake. In other words, if the world were as the defendant had believed, the
defendant's acts would have been justified, but the defendant was reasonably mistaken. See Leidholm,
334 N.W.2d at 816 (noting that conduct is not excused if person's actual belief is unreasonable). Thus.
excuse is not necessarily the use of reasonable but sub-optimal methods to achieve an ends. If it were
defined in such a manner, many instances of self-defense, though technically termed "justification,
would have to be re-organized as excuse. See supra note 231 for a discussion of necessity and the
inclusion of viable alternatives.
381. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duality of the
provocation defense.
382. See supra note 127 for a description of how evidence of provocation may negate
premeditation.
383. See State v. Frendak, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1979) (noting that to prove premeditation
evidence must show that killing was not done in "heat of passion"). The issue of whether the law
should draw such an important distinction between premeditation and passion, I leave for another day.
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evidence negating intent. Provocation, in this sense, does not require separate
treatment under the law as a victim liability defense.
As a prescriptive or evaluative defense, the doctrine is more problematic.
As a prescriptive defense, provocation does more than seek to show that the
defendant lacked the requisite pre-meditation for first-degree murder, it seeks to
show that the defendant made a "reasonable" evaluation of the circumstances. 384
This type of provocation doctrine carries with it an element of prescription.
Consequently, the provocation doctrine does more than reduce first-degree
murder to second-degree murder because of lack of mens rea. It operates more
independently as a mitigating defense and reduces first-degree murder to
manslaughter. However, if the existence of adequate provocation shows that the
defendant truly comported with moral norms and acted morally appropriately
under the circumstances, it seems arbitrary that provocation mitigates murder to
manslaughter, rather than mitigating to a lesser charge or exculpating. 385
Perhaps the reason why provocation merely mitigates is that it is
inadequately prescriptive, as argued in Part IV.B. It does not limit its protective
ambit to those people who truly acted morally appropriately. It provides a
defense to those who acted out of passion but made morally inappropriate
judgments. Thus, in discussing why provocation mitigates rather than
exculpates, theorists often refer to the law recognizing "human weakness" and
"loss of self-control" 38 6 but not endorsing acts premised on such weakness.
There are then three types of defenses implicit in current victim liability
law. The first type serves only to negate intent, like any other factor used to
negate intent. On the other end of the spectrum are defenses that truly require
the defendant to comply with prescriptive dictates of morality, for example, self-
defense. These defenses, when met, show that the defendant made morally
appropriate choices under the circumstances and is therefore not morally
culpable for a crime. 38 7 Somewhere unhappily in between is provocation as a
mitigation doctrine. It seeks to be more than just a pure mens rea issue, and in
fact lessens liability more than pure mens rea negation does, but it does not go so
far as to require that the defendant act morally correctly. The problem is that
the mens rea requirement in criminal law already accounts for loss of self-
control. It is not clear why the existence of passion should reduce liability even
more, and why manslaughter is an appropriate level of reduction. Conversely, if
the defendant acts fully in compliance with prescriptive moral norms, by
responding reasonably to provocation, there is no reason to nonetheless impose
a sentence on him. As with perfect self-defense, the defendant should be fully
exculpated. Perhaps, the reason provocation mitigates to manslaughter is that if
384. See supra note 132 and accompanying text for a definition of manslaughter.
385. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of provocation and exculpation.
386. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (commentaries) (1962).
387. See supra notes 384-86 for a discussion of three forms of provocation defenses. I cite self-
defense here which is a justification defense, but the same statement applies to excuse defenses. While
justification defenses are said to create a better state of affairs in society, excuse defenses equally show
the defendant to be not morally culpable, although a better state of affairs was not produced.
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a critic of the provocation rule were to point out that it provides a defense to a
bad people (i.e., abusive wife-killers), then the proponent could simply reply, "it
is not a total defense but just mitigation." This is obviously an unsatisfactory
explanation of the provocation doctrine. Consequently, provocation, as currently
formulated, is problematic in two ways: first, it can unfairly mitigate punishment
of those who should be punished fully by the law; and second, it can mitigate
punishment of those who should be exculpated or receive a greater liability
reduction.
The wrongfulness requirement in the victim liability defense takes care of
the first problem by ensuring that only those defendants who respond to
wrongful victims are eligible for the defense. Perhaps, then, every defendant
who meets the first three requirements of the victim liability defense should be
fully exculpated, and there is no room for mitigation in the law. The complexity
of human behavior and moral norms, I believe, indicates that there must be some
mechanism in the non-specific victim liability defense to grade defendant
behavior. Even when a non-disposed defendant responds to wrongful victim
behavior, there may, nonetheless, be aspects of his conduct that make him
culpable. For example, the defendant may have responded disproportionately
harshly to the wrongful victim conduct. Alternatively, the defendant may have
responded proportionally to the victim conduct but chose the criminal option
when many other viable legal options were available to her. In addition, there is
the issue of mistake of fact, in which the defendant reasonably but mistakenly
believes that the victim has engaged in wrongful conduct and acts based on this
misperception. In each of the above scenarios, as well as others unmentioned,
the jury could conclude that the non-disposed defendant's crime was caused by
wrongful victim conduct (or the perception of it), but that the defendant should
nonetheless be guilty of something. The last prong of the victim liability defense
allows the jury to balance the defendant's conduct against the victim's wrongful
conduct to determine whether and to what extent the defendant is liable for a
crime.38
8
388. Administration of the victim liability defense would be through a jury instruction, much like
self-defense or entrapment. The proposed jury instruction might appear as follows:
1.1 Victim Liability Defense
Read in all cases:
A defense based on the wrongful conduct of the victim has been raised in this case. The
defendant is eligible for this defense if:
1. The victim's conduct was wrongful;
2. The victim's wrongful conduct caused the defendant to commit the [crime charged]; and
3. The defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.
Give if predisposition has been alleged:
The defendant is not eligible for this defense if he/she was predisposed to commit the [crime charged].
The defendant was predisposed if. before the victim's wrongful conduct, the defendant had a readiness
or willingness to commit the [crime charged].
Give in all cases:
If you find that the [crime charged] was caused by the victim's wrongful conduct and that the
defendant was not predisposed to commit the [crime charged], you must balance the defendant's
conduct against the victim's wrongful conduct. Based on your assessment of the defendant's and
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This Part has defined to some extent the parameters of the victim liability
defense and illuminated some of the issues that will arise in applying and refining
the defense. Many of the issues discussed in this section, for example, the
meaning of reasonableness, are age-old antimonies in the law.389 As with any
defense or any legal term, legislatures, judges, and juries will participate in the
struggle to define with precision and fairness the meaning and application of the
non-specific victim liability defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Criminal law pedagogy has changed over the years. While in past times
criminal law courses and writings centered on the relationship between state and
defendant, today, criminal law, in practice and academia, consists in large part of
policy and jurisprudence concerning victims. Victims' rights have come to the
forefront of criminal law and criminology, propelling the once very public area of
criminal law towards privatization. The victim participates in all aspects of the
criminal prosecution, and oftentimes, takes the role of a party more than a
witness. Implicit in the victims' rights phenomenon is a trend toward a
comparative moral assessment of victims and defendants.390 The problem is that
there is no real comparison. The victims' rights movement has relied on an
incomplete and one-sided picture of the victim. Sentencing allocutions present
to the jury the image of the innocent, hurt, damaged victim juxtaposed with the
cold-hearted, unremorseful, animal-like defendant. In society, "victim-talk" pits
victim character against offender character, nearly exclusively to the detriment
of the defendant. 391
This trend towards the "party-victim" and comparative blameworthiness,
ends, however, when it comes to comparing the fault of the victim with the fault
of the defendant in the criminal transaction. The same victims' rights movement
that has elevated the victim to a party, does not look kindly upon any criminal
defense that "blames the victim." The law, in its present form, determines
victim's conduct you must decide whether the defendant is:
1. Guilty of [crime charged];
2. Guilty of [list all lesser included offenses]; or
3. Not guilty.
389. Certainly, the meaning of reasonableness has been debated exhaustively throughout legal
history. See generally Fletcher, supra note 361, at 953 (theorizing that common law reliance on
reasonableness leads to "flat" legal thinking and an ignorance regarding criminal law distinctions);
Gilles, supra note 361, at 816 (evaluating reasonable person standard under Restatement tort law
analysis); Heller, supra note 361, at 88-90 (criticizing objective reasonableness standard in criminal
law); Robinson, supra note 361, at 229 (articulating differences between justification and excuse
defenses for criminal conduct); Schwartz, supra note 361, at 242 (critiquing objective reasonableness
evaluation as unfair to those who generally fail to take proper care).
390. This is most starkly exemplified during sentencing allocution when juries and judges are
invited to compare and contrast the characters of the victim and criminal. See supra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text for a discussion of victim impact statements and the Eight Amendment.
391. Victim talk characterizes the defendant as an ultimately evil, abnormal person and the
victim as a person beyond reproach and doubt. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the less than fair portrayal of both victim and defendant through victim talk.
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presumptively who is to blame in a criminal transaction and who is not. The
party deemed the victim a priori enjoys a panoply of victims' rights and moral
sanctity conferred by society. The party deemed defendant falls into the
amalgamated collection of undesirables that we ought to be "tough on. ' 39 2 The
response to the problem of the one-sided victim is to require the law to take a
more complete view of the victim. Specifically, the law should examine the
victim's contribution to the crime at the liability level.
The current criminal law does account, in specific situations, for the
complexity of fault and behavior contributing to crimes and carves out discrete
areas in which the law may "blame the victim." There is no consistent ordering
principle, however, explaining why certain victim behaviors are grounds for
defense and other are not or why certain crimes are ones to which the defenses
apply and others are not.393 In addition, there is a tendency in the criminal law
to view everything as a defendant mens rea issue and not a question of
comparative fault, unlike tort law. This tendency leads to several problems
discussed in Part IV. As I illustrate, the focus on victim liability as a defendant
mens rea issue can negatively impact disempowered groups as victims, precisely
because it makes criminal law a mere reflection of the defendant's or even
society's current predilections, which are influenced by the existence of
patriarchal, racist, and homophobic "norms. ' 394 By engaging in comparative
blameworthiness analyses, the law can act in a more prescriptive manner and
determine not so much whether the defendant, based on wrongful or legitimate
victim behavior, was subjectively or even objectively moved to commit a crime,
but rather whether the victim's behavior was sufficiently wrongful to excuse the
defendant's actions. Finally, certain technical requirements of self-defense
arbitrarily exclude those defendants, like battered women, who respond to
delayed yet inevitable attacks from wrongful victims. The non-specific victim
liability defense remedies this problem by eliminating imminence and strict
necessity requirements and replacing them with more logically sound
requirements.
As a consequence, the non-specific victim liability defense is justified on
dual grounds. It allows the criminal law to take a more complete view of the
victim, thereby countering the problem inherent in the privatization trend. In
addition, the defense refines the current law in desirable ways. This Article is
392. Politics and media in no small part have added to society's tough on crime sentiments.
Gerald Uelmen comments: "[Plolitical leaders with ambitions for higher office become so obsessed
with maintaining a 'tough on crime' image they measure every decision in terms of media labels that
might be hung around their necks." Gerald F. Uelmen. Victims' Rights in California, 8 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 197, 203 (1992) (footnote omitted).
393. See Gobert, supra note 11. at 540 (discussing inconsistent nature of victim precipitation
defenses).
394. See Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in
Jurisprudential Perspective. 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 117 (2001) ("There certainly is good reason to
be circumspect about the ultimate value of the rule of law to the quest for a truly rational social world
and good reason as well to be aware of the connections between existing rule of law norms and
exploitation, patriarchy. and so forth.").
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the first of an on-going project to construct and refine the non-specific victim
liability defense. The last section of this Article began the process of defining
the contours and applications of the defense. Unavoidably, many questions
remain. Left to further discussion are the meanings of various requirements of
the defense and the operation of the defense in the criminal law. In addition, the
issue of the penological bases for the defense, that is, whether the defense is
based in retributive concerns, utilitarian goals, or something else remains to be
examined. Also to be explored are the similarities and differences between the
non-specific victim liability defense and victim liability defenses in tort law. I
look forward to discussing these issues and further refining the meaning of the
defense's terms in future papers. What this Article has demonstrated is that
comparative fault has a definite place in the criminal law and is a logical
response to the trend toward criminal law privatization. The reluctance of the
law to embrace a singular concept of comparative blame has led to some tricky
practical, doctrinal, and social problems. This Article is a step in the direction of
the criminal law honestly and logically recognizing comparative blame and
beginning to formulate doctrines that more accurately represent our moral
sensibilities.
